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vSYNOPSIS
This thesis argues that Western theories of labour-management,
which are predominantly neoclassical, do not capture the major
economic forces operating at both firm and macro levels. Consequently
the conclusions derived from the theory are often incorrect and
also lead to erroneous policy prescriptions, both for the cooperative
working wi t.hi.n capitalism, and for the labour-managed economy.
The thesis opens with a summary of neoclassical theories of the
labour-managed firm, and theories of cooperative failure. The validity
of these theories are tested using evidence drawn from the C.P.F.
cooperatives and a sample of similar capitalist firms over the period
1950-79. The evidence lends very little support to the theories.
The following chapters describe the actual experience of the
cooperatives and capitalist firms over the thirty years, and concludes
that the major differences between the C.P.F. cooperatives and capitalist
firms are missing from neoclassical models.
The final section of the thesis considers macro economic
theori.es of the Labour=managed economy. It is argued that the failure
of neoclassical analysists to present convincing macro economic
theories of labour management is because of the rift between conventional
micro and macro economics. The introduction of labour management is
a change at the firm level, i.e. micro economic level which, using
conventional economic theory, cannot be traced through to the macro
economic level.
As an alternative, Sraffa's analysis of a capitalist economy
is adapted to labour management. This allows an analysis of how
vi
changes at the firm level effect macro economic conditions.
The results derived from the application of a Neo-Ricardian
model are found to be very different from those produced by neo-
classical analysis. In the final chapter it is noted that existing
empirical studies of Yugoslavia which claim to provide evidence
of the behaviour predicted by neoclassical models do not provide
conclusive evidence.
The conclusion contrasts the policy prescriptions derived from
neoclassical analysis of lapour management, with recommendations
derived from the alternative analysis presented in this thesis.
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1INTHODUCTION
In this thesis it is argued that Western theories of labour-
management, which are predominantly neoclassical, do not capture the
major economic forces operating at both firm and macro ~evels. Con-
sequcntly thc conclusions derived from the theory are often incorrect
and also lead to erroneous policy prescriptions, both for the coopera-
tive working within capitalism, and for the labour-managed economy.
An alternative analysis of the workings of labour management is
suggested, based on a more realistic understanding of the behaviour
of firms in a marl<et economy. Next, Sraffa's method of describing a
capitalist economy is adapted to the case of labour management. This
enables a more valid comparison of the theoretical performance of
the labour-managed and capitalist economies. Furthermore, his method
can easily be adapted to assist in an understanding of the economic
problems faced by Yugoslavia today.
The usual method employed by Western economists writing on
labour-management is to substitute the standard assumption of profit
maximization by a capitalist firm with that of maximization of income
per member for the labour managed firm. All other neoclassical
assumptions arc retained.
1Since Ward's initial article in 1958, the theory of labour
management has developed along predictable lines, mirroring that
followed by the theory of the firm. Thus, the literature first
described simple one period optimization models, and more recently
has advanced into the fields of utility, uncertainty, and inter-
temporal maximization. The most important conclusions derived
2from th8 neoclassical theory of labour management are briefly
discussed in Chapter 1.
A major concern of the literature has been to compare the
behaviour and efficiency of the theoretical labour managed and
capitalist enterprise. Using neoclassical theory, the labour
managed firm compares badly with its capitalist counterpart.
As explained in Chapter 2, we need drop only one assumption about
the capitalist firm to remove the theoretical differences in the per-
formance of the two types of enterprises. This assumption is that
the level of wages paid by capitalist firms is determined in the
nlarket, and that employees cannot influence the level of their wages.
An important strand of Western theories of labour management has
been concerned with explaining the apparent failure of cooperatives
working under capitalism. These explanations include both neoclassical
models and more pragmatic analysis. The literature on failure is
outlined in Chapter 3.
Chapters 4 to 6 set out to test empirically the Western theories
of labour management described in the first three chapters. A sample
of British cooperatives is compared with a sample of capitalist firms
from 1950 to 1979. The capitalist firms chosen ma~ufactured the same
products and worked in the same location as the sample of cooperatives.
The samples of cooperatives and capitalist firms are described in
Appendix 3.
The cooperatives studied were all members of the Cooperative
Producers Federation (C.P.F.). These cooperatives were selected be-
cause they had been operating long enough for any distinctive qualities
of labour management to be distinguished from the formidable start-
up problems still being faced by most British cooperatives.
3The C.P.F. cooperatives have often been criticised for failing
to meet what many consider the most basic requirement of labour manage-
ment, i.e. that only workers ma~ be members. The C.P.F. cooperatives
have external members and it has been argued that this characteristic
may cause them to behave like profit-maximizing firms.
External shareholders of C.P.F. cooperatives, however, may only
receive a fixed rate of interest on their shares, so that even if
they pursue profit maximization they cannot benefit from the profit
so achieved. This leads one to expect that even external members,
who are nearly always other cooperatives, trade unions, and ex-employees,
would not inevitably aim for maximum profits.
Furthermore, as will be argued in Chapter 8, in reality it
is not differences in the maximand which result in the different
experiences of cooperatives and capitalist firms working under capitalism.
The real difficulties faced by cooperatives are very adequately
illustrated by the experiences of the C.P.F. cooperatives.
The empirical evidence presented in Chapters 4 to 6 is entirely
within the framework of existing theories of labour management. The
conclusion from the evidence is that neither neoclassical or other
western theories have had any success in explaining the experiences
of the C.P.F. cooperatives. Secondly, the one assumption about capitalist
firms that distinguishes them from labour managed firms in neoclassical
theory, i.e. that wages are fixed, is not supported by the evidence.
Chapters 7 and 8 go on to describe the actual experiences of the
cooperatives and capitalist firms from 1950 to 1979, and of the industries
in which they operated. A study of the evidence leads to the conclusion
that neoclassical theories fail to captUl~e the dominant forces acting
on enterprises.
Most firms are caught in a continuous struggle to maintain
their outlets. This is usually achieved by growing ever larger. Rather
than harmonious production by equal competitors, a market economy
is typified by unfair rivalry between unequal competitors. We cannot
rely on the most efficient firms to survive, nor can the action of
individual firms be expected to benefit the community at large.
Chapter 8 concludes that this view of how the market operates is much
more successful in explaining both the response of the C.P.F. cooperatives
to chan8ing economic conditions, and the reason why so many failed.
Macro economic theories of labour management have generally
taken micro economic predictions and simply applied them to macro
economic conditions. Such a methodology would usually be considered
unacceptable when analysing a capitalist economy. \Aihythen has this
method been followed for labour management?
The answer lies in the inexplicable rift between western theories
of micro and macro economics. The failure to make any link between
the two levels of the economy points once more to the doubtful validity
of neoclassical methods. The introduction of labour management is
a change at the firm level. Since the dominant western economic
theory is unable to link firm behaviour to macro economic conditions,
western writers were forced to apply micro economic methods to macro
issues. Part C sets out to bridge this gap.
By the end of Part B a picture has emerged of firms in constant
struggle. They struggle over both the division of surplus within
firms between labour and capital, and over the division of surplus
between firms. Sraffa's analysis is well able to capture both of
these charucteristics.2
5Chapter 9 adapts Steedman's discussion of Sraffa3 to the case
of labour-management. In this chapter the unrealistic assumption
of an equal profit rate across all firms is maintained. This
assumption is analagous to the neoclassical assumption of fixed
wages and zero long-term profits. It therefore enables a comparison
of the theoretical differences between capitalism and labour management
from a neoclassical and neo-Ricardian perspective. It also allows
a simple base to be built from which more realistic discussions are
developed in Chapters 10 and 11. Chapter 9 concludes that neo-
classical models of labour management have been misguided when they
present labour-management as more inefficient and more inegalitarian
than a capitalist system. In fact, in theory at least, labour
management is fundaGentally more efficient and egalitarian in every
respect.
Chapter 10 builds on this Neo Ricardian model of labour manage-
ment to predict differences that might be expected between the macro
economic behaviour of the labour managed and capitalist economies.
In Chapter 11 some of the economic problems faced by Yugoslavia are
discussed. Literature explaining Yugoslavia's experiences from a
neoclassical perspective are contrasted with a neo-Ricardian perception
of the forces at work.
In the conclusion it is argued that Western theories of labour
management have resulted in policy recommendations which could be
damaging both for cooperatives working within capitalism, and for
economies aiming for universal labour management.
FOOTNOTES TO INTRODUCTION
1. WARD, B. (1958) "The Firm in Illyria: Market Syndicalism"
American Economic Review, Vol. 48.
2. SRAFFA, P. (1960), "Production of Commodities by Means of
Commodities". Cambridge University Press.
3. STEEDMAN, I. (1977) "Marx after Sraffa". New Left Books.
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PART A:
,
NEOCLASSICAL THEORIES OF LABOUR MANAGEMENT
7CHAPTER 1
l'x'EOCLASSICALTHEORIES OF LABOUR HANAGEMENT
Th e following is a brief and uncritical survey of the main
issues covered by neoclassical theories of labour-management."
Hathematical proofs are rarely included as they are readily avail-
able in the publications referred to. The pure L.M.F. described in
these theories has the following characteristics:l
(a) All, and only, workers in the firm are members of the firm.
(b) The members of the firm enjoy the usufruct of the assets of
the enterprise, but do not own.them.
(c) All decisions about the operation of the firm are made
democratically by all members of the firm.
(d) The net income of the firm (i.e. revenue minus all non-
labour costs) is shared equally between all members of the
firm.
(e) The firm operates under a fully decentralised market mechanism.
(f) There is complete freedom of employment so that all workers
may move freely between firms, and firms may admit and shed
members as desired.
Needless to say, no firm exists which could satisfy all these
conditions. Many authors have considered the consequences of removing
one or more of these conditions. We shall begin, however, with a
description of the pure L.M.F.
1. The Objective Function-~ ..•_--
Neoclassical theories of labour-management are almost a replica
of neoclassical theories of the firm. One characteristic distinguishes
-the L.N.F. from the C.F. This is the objective function. The L.M.F.
8is assumed to maximize income per worker as opposed to profit. Some
models replace this objective with utility maximization. Members'
utility functions will include their income, but may also include
hours vlOrked, intensity of effort, congenial surroundings, etc.
The intention of most authors has been to compare the behaviour
and efficiency of the L.M.F. with the C.F. Although many authors
have made efforts to adapt models of the L.M.F. so that they may
better describe firms in existence, the standard used for comparison
is nearly always the pure profit maximizing C.F.
Following this system we may now compare the two objective
functions. For a firm with only one output, X, and labour input L,
plus two more inputs capital, K, and materials, M, then the C.F.'s
objective function is:
Max)( = (1.1 )
Subject to the continuous and concave production function:-
x = F(L,M,K) (1.2)
where:
Tt = Profits; P = Output price; P = Price of one unitx m
of materials; Pk = Rent of one unit of capital per production period;
W = the wage rate.
The pure L.M.F., on the other hand, has the following objective
function:
(p X - P M - PkK)
Max Y x m- L
Where Y = income per worker.
(1. 3)
(Subj(~ctto the sarneproducti0:1 f'unct.i.ou ) .
It is a well krown result of neoclassical theory that the C.F.
will combine inputs in proportions to satisfy the condition that
= = (1.4)
Differentiating equation (1.3) we find that the first order
conditions for an L.M.F. maximum are:
oY L PXFL - YI.
E.L = = 0 or PXFL = YL2
6y PXFM - PM = 0 or PXFM = PM
bM = L
by PXFK - PK
0 or PXFK = PKbK -- L -
(1.5)
(1.6)
(1.7)
It has been shown elsewhere2 that the second order conditions for
a maximum are also met by equations (1.5), (1.6) and (1.7). These
three equations may be restated as:
= (1.8)
These conditions are almost exactly those described for the C.F.
in equation (1.4). Just like the C.F., the L.M.F. w:'_llemploy all units,
including labour, up to the point where the value of the marginal
Product of each factor is equal to its "price". The difference is
that the price of labour, Y, is determined within the model rather
than exogenously (see Chapter ~).
Initially the change in the objective function may appear to have
very little effect on the model. It is, however, responsible for
producing behaviour among model L.M.F.'s which is quite different from
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the model C.F. These differences are outlined below.
2. The Point of Production
The pure L.M.F. will face a limited number of points on the production
function at which it would choose to operate. The limited alter-
natives available to the L.M.F. is the result of the determination of
each member's income within the model. The neoclassical C.F. accepts
an ex.ogenously determined wage rate, W. Any surplus left over after
payment to factors will be distributed as profits. The L.H.F. fac.es
the added constraint that payments to factors must exhaust the value
of the product. From (L.3)we see that
= YL + PJ1 (1. 9)
Substituting conditions (1.5), (1.6) and (1.7), then
= (1. 10)
or
(1. 11)
It is well known that(1.ll) could only hold at points on the
production function which are locally linearly homogeneous. 3Vanek
describes the locus of such points for different levels of output as
"the locus of maximum phys ieal efficiency". Thus, the L .M..F. always
aims to produce at the point of (instantaneous) constant returns to
scale, where the average cost per unit of output is minimized.
It is easy to see that the profit maximizing C .F., working under
the same conditions, will only combine factors in the same proportions
"as the L.M.F. when it is not earning a profit, i.e. when payments to
factors exhaust the value of the product. So it is an inevitable
conclusion that, when the C.F. is operating under general equilibrium,
when perfect competiti.on has forced it to the point of zero profits
and local constant returns to scale, the L.M.F. and C.F. will produce
at the same scale using the same factor proportions. More than one
author has in fact shown that the general equilibrium solution of the
4 5L.M.E. and the C.E. will be the same in every respect. '
Differences ~n the long-run equilibrium of the two types of
firms could only occur under conditions in which the C.F. continued
to earn a profit. v,Thenthe C.F. can make a profit, then its L.N.F.
replica would be able to convert its potential profit into additional
income for its members. Consequently the income of L.M.F. members
would be above the prevailing capitalist wage ratp. The reverse would
be true when the C.F. is making a loss.
The above analysis has been extended to conditions of imperfect
C
•• 6ompet~t~on. The conclusions remain the same, with the exception
that the L.M.F. would now choose to operate at a point of inc.reasing
rather than constant returns to scale.
Meade7 has pointed out that if the L.M.F. is operating under a
production function with constant returns to scale, then the L.M.F.
will be concerned only to adjust its factor ratios to the desired
proportions. It will, however, be indifferent to the scale of output.
This is because the maximum income per worke r wi11 be the same at any
point along the locus of maximum physical efficiency.
It rs a we Ll known result that the C.F. operating under constant
returns to scale and earning a profit will attempt to increase output
wi thout limit. The L'M'F" O? the other hand, would be content to
stay at the same scale. This led Vanek to conclude that monopoly
power would be less of a problem in an L.M.E.8
Recently several papers have appeared which consider the behaviour
9of the L.M.F. facing price uncertainty in the product market. TI1ey
all take a similar approach and reach the same conclusions. The firm
no longer aims to maximize income, but rather utility, which ~s a
function of expected inc~me. As a result of price uncertainty, the
risk averse L,M.F. will employ more labour and produce a larger output
for a given level of fixed assets than its L.H.F. tw in operating
with a certain price. This result is quite the opposite from the model
C.F., which has been found to opt for a smaller output in risky
conditions.
These results are very much dependent on the assumption that
there are only two inputs, K and L. As shown in the section on short-
run behaviour, such perversity is far less likely when other inputs
may be varied.
3. The Short-Run
WardlO was the first person to discuss the short-run behaviour
of the L..M.F. He took his definition of the short-run from standard
neoclassical analysis, i.e. some period of time during which capital
is fixed, but other inputs may be varied.
Ward's model L.M.F. contained only two inputs, labour and capital.
From equation (1.5)we know that in eq_uilibrium Y = (1. 5)
13
But it 1S always true that
therefore
y X=Px L
Now we can
(1.12)
ask how the L.M.F. would respond in the short-run to an
increase 1n the price of capital, PK. A rise in PK will increase the
final term in equa tion (1.12) ,and so, Y/Px will fall. In order to
return to an equilibrium in which Y/PX = FL, the l.m.f. must adjust L
so as to reduce FL'
concave, i.e. FLL < 0, then the firm must increase its labour force,
Since the production function is taken to be
and as a result output will also rise. This result is very different
from the model c.f., which may be expected to maintain a constant
output when Prises.
K
Similarly, an increase in the output price Px will increase the
right hand side of (1.12) •. ~onsequently the L.M.F. must reduce labour,
and therefore output, in order to return to equilibrium. This is the
much discussed "perverse" behaviour of the L.M.F. Thus, neoclassical
analysis predicts that the L.M..F. would have a backward sloping supply
curve in the short-run.
4. Explaining away the Short-Run Perversity of the L.N .F.
The prediction of a backward sloping supply curve for the L.M.F.
Was apparently too much even for neoclassical supporters to swallow. ,
Consequently a great-deal of effort has been expended on explaining
why it might not occur.
Domarll extended the model to include inputs, other than
labour, which wou ld be variable in the short-run. He showed that
the addition of other ~ariable inputs would produce a positive supply
curve unless labour was a very substantial component of variable costs.
Even so, labour would still be cut back in response to a rise in out-
put price (or a fall in the cost of capital). Output would be increased
by substituting other variable inputs for labour.
If the L.M.F. produces more than one output, then labour may be
increased with an increase in the price of one output, although this
is not certain. However, production of the output in question sh()ulddefinitel~
increase in response to a rise 1n its price.
12Domar used another ploy to escape the "perverse" short-run
behaviour of the L.M.F., this was the supply schedule of labour. In
this version he took the membership as fixed, but the hours and
intensity of work as variable. As long as the supply of labour
schedule is positive, then the hours or effort of labour will increase
with the price of output, and the supply schedule will be positive.
Damar Is scheme may 'be seen as one form of the utility-maximizing
models of the L.M.F. These models assume that L.M.F. members maximise
'1' f' . . 1 hei b h . bI 13a uta i ty unc t i on con tai.m.ngnot on y t e i r ancome ut ot er varia es.
Domar's labour supply schedule is equivalent to a cooperative with fixed
membership maximizing a utility function containing income and hours
worked. This is exactly the model described by Berman and Berman14,
who'claim, like Domar, that the perverse behaviour of the L.H.F. in
the short-run will disappear under these conditions.
1 15 . . d hI' 1'"Ire and and Law - have po~nte out t at t1~S cone us~on ~s ~ncorrect,
and that the direction of change in labour hours (and therefore in
output) depends on how far the income effect of a rise in earning per
hour outweigm the substitution effect between income and hours. In
effect, cooperative members ~~y have a backward sloping supply curve of
labour. Even with fixed membership, therefore, a rise in the price of
output may induce a fall in the hours worked.
Once a flexible membership is reintroduced into the utility
function model the direction of change in output becomes even more
confused. It does, however, remain certain that membership would be
reduced in response to a rise in output price,16 although total hours
worked may increa.se.
It is clear that a number of writers have tended to assume that
the "short-run" for the L.M.F. as rather different from the C.F., in
that labour as well as capital will be fixed. Why should this be so?
Many authors rely on the intuitive argument that cooperative members
will be mot.ivated to support each other, and therefore loathe to
throw their colleagues out of work ,
17Vanek employed tf;islogio to overcome the predictions of L.M.F.
perversity. He introduced the "social short-run" ~n which both labour
and capi tal are fixed. He justified this by argu.ing that, "in a
system~lere labour ~s not bnly the principal beneficiary but also the
sole manager of the productive efforts of the enterprise, it makes a
good deal of sense to speak and think in terms of categories involving
a constant labour force."
16
R 1 S 'h d' 18 h bl' h d '.ecent y tei n err an Thi sse ave pu 1S e a more mgorous
justification for a fixed labour force in the short-run. TIleymodified
the objective function of the·L.M.F. to take account of the risk to
workers of being made redundant, and assumed that those members who
are to be layed-off are determined by a rRndom process. They used
two methods to introduce the risk of redundancy into the model.
Either members are assumed to maximize their "expected" utility,
which is a function of their earnings while in employment;and their
earr.i ngs when Laye d+o f f , weighted respectively by the probability of
retention or redundancy. Alternatively workers who remain with the
firm are assumed to be obliged to fully compensate those who leave
for their loss of income. Either way, the authors illustrate that
the L.M.F. would never decide to lay-off workers. In the long run,
however, labour may be reduced through attrition.
A number of authors have dismissed predictions of L.M.F. perversity
by dropping conditions (a) or (d) of the pure L.M.F. as described on
page 1.
Domar19 discards condition (a), and assumes that cooperatives
hire non-members at a fixed wage rate. This is frequently practised
among western cooperatives. Basically the cooperative is now equivalent
to a capitalist firm which is owned by a fixed number of its workers.
It is not surprising, then, that Domar finds that such an arrangement
would lead cooperatives to behave just like a C.F. in the short-run.
-,Meade20 and Carson21 resol.vethe problem by removing characteristic
(d) of the L.M.F., i.e., that all members are paid equally. Meade
builds a model in which new members are given a smaller share in the
coop than existing members. Carson argues that cooperativeE'
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often justify such tlinegalitarianll arrangements by reasoning that
they are rewarding length of service or different skills. The end
result is little different fr~m cooperatives which hire workers.
Under both systems new workers may be recruited at the prevailing
wage rate which, if the C.F. twi.nis earning a profit, would be
below the rate earned by existing members. A rise in the product
price could therefore stimulate old members to recruit new workers
as this would improve their own 1ncome. The cooperative would
consequently display a positive supply curve.
22Next we come to Horvat ,a Yugoslav economist, who hastened to
dispute predictions that the L.M.F., and by implication Yugoslav
firms, would behave at all strangely. He pointed out that in Yugo-
slavia firms always fix wages at the beginning of the period. The
same is true for most western cooperatives. Horvat argued that once
wages are fixed then firms would maximize profits over and above all
costs, including wages. The end result would be a firm that behaved
just like the traditional capitalist firm.
Although Horvat may be right in arguing that wages are fixed at
the beginning of a production period, the behaviour of the L.M.F. will
depend on how wages are determined for each period. It seems reasonable
to expect that wages will be adjusted in relation to the size of the
profit in the previous period.
V k d M· . 23 d d H' b . thane an 10V1C respon e to orvat s paper y trac1ng e
path'of a firm following Horvat's profit maximizing rule. TIley
introduced various formulas for adjusting the wag e rate. The simplest
model is when wages are adjusted upwards if profits were positive in
the previous perio~ and vice versa if they were negative. Equilibrium
will be finally reached when the wage rate does not change, which
can only occur when profits are zero. Obviously, then, the final
equilibrium must be exactly the same as in the income maximizing
model, on the locus of maximum physical efficiency, where payments
to factors exhaust the product.
Applying the Vanek and Miovic wage adjustment rule, we can
see that a rise in product price may eventually result in a fall in
labour and output. The question is now empirical. Which adjusts
more quickly, wages or capital? If wages adjust more slowly than
capital, then the concept of a "short-run" adjustment among L.M.F.'s
disappears. It seems likely that both labour and capital will be
d . d h Th . . . db' 24a JUS te toget er. 1S poin t 1S rna eyEs tr1I1 ,"'ho overcomes
the problem of perverse behaviour among L.M.F. 's by arguing that the
"short-run" is not a relevant concept to labour-management.
Finally, it should be noted, that the existence of imperfect
competition may produce a forward sloping supply curve among L.M.F.'s.
Once the assumption of perfect competition and a given product price
is dropped, then the direction of response in the short-run becomes
indeterminate. Meade25 reached the following conclusions:-
(a) that an elasticity preserving increase in demand would reduce
..
the output of an L.M.F. working with only two inputs.
(b) If the elasticity of demand rose sufficiently as a result of
a rise in demand, then the L.M.F., even with only two inputs,
may increase its output.
(c) As under perfect competition, a reduction 1n a lump sum tax
or the price of fixed capital will reduce the optimal level of
output.
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5. The Long-Run
The long-run response of the L.M.F. to changes Ln exogenous
26variables has been thoroughly analysed by Vanek. In general the
direction of response of the firm is impossible to predict when the
price of output changes. As in the short-run, a change in fixed
costs, such as a lump-sum tax, 'will result in output moving in the
opposite direction from the C.F.
Although the absolute direction of the L.M.F. response in the
long-run cannot be determined within a neoclassical f ramewo rk, it
is possible to determine the direction of relative differences Ln the
response ofC.F. 's and L.M.F. 's in the long-run. This will be
examined in Chapter 2.
The long-run behaviour of the L.M.F. has not attracted a lot of
attention Ln the literature for two reasons. Firstly, because the
direction of change is indeterminate, and, second because, unlike
in the short-run, perverse behaviour did not appear inevitable. The
issue central to long-run analysis of the L.M.F. has instead been
that of efficiency.
6. Efficiency in the Labour-Managed Economy
A perennial concern of 'neoclassical economists wr i.t i.ngabout
labour management is the fact that, even in the long-run when all
inputs may be fully adjusted, the marginal product of labour will not
be equalised across firms. Domar writes that under the pure Lncome-
maximising model "there is a definite misallocation of labour.,,27
While Meade also noted that the long-run equilibrium of the L.M.E.
1• " P -. l' ." 28s aareto non-opt1.ma sLtuatLon The L.M.E. is therefore
inefficient because resources could be rearranged to make everyone
better-off.
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Why is the marginal product of labour not equalised throughout the
economy? This occurs because Y, members' l.ncome, is determined within
the L.M.F. This will be explained in more detail in Chapter 2. In the
neoclassical model of the capitalist system wage rates are determined
outside of the firm by the labour market. Consequently wages are
assumed to be made equal as a result of the clearing of the labour
market.
Not only is the long-run position of the L.M.E. thought to be
inefficient, but it will also have adverse effects on equality,
employment and growth.
The problem of inequalities is quite straightforward. If the labour-
market does not clear: then the members in some coops will be better
off than those in others.
A corollary of this problem is the prediction that L.M.F. 's will
Opt for a higher rate of capital intensity than the C.F. As demand
expands and the price of the L.M.F. output rises, then members' income
"'ill increase. This will raise the implicit cost of labour relative
to other inputs, and the L;'M.F. will tend to substi tute away from
labour into capital. This process is explained in more detail in
Chapter 2.
The choice of a more capital intensive technique ,,,illresult in
the L.M.F. recruiting less labour than its capitalist twin and also
expanding output less. The net result has been predictions of unemploy-
. 29ment and slow growth rates in L.H.E. 'so
These predictions for the long-run L.H.E. assume, of course, that
the L.H.E. has not reached the point of General Equilibrium. He saw in
section 2, that in General Equilibrium the output and employment of
eaGh L.M.F. will be exactly the same as its C.F. twin. For this
reason Meade has emphasised the importance of free entry of new firms into
the L.M.E. Entry of new firms into an industry in which earnings are
above the average should force members' incomes down to a more acceptable
rate. Meade writes that, "it is thus clear that the competitive pressures
of free entry playa much more important role in a cooperative than they
30do in an Entrepreneurial system."
7. Under-Investment in the Labour Managed Firm
We have so far assumed that the pure L.M.F. hires capital equipment
at the rate of PK per unit of capital per production period. This allowed
us to reach the standard conclusion that, in equilibrium, the L.M.F. will
employ capital up to the point where the value of its marginal product
equals its cost, i.e. PXFx = PK (see equation 1.7).
In reality both capitalist firms and cooperatives generally purchase ,
rather than hire, the majority of their capital equipment. Usually the
return from these fixed assets will continue for several years. Enter-
prises must, therefore, forego income today in order to finance production
in the future. Two issues'arise from this.
If members of the L.M.F. had not financed a new investment they
could have deposited the unspent money in a savings account and earned
the rate of interest, i. Alternatively, they could borrow funds to
finance the investment, and pay interest at rate i on the loan. The
, j.. ,~
cost of an Lnvestment in K units of capital, at price PF per unit, which
operates for N years may be written as PFK (1 + i)N. The present value
of the cost is therefore PFK (1 + i)N/(l + i)N = PFK.
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Suppose that the investment (for ease of illustration) is
equally productive for each of the N years. Each year the production
function X = F(K,L) applies. At the end of the first year output of
value PXX will be received. The present value of this output is PXX
(1 + i)
After the next year another PxX will be received. The present
value of this will be PXX
(1+i)2
and so on for N years.
The problem faced by the L.M.F. is to maximize the present value
of their income, i.e.
pxX{~) + (~)2 ••.(~N} - PFK
LMax Y = (1.13 )
Differentiating we find that
= = 0 (1.14)
Thus, in equilibrium, the L.M.F. will invest up to the point where,
(1.15 )
The left-hand side of (1.15) will decrease as i is increased. Thus,
as the rate of interest increases, so the equilibrium marginal product
of capital, FK, must increase to return the firm to equilibrium. This
is the standard result that a firm will decrease its level of investment
as the rate of interest rises.
So far the result is no different from that of the standard
neoclassical C.F. The conditions for the L.M.F. diverge when we take
account of cooperative rules on ownership of assets.
Many members may exp~ct to leave or retire from the firm before
N years are up. Consequently they will leave before receiving the full
return on their investment. Exactly the same is true of shareholders in
capitalist firms who may well sell their shares before the Nyears
are completed.
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In theory capitalist shareholders may recoup the unearned income
from their investment via the appreciated value of their shares. A
similar scheme is available to some cooperative members. In Mondragon,
for example, members may withdraw their share of the assets on leaving
the coop. Under British law, however, cooperative shares may only be
sold at their nominal value and assets may not be withdrawn by departing
members. This may give rise to what Vanek terms "the under-investment
force.,,31
If the members have a time horizon H, which is less than the time
taken for a full return on investment, N, then the L.M.F. maximand
becomes,
Max Y = + (1~i)2 +... +(1+f) H} - PFK
L
(1.16)
or [1 1 1;1, P
FK~1+i) +(1+i)2 + •.. +(1+i)HJ = pF
X
The term containing iin (1.17) will be less than in (1.15) as long as
(1.17)
H < N (See Appendix 1 for a proof of this). Therefore, if the members I
time horizon is less than the investment period, 1.M.F. members will set the
value of the marginal product of capital above the rate chosen by capitalist
firms. The L.M.F. will, therefore, choose to invest less than its
capitalist twin.
In Yugoslavia, firms do.not legally own their fixed assets, but
merely have the right to use them. In practice they must pay for new
investment by taking loans or through internal financing just like
capitalist firms. There are two differences. When workers leave a
Yugoslav firm they cannot take or sell a share of the assets, as they
have no rights to them. Second, Yugoslav law requires members to maintain
24
the book value of the capital assets of the firm. In other words,
once they increase the written down value of fixed assets, they must
maintain the assets at that level in perpetuity. The only way that
they can avoid this is by transferring the assets to another firm.
In effect, the Yugoslav firm must pay a depreciation "tax" at the
rate ~ on any net investment.32
In a number of articles, Furubotn and Rejovich33 have illustrated
why, even without limited time horizons, Yugoslav property laws may
induce under-investment. The Yugoslav firm will aim to maximize:
Y =
1
+ (1+i)2 (L18)
L
where £ is the present value of the annual rate of depreciation which
must be set aside in order to maintain the value of the assets, K.
The conditions for a maximum will be,
+ ••• + = (1.19 )
Once again the L.M.F. will choose to fix the marginal product of
capital above the capitalist rate described in (1.15). Capitalist
shareholders working under Yugoslav property laws should see the payment
ofL\ reflected in a permanent appreciation of the value of their
shares. They need not, therefore, include S as a cost in their maximand.
8. Conclusion
This completes the brief survey of neoclassical literature on
lab~ur-management. This is by no means an exhaustive survey. It does,
however, cover all the major topics, especially those which make clear-
cut predictions about the behaviour of the L.M.F. and the L.M.E.
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CHAPTER 2
AN ENDOGENOUS WAGE RATE IN THE NEOCLASSICAL MODEL
We saw in Chapter 1 that ~he neoclassical model predicts that
the labour managed firm will behave very differently from its
capitalist twin. The explanation generally offered for this differ-
ence is that the L.M.F. pursues income rather than profit
maximization.
The purpose of this chapter is to show that the difference
predicted between these two enterprises is simply the result of
the questionable neoclassical assumption that wages in a C.F.
are entirely determined without the firm, i.e. in the labour
market. This is true even when we extend the analysis to include
utility maximization by the L.M.F.
If we remove this assumption, and assume that pressures from
the labour force, society, or government, forces firms to relinquish
part of a potential increase in profits as wages, then predicted
differences in the behaviour of the L.M.F. and C.F. will disappear.
The implications of comparing the behaviour of the L.M.F.
with a C.F. facing an endogenous wage rate has often been recognised
in the literature. Ireland and Law comment that "we must recognise
that even in'capitalist economies the earnings of workers of similar
quality may differ greatly which suggests that the neoclassical
model of PM-firms (Profit Maximizing) hiring homogenous labour
at a given wage is a significant over-simplification .•.. Thus
the differences between PM and LM-economies may be differences
. 1In degree rather than kind." Estrin also accepted that "if
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trade unions (under capitalism) can absorb some proportion of profits
into wages, there will be interfirm wage dispersion so the systems
(CE & LME) differ quantitatively rather than qualitatively.,,2
1. Short-Run Behaviour of the L.M.F.
We will now look at the short-run comparative statics of
the L.M.F. in more detail. The style of much of this section follows
3the analysis used by Domar.
The pure income maximizing L.M.F. faces the following problem:-
Max Y = (2.1)
subject to the production function
x = F (K,M,L) (2.2)
The first order conditions for a maximum in the short-run when K is
fixed are:-
FM ;::PM/PX
PXX _ PMM _ PKK
(2.3)
= (2.4)
For the C.F. the equivalent first order conditions are:
(2.5)
F - W/PL - X (2.6)
To find the effect of a change in the output price, PX' equations
(2.3) and (2.4) or (2.5) and (2.6) must be differentiated with
respect to PX' The result is:
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FM~M + F'ML bL -- -PM = - FM (2.7)6 Px oPx Px2 Px
for both types of enterprise
FLM bM FLL bL - W - F+ = = L (2.8)bPx bPx PX2 Px
for the C.F.
FLM 6M + FLL 6L
PMM PKK
= FMM + FKK (2.9)&PX
= + -- --
bPX PX2L PX2L PXL PXL
for the L.M.F.
Using the subscripts Sand C to denote the labour managed and capitalist
firms respectively, we may solve equations (2.7), (2.8) and (2.9) to
find the change in L as the result of the change in PX•
> 0 (2.10)
We know (2.10) to be positive, given the neoclassical assumption
of a concave production function.
For the L.M.F. we have:-
6Lbp S =
X
< 0 (2.11)
FLMFML)
The difference in the response of the two types of enterprise may be
written as:
6L
cSP S
le .c.0 (2.12)
In other words,
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bL S < 6L C
6Px bPx
that is, that the L.M.F. increases L (in fact decreases L) less in
response to an increase in output price than does the C.F.
The meaning of the term in (2.12) may be better understood
by looking at the effects on the C.F. of a change in the wage rate,
W, when all other prices remain constant. The analysis below is
adapted from Neary (1979)4 who illustrated the "income effect" of
L.M.F. behaviour in the short-run. In this chapter his analysis is
extended to long-run behaviour and utility maximization by the L.M.F.
Differentiating (2.5) and (2.6) with respect to W, we find
F 6L FMM SMML - + -- = 0Sw SW
6L + FLMbM
..
1and FLL = ·PX6W bW
(2.13)
(2.14)
which may be written as
(2.15)
Inserting (2.15) into (2.12) we find that
+ (2.16)
Equation (2.16) highlights why the income maximizing L.M.F. may
behave differently from the C.F. in the short-run. As the output price,
-,
PX' increases, the L.M.F. is able to increase the net income of its
members, and so the implicit price of labour faced by the L.M.F. will·
rise in comparison wi.ththe fixed wage faced by the C.F. In
consequence the L.M.L will substitute away from labour, as reflected
in the term CL/ (Wo 0 c.
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the L.M.F. will have to sacrifice part of the potential increase in
Y that it could achieve. On the other hand, even when holding L
constant, it will be able to enjoy some increase in Y when Px increases.
The L.M.F. labour-income possibility curve must pass through Ec,
the C.F's optimum scale and factor proportions. This is evident from
equation (2.21). When the function g( Sy
1
- ) = 0, then bKs = bKc andPx
5LS = 6Lc. i.e. the (K/L) ratio of the L.M.F. must equal that of the
C.F. We have already seen that the rational L.M.F. will always choose
factor proportions such that FK = PK/PX' and Ec must lie at such a point.
However, the L.M.F. will actu~lly be paying a wage Y > Wo at Ec, and
so its Isocost curve must be steeper than that of the C.F.
It is possible to graph the (K/L) ratio as a function of Y,
in comparison with the pure profit-maximizing (K/L) ratio of the C.F.
As is shown in Appendix 2, when output price (therefore profits) increase,
then
l{
(.- )L C as g ( bY ) ~ 0 (2.34)
as long as the production function is such that the C.F. would increase
its (K/L) ratio if W increased when all other prices remained constant.
When will g( bY ) = o? This occurs when the C.F. and L.M.F.
increase K & L Px 1.nequal amounts and so must be producing
the same output, shown as Xz 1.ndiagram 2.1.At this point two equalities
mUst hold'
for the C.F. = S + (2.35)
for the L.M.F. (2.36) r
i.e. = S + WOL2
= Y2 - Wo S
L2
(2.37)
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Differentiating by Px we find
OK 1- F r-FKKFKK FKM FKL 6PX Px 1-Px
FMK FMM FML bM - F -F (2.17)== M OR M6PX ==Px Px
FLK FLM FLL SL - F FKK FMM6PX
L +Px LpXL PXL
for the C.F for the L.M.F.
Writing the matrix on the left-hand side of (2.17) as A, and the
minor element of A .. as a .., then the long run difference in the
l.J l.J
response of the two enterprises may be written as:
(2.18)
Totally differentiating the first order conditions of the C.F.
with respect to the wage rate W, we find
&KC
OW
A x bMc
bW
bLCoW
and so bLC
SW
l
o
== o
==
(2.19)
and substituting(2.19) into (2.18)
'5L s _ bL C FKK FMM SL c (2.20)== (-- + + FL) <05Px oPX . L L Sw
The difference between the long-run response of the L.M.F. and
C.F. is again entirely due to the assumption that the L.M.F. adjusts
members' income upwards to absorb the entire revenue, and that the
----~---------------------------------------------------------------------------~-.--
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wage rate in the C.r. does not change.
This style of analysis may be easily extended to change in M
and K as well as L, and also to changes in PM and PK.
is always the same. Any predicted differences in behaviour between
The conclusion
the two types of enterprises is entirely due to the assumption that
as conditions change, then wages and L.M.F. members' incomes will
diverge.
3. Income Adjustment within the L.M.F.
Suppose, then, that L.M.F. members' earnings do not immediately
fully adjust to absorb all revenue, and that the L.M.F. adjusts inputs
to the prevailing earnings. The L.M.F. will now operate at some
lower Y and larger L. We could now re-write (2.20) as
+ g ( by ). SLCOW (2.21)
where g is some function of the increase in members' income
measured at the original price of PXO' Y must be deflated because
describes the change in L as a result of a change in W when all other
prices are fixed.
It may be seen from (2~21) that if the L.M,F. did not adjust
Y up at all !)i.e. Y:=. Wand bY = 0 ,then the L.M.F. may employ
more labour than the C.F. as Px increases. This is because if
oY = 0, then (the real, deflated value of bY) is less
than zero.
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Consequently the function g will be negative. As bL/6wc 1S negative,
6L
bP c.
X
then must be greater than1;PS
X
This style of analysis may be equally applied to a utility
maximizing L.M.F. in wh ich both income and size of membership are
important in determining members' utility. Thus, we may see the
L.M.F. as an income maximizer, but with a slow wage adjustment, or
as a utility maximizer choosing to restrain increases in income in
order to reduce lay-of£s or even to create employment. The following
analysis may be used to describe either position.
This discussion may be illustrated using the usual isoproduct
and isocost curves. However, to understand why the C.F. and L.M.F.
differ, it is first .1ecessary to distinguish the points at which their
" . .51S0COSt lines Wl.ll intercept the Land K aX1S.
Isocost lines cut an axis at the point at which costs for a
given output are spent entirely on that one factor. Suppose that the
C.F. is producing output X at a price Px and total cost of C. Then
the equation for the capitalist isocost line may be written as
C = WL + (2.22)
(dropping M to allow the situation to be depicted·in a two dimensional
diagram) .
However, if the capitalist firm is able to enjoy a surplus equal
to S at this output and price, then
c = P X - SX (2.23)
i.e. the equation for the capitalist isocost line 1S
(2.24)
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and so the intercept with the L axis, when K = 0, is g~ven by (P;!-S)/w,
and similarly the intercept with the K axis is (PXX-S)!PK' For the
L.M.F., however, which does not a~m to earn a surplus that will not be
returned to the original inputs (including labour), then the intercepts
Diagram 2.1
K
L
EcoXQ
Wo
In diagram(2.~Xo to X4 are isoproduct curves, with output
increas'ing as the curves move a\vay from the origin, but wi th returns
to scale monotonically decreasing with output from some value above
one to a value below this.
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Originally both the t.M.F. and C.F. produce Xo using factor
proportions represented by EO' At this price (PXO) ~nd output XO' the
C.F. is unable to earn a surplQs, and so the isocost iine for both
enterprises cuts the L axis at (PXOXO)/Wo'
The price now rises to PI' and the C.F. adjusts its output to X2'
the output at which it will maximise its surplus, S. At this output
it chooses the factor proportions represented by Ec. In the diagram
I have drawn a homogeneous production function in which C.F. factor
proportions stay (more or less) the same after a price change. Of
course, this is not essential, and, depending on the shape of the
isoproduct curves, factor proportions may be adjusted.
The t.M.F. could follow the example of the C.F. and move to Ec,
while holding the wage rate at W. If it did so, it would find itself
with a surplus, S, at the end of the year, which it could then
distribute to the members. Alternatively the t.~I.F. could take
advantage of the fact that it is only required to cover costs, and might
adjust factor proportions to the position indicated by Z in the diagram.
At this.point the wage rate. remains at Wo, but the labour force has been
increased beyond the C.F. value, to a point at which L.~l.F. revenues just
cover costs.
However, Z is clearly not an opti~~l position for the L.M.F., and
there is no reason why it should remain at the profit-maximising output
of X2. At Z the marginal revenue product of capital (FK) is
considerably more than PK/PX1 (since FK = PK/PX1 at Ec.).The t.M.F.
might increase K (and consequently X), and once more receive a surplus,
which may be distributed as a bonus or alternatively used up in employing
yet more labour.
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TI1e L.M.F. objective then, might be seen as one of maximising L
for any given Y ~ Ho which it pays itself, with the constraint Y ~ Ym,
the maximum Y which may be earned without the L.M.F. finding itself
unable to cover costs. The problem then becomes one of,
Maxi.mise L = (2.25)
subject to X = F(L,K) (2.26)
Forming the Lagrangian
+ A(X - F(L,K) ) (2.27)
and for a maximum
oZ Px
oX = _-y
bz -p= __KoK Y
and combining (2.28) and
a maximum is
FK
PK=-
PX
+ " = 0 (2.28)
(2.29)
(2.29), then the first order condition for
(2.30)
and substituting back into (2.25)
PXX - PXFKK
L = Y (2.31)
or (2.32)
Equation (2.30) is the usual condition that capital should be
employed up to the point at which the value of its marginal product is
-,
equal to its price. Howeve r, (2.32), the rule for adjusting L, is quite
different from the rule for the profit maximising C.F. or the income
maximizing L.H.F. L is simply increased until all revenue above the cost of
capi tal is abaor-bel in paying the member-sat be chosen level of income Y.
--- --------------------
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Returning to Diagram 2.1, X4 represents the output at which the
capitalist firm would earn zero profits when the product price is set
at PX1' i.e. the output at which average costs equal average revenue.
If the C.F. was forced to produce at this output then it would choose
to combine K and L in the proportions indicated by A. Clearly the
L.M.F. cannot possibly move beyond output X4 without running at a
loss or lowering members' income below the capitalist wage rate.
maximise L by moving to KIm at which FK= PK
Px
to keep wages at Wo could
X-F K
but y/pX = ( -----f- )
However, the L.M.F. which is satisfied
In other words, the L.M.F. maximizing L will adjust capital
until the value of itsnarginal product equals its rental, but will
increase labour beyond the usual C.F. level (at which Y/Px = FL), until
any further increase in labour at the chosen income level must force
the firm into making a loss.
When the product is such that the C.F. is making zero profits,
then it is well known that at the output chosen by the C.F. (XO),
then
Xo = FLLO + FKKO
i.e. FL Xo - FKKO (2.33)
LO
and so condition (2.32)reduces to the usual condition that FL = W/Px,
and the L.M.F., even when trying to maximise labour, must produce at
the same scale and factor proportions as the C.F.
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At the other extreme, the L.M.F. may choose to maximise y regardless
of the size of the labour force (the original Ward hypothesis), while
~ncome Y adjusts instantaneously to absorb all the surplus. In this ~ the
firm's objective may be translated, in terms of the diagram, as one of
trying to maximise the slope of the isocost curves. The intercept of
the isocost line w.i th the L axis will be PXX/Y and so, as Y is increased,
the distance of the intercept from the origin must decrease, but the
intercept with the K axis PXX/PK will rema~n the same. In consequence,
as Y increases the slope of the isocost line must increase.
There is, however, a limit to how far the L.M.F. may tilt the
isocost lines, the same constraint that limits the maximisation of L,
~.e. that revenues must cover costs. This, as is well known for the
case of an L.M.F. maximising Y, is reflected in the condition that the
L.M.F. must produce at a point of local constant returns to scale.
Returning to the diagram, the L.M.F. may produce X3 at a wage rate
of Wo in order to maximise L. Since it is paying Wc' to its members then
its isocost line must be parallel to that of the C.F. Now the L.M.F.
decides to increase Y by sacr i f i.cing the jobs of some members. Any
increase in Y will move the isocost line's intercept with the L ax~s
toward the origin, and output must be reduced. Ho~ever, a reduction
in output will also move the·intercept with the K axis ( = PXX/PK)
towards the origin, but because of the effect of by, the L intercept
moves farther than the K intercept. The L.M.F. trying to increase Y
must, therefore, set in motion a process by which its isocost line moves
downwards and becomes steeper. Eventually the maximum possible Y will
be achieved at a point such as Eym, where, as we know from equation (2.12)
the L.M.F. labour force must be less than the C.F'.'s optimum labour force
at Ec.
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Whether or not Eym is reached at an output above or below the
6initial Eo depends entirely (as explained by Estrin (980) )' on "how:
returns to scale vary around an isoquant". We know that at XO the
equilibrium Eo must lie at a point of local constant returns to
scale. Because of diminishing returns,A, Ec, and intervening points,
must reflect less than unit returns to scale. As I have drawn
diagram 1, returns to scale must increase as K is substituted for L
around an isoquant, and consequently Eym will be at a point of
local C.R.S. If however the reverse was true, a v e, returns to scale
diminish as K is substituted for L, then the output at which Y is
maximised would be at an output below Xo. For the special case in
which returns to scale are constant around an isoquant, then the L.M.F.
will rema.in at output Xo, but it may increase members' income when Px
increases by substituting K for L.
The alternatives available to an t.M.F. as described in equation (2,21)
are depicted by the dashed line passing between Eyreand Elm in diagram 1.
Moving away from Elm, the increasing income of members will be indicated
by the increasing slope of the isocost curve as L is decreased. It
would be possible to map out a locus of possible income and labour-force
combinations.
The members' utility function may include a preference to hold the
labour force constant, whenever this is possible without going bankrupt.
If Eyre lies to the left of Eo then this preference wi lL be included in
the EYI?~ Elm locus. However, it is possible that Eym will lie to the
right of Eo, i.e. after a price increase the L.M.F. will need to increase
L if it is to maximise Y. In this case the locus of possibilities will
have to be extended l>-eyondEyre to the point at which L = Lo. However,
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the L.M.F. will have to sacrifice part of the potential increase in
Y that it could achieve. On the other hand, even when holding L
constant, it wi l.lbe able to enjoy some increase in Y when Px increases.
The L.M.F. labour-income possibility curve must pass through Ec,
the C.F's optimum scale and factor proportions. This is evident from
equation (2.21). When the function g( bY 1-) = 0, then bKs = bKc andPK
bLS = 6Lc, i.e. the (K/L) ratio of the L.M.F. must equal that of the
C.F. We have already seen that the rational L.M.F. will always choose
factor proportions such that FK = PK/PX' and Ec must lie at such a point.
However, the L.M.F. will actually be paying a wage Y > Wo at Ec, and
so its Isocost curve must be steeper than that of the C.F.
It is possible to graph the (K/L) ratio as a function of Y,
in comparison with the pure profit-maximizing (K/L) ratio of the C.F.
As is shown in Appendix 2, when output price (therefore profits) increase,
then
l{
(-- )L C as g ( bY ) ~ 0 (2.34)
as long·as the production function is such that the C.F. would increase
its (K/L) ratio if W increased when all other prices remained constant.
loJhenwill g( oY ) = O? This occurs "Then the C.F. and L.M.F.
increase K & L Px in equal amounts and so must be producing
the same output, shown as X2 1.ndiagram 1. At this point two equalities
must hold
for the C.F. P1X2 = S + WoL2 + PKK2
for the L.M.F. P1x2 = Y2L2 + PK~2
i.e. Y2L2 = S + WOL2
ancl 6Y = Y2 - Wo = S
L2
(2.35)
(2.36)
(2.37)
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To determine S we can compare the C.F. 's initial equilibrium at Eo,
with its profit maximizing equilibrium at Ec. At Eo we know that
= (2.38)
and so combining (2.35) and (2.38) we have
=
s X = S
6PX
S = b PXX2
(2.40)
and so > 0 (2.41
which means that when product pric~ increases the L.M.F. would be able
to increase OY to a value greater than = 0) without reducing
the labour force below the size of the capitalist L.
This seems reasonable since the rise in product price might be
viewed as a decrease in the value of returns going to both inputs,
but since the L.M.F. is able to continue paying only PK per unit of K,
then it may increase the return to L so as to more than compensate
Ifor the rise in product price.
Diagram 2.2 compares the L.M.F. wage - capital/labour ratio curve
with that of the pure profit maximizing capitalist firm. At maximum Y =
Ym, the K/L ratio of the L.M.F. must be higher than that of the C.F.
which will employ inputs in a ratio of (K/L)C and pays labour a wage of
Wo. The incom~-maximising L.M.F. finds itself in a position such as Eym
in Diagram 2.2, when th0 product price PI is above the zero profit price
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bY'2 (X2bPX)jLz
of Po. At the other extreme, if the L.M.F. continues to pay Wo to its
members (r am assuming that Wo is the minimum acceptable wage to
workers r.neither enterprise) then it must have a Lower capital/labour
ratio than the e.F'. At some point A in between, at which Y > Wo, the
L.M.F. and e.F. will have the same ratio of K to L, i.e. (K/L)e' and,
in fact, produce the same output.
As the product price increases then g( bY h~.) must decrease, and so
it can be seen from (A2.4) in the appendix that,Xwhen the function g
is positive, then for any given Y, as Px increases, the difference
between (K/L)s and (K/L)e must decrease. But when g( ) is negative,
then as Px increases then the absolute value of g( ) must increase,
that ~s it becomes yet more negative. And so, once the L.M.F. (K/L)
ratio falls below (K/Ue then for any given Y the (K/L) ratio at P2
will be even l?wer than for Pl' In other words, the L.M.F. curve m~ves
furthe~'to the right of EO as bP increases.
Of course, as the product price changes, Ec may move up or down
depending on the form-of the production function. In the case of a
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homogeneous production function it would stay in the same position. But,
however Ec shifts, the distance between Ec and the L.M.F. curve must
increase as product price increases. Thus, in diagram2.2Ec is assumed
to remain stationary as price increases from PI to P2 but the L.M.F.
curve will shift to the right.
Throughout this section I have concentrated on capital/labour ratios,
however, it should be clear from the appendix, that exactly the same
arguments may be applied to the materials/labour ratio.
If the L.M.F. holds lab~ur constant then its choice of Y and factor
proportions may lie somewhere between A and Eym in diagram 2.2.However,
fixed L may require the L.M.F. to move to some point off this locus,
lying to the left of Eym in diagram 2l. Whichever is the case, the
L.M.F. may still achieve a net income per worker above Wo, and, as
shown in the appendix, its capital/labour ratio will be above (~)C' The
fixed labour option will, therefore, lie somewhere in the vicinity of
the A -?> Eym locus.
In order to draw conclusions about the differences between the
L.M.F. andC.F.ratio it has been necessary to constrain ·the production
function to one in which the C.F. would increase its capital intensity
when the wage rate r1ses. Obviously this excludes a fixed proportions
function. If such a function prevailed the L.M.F. may well choose
a scale of output which was different from the C.F. 's optimum position.
If the L.M.F. wished to maximise income per worker it would choose a
scale which maximised average product per worker, which under fixed
proportions must lie at.the zero profit constant returns to scale output ,
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(i.e. Eo). Alternatively, to maximise L, the L.M.F. would move to the output
at which revenue just cover costs, i.e. where average costs (at a wage rate of
Wo) equal average revenue. Such a point would be equivalent to A in Diagram 1.1
The L.M.F. may choose any output between these two depending on its degree of
preference for L or Y. One choice may be at the same scale as the C.F., but
here again, the L.M.F. should be able to achieve an income of Y > Wo for its
members.
4. Introducing an Endogenous Wage Rate in the C.F.
So far all the comparison has been based on the mythical C.F. which is
able to ruthlessly maximise profits without releasing any of its 'potential
surplus' to employees of the firm. The 'potential surplus' is that profit
which a C.F. might achieve after a rise in product price if all factors
continued to be paid at their old, zero profits price., 'Profits' I define
to be the actual surplus expropriated by the C.F.
Law has already pointed out that the short-run behaviour of the pure
income maximising L.M.F. is equivalent to "a limiting case of Fellner's union-
7management model with workers possessing maximal bargaining power," (i.e. able
to retrieve all potential surplus as wages). Furthermore, if L.M.F. members
are assumed to include the number of workers, as well as income per worker, in
their utility function, then the model of the L.M.F. in the short-run be-
8comes equivalent to the Fellner model. In this section this approach is
extended to the long-run analysis of the firm.
Let us continue to assume that the C.F. is a profit maximiser, but that
it is forced to relinquish a proportion (1-0<-) < 1of its potential surplus,
S, eithe~ because of pressure from organised labour or from sooietal/govern-
ment pressures. Representatives of the firm's employees now face the same
choice as members of the L.M.F. Suppose that they decide to maximize W
regardless of how this may effect employment levels. The objective may be
Written as
Max W = PXX - PMM - PKK -0< S
L
(2.42)
SUbject to the usual production function
X = F (L,M,K)
\-JhenPx = Po then S :: 0, and the term cxS in (2.42) will dis-
appear, allowing the C.F. employees to achieve the same income as
L.M.F. members, i.e. Wo.
The first order conditions for a maximum are
6w P F - PKX K
bK = L
Sw P F - PMXM
8M
::
L
bw ::
8L'
:: 0
= 0
= 0
i.e.
PK
F =-K Px
i.e.
PM
F =-M Px
W
~.e. F =-L Px
(2.43)
(2.44)
(2.45
which are exact.ly the same as for the L.M.F., except, of course, Y
ut
must be greater than maximum W.
To find the effect of an increase inPX' (2.43) to (2.45) must
be totally differentiated.
and so
cx.S+ - 2LPX
(2.46)
=
:: bKbP c
X
(2.47)
bL"""p c
Ox.
+
+
+ (2.49)
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using the subscript t to denote the situation where through trade
union pressure or otherwi se the C.F. gives up a proportion(1.-ex)ofits
potential surplus. Equations (2.49) may be re-written as,
+ ( bw (2.50)
similarly for M and K.
(2.50) may be compared with (2.21). It is clear that for any given
i.ncr ease in workers' income above Wo such that OH = bY, then C.F.
employees will be forced to accept a smaller labour force than the L.M.F.
The 'reverse is true for any given increase in the labour force.
Thus, in diagram 2.1the C.F. employees may also select a point on
the Eym/Elm locus, but at any point on this curve their isocost line
would have a lower gradient than the equivalent L.M.F. isocost line.
The C.F. 's possible options must also begin above Eym (to a degree
depending on the size of ex) and end below Elm.
In diagram2.3the C.F. and L.M.F. options are compared. The C.F.
possibility curve, shown a's T, must lie to the left of the L.M.F. curve
because, as a glance at equation (ALJ in the appendix w iLl,show, for any
given Sw then Ne '> Ns, i.e. the C.F. (K/L) ratio ~ill be greater than
the L. 1-1.F. (K/L) ratio. Furthermore, for maximum Y or W, when g( bY I )Ipx
cxS )+ -'-2
Px
2.3.
in (A4) is Freplaced by (F/L) for the L.M.F. and (i
K K(i) t> (i) c, as illustrated in diagram
for the
C.F., then
49
Dia~ram 2.3
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However, the maximum of wage rate, Wm, will be less than Ym.
As bP (and therefore S) increases, then both the T and L.M.F.
X
curves will move to the right in diagram 2.3(in respect of Ec; which
mayor may not shift). Returning again to (A4), as bPX increases
then the bY or b W which satisfies the condition that g ( ~Y 1_ ) = 0
Pxmust increase, i.e. the L.M.F. or C.F. can achieve a higher
income per worker while maintaining the pure profit maximising factor
Kproportions of (I)c.
However, an increase in OPxwill also increase S and so the
distance between the LMF and T curves must increase as well.
Suppose, then, that an increase in capitalist profits was observed.
This may 'be the result of two forces, either improved trading conditions
(Px increases or factor prices decrease) or a weakening of the C.F.
employees' bargaining power so that the C.F. is able to force 0( up r
-In both cases it should be clear that the T and LMF curves in Diagram 2.3
must move further apart.
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5. Variable Hours
So far I have ignored the issue of flexibility in the hours worked
by capitalist employees and L.M.F. members. Hours of work has often
been included in the L.M.F. utility function, i.e. members maximise a
function of the form
U = U(Y, L, h) (2.51)
where h is hours worked and Uh < O. Now, depending on the members'
preferences, Uhymay be positive or negative, Y now being taken as net
income per hour.
But whatever the sign of U , the total labour offered L = mhhy
(where m is the number of members) will still lie along the Eym ~ Elm
PKcurve in diagram 1) because the condition that Fk = Ip will still
X
prevail.
Previously Y and W were described as income per worker, but
since hours were assumed fixed, then they may just as easily have
represented earnings Der hour. In diagram 1 the L axis may now be
taken to represent total hours of labour rather than number of workers.
If. Uhy> 0, i.e. the members increase the hours worked as the hourly
wage rate increases, then as the L.M.F. moves towards' Elm so the
proportion of L = hm which is made up of h will increase relative to
m. 'I11ereverse will be true if U < O.hy
The L.M.F. curve illustrated in diagrams 2.2 & 2.3will then,
take the same form even if flexible hours are taken into account. The
important point is that Land Y must be measured in hours and hourly rates.
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TIle capitalist firm may similarly adjust hours as a result of
agreements over the length of the working week or through the use of
overtime. 'h' may not be adjusted to the same degree, or even in the
same direction, as the 1.m.f. when profits improve, but the T curve
illustrated in diagram 2.3wi.ll still represent the C.F. 's possible
options.
6. Hired Labour
The final option is the use of hired labour by the labour-managed
firm. When product price increases above Po, the existing members may
hire non-members at the capitalist wage rate of Ho. They may choose
this path either because their coricern for the welfare of non-members
is negligible, or because they want the freedom to lay-off workers
when necessary.
If the first were true, then the members' objective would be to
maximise their own income. Their objective would be exactly the same
as the pure profit-maximising C.F., and they would try to move to Ec,
and distribute the profit earned between the existing members.
In the second case, members may still derive som~ pleasure from
providing employment for non-members, and may choose to sacrifice part
of the potential. increase in their mm income in order to provide
employment or increase the wage of hired workers. In this case the
L.M.F. will move to the right of Ec in diagram zS and, the more members
are willing to give up an increase in their own income, so the further
will the hired members' options lie from Ec. In diagram2i3the horizontal
axis may now be taken to represent the income of hired workers. The
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curve T reflects the alternative wage/employment combinations for
employing hired workers, members having decided to forsake the-
surplus represented by the distance between Ec and T in favour of
non-members. The preferences of existing members and hired workers
will result in some agreed solution along the T curve.
The difference between the L.M.F. and capitalist solutions
will now depend on the degree to Vlhich the C.F. and L.M.F. owners
(shareholders and members respectively) are wi lli.ngto give up
their potential surplus in favour of non-owners working in the firm.
An increase 1.nobserved capitalist profits would not necessarily
see a shift 1.nthe comparative factor ratios of the two enterprises.
6. Conclusion
We can see from the above discussion that one of the reasons
why neoclassical analysis has concluded that there may be significant
differences between C.F. and L.M.F. behaviour is because the neo-
classical models of the capitalist system assume that wage rates are
determined in the labour n~rket at the intersection of the labour
demand and labour supply schedules, i.e. exogenous to conditions
prevailing in the firm.
Even if labour in capitalist firms are unable to recoup the full
amount of the capitalists' potential surplus, i.e. 0< > 0 , the
di.fferences between the two types of enterprise may completely
disappear.
In diagram 2.3 as ex:. decreases, then the T and L.N.F. curves
will move closer together. The t\.JO curves will not meet, however,
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unless 0<.= O. Why do the two curves remain apart? Because of
the existence of a capitalist surplus S which is not distributed
to factors of production. We can see, then, that should the L.M.F.
retain a similar portion of undistributed surplus (for reinvestment,
or because neither labour, or labour earnings, adjusted quickly enough
to absorb the entire potential surplus) then differences between the
two types of enterprise could completely disappear.
Thus, once we introduce slow wage adjustment or utility
maximization into the L.M.F. analysis, then L.M.F. behaviour may
be exactly the same as C.F. behaviour with an endogenous wage rate.
Differences will only appear if wages in the I..M.F. adjust at a
different rate to wages in the C.F.
It will be argued in Chapter 9, however, that once we
accept that wages are also determined endogenously under capitalism
(as a result of class struggle), then it is no longer relevant to
use a neoclassical model to deduce differences between capitalist
and labour-managed sysrterns ,
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CHAPTER 3
THEORIES OF COOPERATIVE FAILURE UNDER CAPITALISM
Most of the theory of the labour-managed firm has been developed
within the framework of a "pure" labour-managed economy. Many writers
have suggested that cooperatives operating within a capitalist system
face additional problems, and that this is why \'lesterncooperatives
have been such a failure.
Three questions need to be answered:
(i) Is it true that Western cooperatives have"failed" more than
capitalist firms?
(ii) Do existing theories explain why cooperatives have failed?
(iii)VJhyhave cooperatives "failed" under capitalism?
\'le will attempt to answer these questions in Chapters 5, 6
and 8. In this chapter we review the existing theories of cooperative
failure under capitalism. Some of it, such as Vanek's self-extinction
forces and Chiplin and Coynes' degeneration theory, are borne out of
a neoclassical framework. 'Other contributions are more pragmatic
in their approach. First we must discuss what is mea.ntby cooperative
failure.
1. What do we mean by "Failure"
How success or failure is perceived, depends entirely on what one
hoped 'of cooperatives in the first place. These hopes have been many
and varied. Below, we briefly review the most common objectives set
for cooperatives. Each objective has a different measure of success.
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Object 1: To overcome the IIBritish Di.sease" (or similar foreign
diseases), i.e. to raise the productivity of workers.
Measure of Success: Comparative economic performance of coops
and their capitalist counterparts. Performance is measured in
traditional capitalist terms, i.e. productivity, profits, rates
of growth.
Object 2: To reduce unemployment.
Measure of Success: The number of jobs created or saved.
Object 3: To return to workers control over their place of work.
Measure of success: The levels of democracy and participation
maintained within the coop.
Object 4: To return to labour the surplus expropriated by capital.
Measure of success: Labour incomes are higher and/or the work
is less intensive than in capitalist firms.
For all four objects another indicator of success will be the
length of life of the cooperative.
In Chapter 5 we will consider whether the British cooperatives
have succeeded in any of these objectives.
EXPLANATIONS OF COOPERATIVE FAILURE
2. Introduction
There is a widely held belief in Britain that producer cooperatives
(P.C.IS) are doomed to failure. This pessimism certainly goes as far back
as the middle of the last century, when the Rochdale Pioneers I first experi-
ment with producer cooperation (rather than consumer cooperation), known as
the Rochdale Cooperative Manufacturing Society, degenerated into a joint
stock company within six years of its formation.1 The influential Fabians,
. 2Sldney and Beatrice Webb, reinforced this antagonism towards P.C. IS.
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In recent times the highly publicised problems of the three so-called
3"Benn" coops have added to the pessimism. Only Triumph. Meriden survived
for any length of time, but it too has recently gone into liquidation.
Disproportionate press coverage has been given to coops growing out
4of capitalist closures, and most people remain in ignorance of the
large numbers of cooperatives which have managed to survive in Britain.
Explanations of cooperative failure range from the theoretical to
the pragmatic. They can be sub-divided into two groups:
(i) Economic - i.e. mainly concerned with objects 1, 2 and 4;
(ii) Degeneration - i.e. can coops maintain a truly democratic structure,
or must they inevitably degenerate into capitalist or hierarchical
organisations. These two groups are often linked ty authors who claim
that failure on at least one of these fronts is unavoidable. They
would argue that financial success can only be achieved if coops return
to traditional managerial practices.
The literature on the labour-managed firm predicts a number of
likely obstacles to their success. These issues were covered in earlier
chapters. In this chapter we are concerned purely with the additional
problems that cooperatives might face under capitalism.
3. Problems in Raising Finance
This is a very common explanation of cooperatives' difficulties.
Raising finance may be considered more difficult for coops because
of (a) the prejudices of financial institutions, or (b) coops' limited
ability to raise money by issuing shares to the public.
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Jenny Thornley argues that "inadequate capital from inside and ou tu ido
is a major source of concern for cooperatives".5 Wilson states thut
the "major impediments to the emergence of the cooperative enterpri8c
stems from inadequate sources of capital for start-up and cashflow, OY.-·
pansion and growth, and that this is not merely a case of market failuro
but results from a combination of factors both internal and external to
the enterprise.,,6 Many more writers could be quoted in support of thlo
position. The wide acceptance of this proposition has incidentally prompted
a growing literature on internally financed cooperatives. Cooperative!;
are assumed to rely heavily on internal finance, either because they
cannot, or do not wish, (for fear of losing worker control) to obtain
funds from outBide. In theory, internal financing may lead to additionul
problems. These will be discussed later.
4. Prejudice against Cooperatives
Apart from facing prejudice when applying for loans, it has also
been suggested that coops have to struggle against prejudices in their
day to day operations. Thus suppliers and customer's may boycott coop-
eratives, for straightforward political reasons, or because ignorance
of cooperative enterprises leads to uncertainty about their financial
stability.
5.Vanek's Self-Extinction For~es
In 1971 Jaroslav Vanek published a paper which he believed contained
arguments "so powerful in explaining the shortcomings of traditional ot'
conventional forms of producer cooperatives and participatory firms,
that they offer an ample explanation of the comparative failure of these
7forms in history."
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Vanek's explanation relies on the assumption that cooperatives "rely
heavily on their own funds." This is because "especially in the Western
world, banks and other external creditors are unwilling to finance the
totality, or even a major portion, of a labour-managed firm "s assets,
but, and this is more important, the firm itself will generally not want
such financing because this would jeopardise its autonomy and thus under-
mine its very nature and raison d'etre".
Vanek's model is at its most powerful for production functions with
constant returns to scale. 8Under C.R.S., as was explained by Meade,
income maximising coops need only attain a certain capital/labour ratio
to maximise each member's income. The absolute level of output is not
important.
In diagram 3.1, Xoutput per labourer, L' is plotted as a function
of the capital/labour ratio, and displays marginal diminishing returns
to capital.
X
L
a J K/L
Diagram 3.1 ,Va:nek's Self-Extinction Forces under Constant Returns
to Scale.
Va:nek envisages a situation in which members build up capital
stocks financed errti r-e Iy from retained earnings. At the time that the
cquipr.1cntis purchased the use of internal funds has an opportunity cost
to the members equal to the rate of interest that could be earned by
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depositing the money in a bank. Therefore the optimum capital labour
ratio will be the same as that using external finance.
This optimum ratio is at a in diagram 3.1. At this point income
per worker, ba, is at a maximum, given the cost of renting capital, PK.
However, a only indicates the K/L ratio. Given the number of members
that the coop has, or would like to have, then they will accumulate
capital until the K/L ratio equals a.
Another fundamental assumption in this model is that all assets are
owned collectively, and cannot be withdrawn, as, say, appreciated shares,
when a member departs. Vanek also simplifies the argument by assuming
that the capital has infinite durability, i.e. no expenditure is necessary
to maintain and repair the machinery.
Vanek points out that if capital had been externally financed,
then the segment bc in diagram 3.1 would represent the share of output
per worker paid to capital, and ba would be the earnings of each worker.
If the coop had paid for the capital from internal funds, then labour
can now enjoy the Lncorae represented by ac, as repayment of loans at
the rate PK would not be neceasary , In other words, Labour now reaps
the return of its earlier thriftiness.
Vanek describes four forces that he believes will now act on the
firm.
1. THE FIRST SELF-EXTINCTION FORCE: As members leave, perhaps
because, they change jobs or retire, then the K/L ratio will rise, and so
the coop will find itself at a point to the right of c in diagram 3.1
e.g., g. With external finance, such a shift would raise the level of
loan repayments per worker to, say, gh.' Each worker's earnings would
therefore fall from ba to hj. However, because of internal financing
labour will receive the total value of jg. In other words, those members who
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stay on enjoy the rewards not only of their own foregone income, but
also that of members who have left. Consequently, as members leave, those
remaining will find themselves enjoying a rising income, and so they will
be happy to allow the membership to run down. This process could continue
until there was only one member left, or, more realistically, for non
CRS production functions, to the point where increasing returns set in.
2. THE SECOND SELF-EXTINCTION FORCE: If point c in diagram 3.1
represented the optimum K/L ratio, i.e. where PK equals the value of the
"marginal product of capital, then at g the rate of interest will be more
than the M.P.K. Those members remaining could therefore raise their income
by selling capital equipment, distributing the income, and putting the
proceeds in the bank where it can earn the prevailing interest rate.
The departure of members will therefore encourage those left to disinvest.
3. THE UNDERINVESTMENT FORCE: Vanek's underinvestment force was
described in Chapter 1. If cooperative members are unable to recoup the
principal of their investment, they will only employ capital up to the
point where the value of its marginal product is equal to PK + D (D> 0).
D represents an addition to the return on capital sufficient to rectify
for the loss of principal. Consequently, for a given number of workers,
coops will use less capital than capitalist firms.
4. THE NEVER-EMPLOY FORCE: Suppose that the firm finds itself at
the point e in diagram 3.1 (perhaps because of an over enthusiastic re-
sponse'to the second force). The firm may now invest in more capital
and expand output until K/L :::a. This is the only situation in which
the coop might be induced to increase output, but it does so by increasing
capital. The income maximizing cooperative will never have an incentive
to increase labour.
Vanek admits that his forces (excluding number3)will be less power-
ful for coops working under the traditional U shaped technology. This
occurs because the loss of economies of scale as output falls counteracts
the effects of the increasing K/L ratio on members' income. Vanek believes,
however, that the forces would still impinge on the cooperativ~s decisions,
and would tend to keep cooperatives small, under-capitalised, and reluctant
to take on new members.
6. Degeneration
The idea of degeneration of cooperatives comes in at least three
forms. There is straightforward degeneration into a capitalist firm,
which occurs when outsiders gain control by buying up a majority of the
shares. This is what happened to the Rochdale Cooperative Manufacturing
Society. Next there is degeneration into a quasi capitalist firm, in
which a small number of members employ the majority of workers who are
not given the option of becoming members. Finally there is degeneration
into hierarchical or managerial structures. In this case, although the
cooperative may remain legally a cooperative, with workers in theory
dictating policy, in fact decision making has returned to managers, or
non-worker members.
The Webb's were convinced that if coops did not fail as business
concerns, then they must inevitably cease "to be democracies of producers
managing their own work, and ... become in effect associations of capitalists
'" making profits for themselves by the employment at wages of workers
outside the association.,,9 The Webbs apparently based their opinions
on the experiences of producer cooperatives at that time, but they did
not make clear why such degeneration must be inevitable. More recently
Chiplin and Coyne have used neoclassical theories to argue"that it always
'pays' a member to try and exclude other members", and that "the incentives
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are such that it is unlikely that a pure L.M.F. could exist alongside a
pure capitalist firm.II10
We saw in Chapter 1, that according to neoclassical theory, in
general equilibrium workers in the income maximizing L.M.F. will
earn exactly the same as workers employed by a capitalist firm. This
incidentally, is one explanation why coops must inevitably fail, in
the sense that the members will be no better off than if they had worked
within a capitalist firm.
Even using neoclassical theory, however, it is an accepted fact
?
that members of an income maximizing cooperative will earn higher incomes
than their counterparts in capitalist enterprises when the C.F. is earning
a profit. The important proviso of all other things being equal, e.g.
production function, intensity of work, access to markets, of course
must apply. Ironically, it is this fact which prompts Chiplin and
Coyne to suggest that degeneration is inevitable.
We saw in Chapter 1 that the income maximizing L.M.F. will produce
at the point where,
P X - PKK
Y
X :PXFL PK = PXFK= ~L
As we saw in Chapter 2, wages in the C.F. will be equal to,
W = -"E-F:--x L
where S' is the surplus earned by capitalists. The cooperative members
could, therefore, undoubtedly benefit by employing additional workers
at the going wage rate of W, which is less than Y. Existing members will, ,
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in fact, maximise their income by employing non-members up to the standard
capitalist point where W = PXFL. The income of members will be improved
because the marginal product of the extra workers will be higher than
their wage rate. The coop members will be fundamentally no different
from a small group of capitalists combining to rake surplus from the labour
of their employees. Furthermore, the smaller the membership as a proport-
tion of the total workforce, the higher the income enjoyed by the members.
It seems then that coops cannot win. Either they will find themselves
no better off than capitalist employees, or they will degenerate into
capitalist structures. Chiplin and Coyne believe that "if a pure labour-
,
managed economy is to emerge .•. all other forms of organisation would
need to be proscribed by law". In other words, that coops and capitalism
cannot co-exist.
Conclusion
This concludes the survey of theories of cooperative failure under
capitalism. In Chapter 6 we will consider whether evidence from the
C.P.F. cooperatives supports these theories.
,
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PART B:
EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE FROM COOPERATIVES
WORKING WITHIN CAPITALISM
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CHAPTER 4
TESTING NEOCLASSICAL PREDICTIONS OF THE BEHAVIOUR OF
CAPITALIST AND LABOUR-MANAGED FIRMS UNDER CAPITALISM
We saw in Chapter 1 that neoclassical theory has produced a number
of predictions for the behaviour of the L.M.F. which might be tested
empirically. In fact empirical tests of the theory are very thin on the
ground, and are almost universally based on the Yugoslav economy. These
will be discussed in Chapter 11.
Only one study has been published to date which is designed to
test the neoclassical theory of the L.M.F. among cooperatives working
within a capitalist system. This is the article by Jones and Backus which
uses data from the C.P.F. footwear cooperatives.1 The purpose of their
study is to test Vanek's theory of financing, and so we will defer dis-
cussion of their results until Chapter 6.
This chapter will contentrate on neoclassical predictions of L.M.F.
behaviour in the short and long-run. The method used will be to compare
the cooperatives' behaviour with a sample of capitalist firms. We saw
..
in Chapter 2, however, that the behaviour of the two types of enterprise
might well converge if we make some adaptions to the pure neoclassical
models of the profit maximizing C.F. and income maximizing L.M.F. This
inevitably leads to the problem of distinguishing between whether it is
the C.F. 's or L.M.F. 's which are not behaving according to theory. The
problems become even more acute if we begin to doubt whether the behaviour
-,of firms of any sort are adequately described by neoclassical models,
even if the models are adapted. It may be that the most important forces
acting on firms are not included in neoclassical models. If this is
true, and in Chapter 8 we will argue that it is true, then the results
reported in this Chapter and Chapter 6 , are unlikeLy to help us understand
the experiences of C.P.F. cooperatives.
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1. The Data
The Data used in the following five chapters is described in Appendix
3. As explained in the appendix, most private firms were exempted from
filing accounts with the Registrar of Companies until the passing of the
1967 Companies Act. Consequently, detailed information on the sample
of capitalist firms is usually only available from 1969 onwards. By this
time so many of the original s~mple of capitalist firms had ceased to
trade that accounts were available for only a small numcer of firms.
There is the added problem that information on wages and salaries was
rarely reported by these companies.
Two new samples of firms were therefore selected from "Inter-Companies
Comparisons" Business Ratio Reports. These samples were taken from the
reports on footwear and clothing manufacturers. Unfortunately the ICC
series on Printers were introduced too late to be of value to this study.
Appendix 3 contains a description of the I.C.C. sample and a comparison
of the C.F. and C.P.F. samples.
When studying short-run behaviour aggregate industry data was some-
times substituted when individual firm data was not available. This was
possible because short-run models of the C.F. predict the absolute dir-
ection of change in observable variables. Thus, we,expect to find an
expansion in the workforce following a sudden boom in demand. No such
clear cut prediction is available in the long-run. The anticipated differ-
ences between the L.M.F. and C.F. are merely of degree, rather than
opposite. Consequently it was not possible to use aggregate data for
comparison in the long-run. As a result, the evidence on the long-run
behaviour of the enterprises is very limited.
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2. Short-Run Predictions
The short-run is some period of time in which capital is fixed.
The enterprise can only adjust labour and other variable inputs (M)
in the time available.
It is well known that a rise in demand will induce the neo-
classical profit maximizing firm to raise output by increasing the work-
force while holding the wage rate constant. It was explained in Chapter
\
1 that in the simple case of only two inputs, capital and labour, that
the pure income maximizing 1.M.F. would reduce output and labour in
response to a similar shift in demand.
Chapter 1 also contained a list of explanations as to why the L.M.F.
might not display such perverse behaviour. Some of these explanations
relied on the assumption of a fixed labour force in the short run. Others,
such as those which introduced more than one variable input or flexible
working hours, removed the perverse response of output, but still predicted
a fall in the labour force with a rise in demand.
The size of the labour force is therefore vital to most of these
theories. This chapter will therefore concentrate on labour force
adjustments.
The immediate problem is to distinguish short-term adjustments from
long-term reconstruction. The method followed has been to identify
long-tepm trends in the industries concerned and then to study years which
showed an obvious shift away from the trend.
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Study of the individual capitalist firms indicated that they had
experienced a wide variety of conditions during the 1970's. Indeed
for most firms their individual experience was apparently as important,
and probably more so, than general progress throughout the industry.
It would appear that many firms are buffeted by forces which are miss-
ing from the neoclassical model of the firm. We will return to look
at these in Chapter 7. In this chapter we will continue to assume that
firms throughout an industry face the same trading conditions. Each of
the industries in which cooperatives operated will be discussed in turn.
3. Long-Run Predictions
The neoclassical predictions of perverse short-run behaviour of the
L.M.F. lends itself most easily to empirical verification. The litera-
ture has also produced numerous explanations of why such a perverse
response may not be observed. We will discuss in section J2 whether
any of these explanations fit evidence from the C.P.F. cooperatives.
The neoclassical analysis of the L.M.F. in the long-run has been
much less controverf;ial. Apparently most authors accept the conclusions
derived from the models.' Indeed, the long-run analysis has frequently
been used to explain the behaviour of the Yugoslav economy (see
Chapter 11).
The problem with testing this theory is that many of the character-
istics attached to Western cooperatives may hide their anticipated
response. Thus it is often argued that cooperatives face prejudice in
the market and when applying for loans. Such prejudice may well lead
to smaller size and slower growth, while forcing the coop to be more
labour intensive than they might wdsh ,
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It is necessary, then, not to look for absolute differences between
cooperatives and capitalist firms, e.g. smaller output, higher capital
intensity, but to search for differences in the enterprises' response
to changing conditions.
In Chapter 2 we saw that a rise in the profitability of an industry
is equivalent to moving the Ey'm-Elm curve in diagram 2.2 to the
right. The income maximizing L.M.F. will always position itself at
Eym on the curve. Consequently, as profitability in the industry increases,
we would expect the capital/labour ratio of the L.M.F. to increase as
a proportion of the C.F. capital/labour ratio (and vice versa if profits
decrease). The proof of this is contained in Appendix 2.
In order to test the long-run predictions we will attempt to identify
fairly long periods during which general profitability in the industry
has shifted. Changes in the K/L ratios of capitalist firms will then
be compared with that of the cooperatives. Unfortunately the concept
of the "long-run" is inevitably limited by the time span for which suitable
data is available. It may be that this is not a long enough period to
allow the full adjustment of all factors of production.
4. Long-Term Trends in the Footwear Industry
Martin and O'Connor calculated real rates of return for private
manufacturing companies in Britain.2 Their results are shown in Table
U.1.
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TABLE 4.1 REAL RATES OF RETURN OF PRIVATE MANUFACTURING COMPANIES .
t:-:------····-=- -.-...--.----
!
Year 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69
Rate of Return* 12.9 10.7 9.7 10..1 11.1 10.4 9.0 9.0 9.1 8.9
Year 70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79
Rate of Retur-n= 7.3 7.5 ?8 7.6 3.3 3.1 3.? 4.7 5.0 2.9
Source: Martin &O'Connor. See Footnote 2.
* Rate of return = Gross trading profit plus rent received, less stock
appreciation, less capital consumption at replacement costs as percentage
of net capital stock (fixed assets other than land) at replacement
cost plus book value of stocks.
Martin and O'Connor comment that "rates of return for the
U.K. show a downward treT'.dfrom at least 1960, with a sharp decline
in 1974-5, and a partial recovery up to 1978 and a further sharp drop-
in 1979.
Footwear manufacturers were no exception. It is impossible to obtain
information on profitability in the footwear industry before the 1970's.
The Footwear Industry Study Steering Group r-epor-t;,however, that a "study
carried out by the consultants A.I.C. in 1970 concluded that the trend
in profitability had been downwards in all sectors of the industry since
1960.,,3
The British Footwear Manufacturers Federation (B.F.M.F.) began to
publish measures of industry profitability in 1972. Their results are
reported in Table 4.2. The Footwear Industry Study Steering Group (F.r.S.S.G.)
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commented that the B.F.M.F. estimates "are based on historic cost accounts,
and hence, given the acceleration of inflation over the period, the trend
in current cost terms would have looked a great deal worse. A rough
adjustment to the 1974 and 1975 figures to allow for the current cost
of replacing stock and capital equipment suggest that the industry barely
broke even in 1974 and made a loss in 175.114
The Footwear Industry also suffe~ed a massive decline in its labour
force between 1950 and 1978. This was mostly as a result of extensive
import penetration, rising from 4.4% of U.K. sales (measured in pairs)
in 1950 to 42.5% of sales in 1978.5
5. Short-Term Expansion in the Footwear Industry 1970-1978
We will begin by looking at the period 1970-78, as these are the
years for which information on individual firms is available.
The Census of Production records a decline in total employment
~n the industry for every year between 1970 and 1978. The B.M.F.M.
reported a similar experience among its members, although one year,
1977, saw the workforce mai,ntained at the same level as the previous
6year.
The long-term trend was, therefore, undoubtedly of a contracting
workforce. The sampl~ of capitalist firms and cooperatives followed
this trend. (See Chapter 5, Section 4 ). Two years, 1972 and
1977 stand out against this trend. The Census of Production records
a rise over the previous year in employment per enterprise, even though
total employment was still falling in these two years.
Census of Produ~tion data covers a calendar year. Many firms
use a different financial year. Consequently we would expect a rise
in firms' employment to be reported in either 1972 and 1977, or in the
following years, 1973 and '78.
The samples of individua.lfirms lend support to the picture that
emerges from the aggregate figures. Ten of the ICC footwear sample
reported labour force figures for the 1970's. Eight recorded a rise
in their workforce in either 1972 and/or '73. Nine out of the ten recorded
an increase in 1977 and/or '78. The original sample of C.F.'s followed
a similar pattern. Information is available on sixteen firms. Thirteen
increased their labour force in 1972 and/or '73, although only ten did
so in 1977 or '78. Two more firms, however, managed to hold their labour
force steady in 1977.
Table 4.2 illustrates profits and earnings in the footwear industry.
Real profits rose in the years of expansion, i.e. 1972 and 1977, and
peaked in the following years. The rise in real earnings was poor in
1972 and 1977. In fact the high rate of inflation forced real earnings
down in 1977. Real earnings recovered well in the following years
however, i.e. 1973 and '78.
Table 4.2 suggests that the expansion in the workforce noted
in 72/73 and 77/78 was accompanied by a rise in industry profitability,
as we might expect. There is also evidence that the workforce soon
responded to the improved conditions enjoyed by their employers, and
were able to win back some of the short-term improvement in the surplus.
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TABLE 4.2 PROFITS AND EARNINGS IN THE FOOTWEAR INDUSTRY
Year Index of Footwear % Increase % Increase % Increase
Deflated Manuf's In Ave. in Retail in Real Ave.--Profits Profita- Earnings Prices Earnings.
C & F (1) bility(2) (3)
78 60.0 6.1 13.2 8.3 4.9
77 50.4 5.0 12.2 15.8 -3.6
76 42.5 4.5 16.6 16.5 0.1
75 49.6 3.7 22.7 24.3 -1.6
74 74.5 4.1 18.9 16.0 2.9
p
73 80.6 5.7 17.0 9.2 7.8
72 78.6 4.5 8.9 7.1 1.8
71 70.7 N/A 10.5 9.4 1.1
(1) Source: Annual Abstract of Statistics for Footwear and Clothing
Manufacturers. Index of Gross trading profits deflated
by R.P.I. 1950=100.
(2) Source: B.F.M.F. "Footwear Industry Statistical Review".
"Profitability" = Pre-tax Profit + Turnover.
(3) Source: Census of Production. Average Earnings were calculated
by dividing the annual wages bill by the number employed.
6. Capitalist Footwear Firms 1972/3
We next turn to the experiences of individual capitalist firms.
Unfortunately information on wages and salaries were only available for
five of the original sample of footwear firms. Much of the evidence will
therefore be concentrated on the I.C.C. firms.
,
TABLE 4.3 EXPERIENCES OF THE ICC FOOTWEAR SAMPLE 1972-73
No. of Increased IN THE SAME YEAR AS WORKFORCE ROSE IFirms Workforce Real Potential Real Real Ave. Ave.Earnings rose I
rin 72 or 73 Surplus Rose Profits Earnings more than ave. rr
Rose Rose in footwear Ir
I
!
3, YES YES YES YES YES
1 YES "YES YES YES NO
2 YES YES NO YES YES
1 YES YES NO YES NO
1 YES NO NO NO NO
1 NO YES YES YES NO
1 NO NO YES NO NO
Table 4.3 summarises the experience of the ICC Footwear firms in
1972/73. The table not only describes movements in labour for~e,
profi ts and earnings, but also in "real potential s.ur-p Lus!". In
Chapter 2 the "potential surplus" was described as "that profit
which a C.F. might achieve after a rise in product price if all factors
continued to be paid at their old, zero profits price." (see p. 46).
In this chapter the "real potential surplus" (R.P .5.) is estimated
by adding profits before tax to the annual wages bill and deflating
this figure by the retail price index. The R.P.S. is therefore diff-
erent from the"P.S. because it includes what would have been the
wages bill had wages remained constant. This estimate of the R.P.S.
is useful, however, because it gives some indication of whether
profits fell because of changes in real earnings or in trading conditions.
. '
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The changes in average earnings described throughout this chapter
will reflect changes in the earningsfrom piecework and overtime -as
well as movements in the wage rate. Goodman reports that in 1975,
71% of adult operatives in footwear worked on payments by results.7
Unfortunately data is not available which would allow these two factors
to be separated out-,
We can see from Table 4.3 that seven of the eight firms which
expanded their labour force in 1972/73 also enjoyed a r-Lsein their
R.P.S. in the same year. The remaining firm recorded such a massive
expansion in employees (87%) during 1972 that it seems probable that
it merged with or took over another firm. The consequent readjustment
apparently brought profits down, although by 1974 they had risen
to a new high.
Three firms expanded their labour force, and saw a rise in R.P.S.
but real profits fell. Why was this? Two of these firms would have
been able to maintain a fairly stable level of profits if real average
earnings had stayed at the level of the previous year. In one firm,
although real earnings r-ose, they lagged well behind the national
increase. This firm would have suffered a serious decline in profits
even if real earnings had remained constant. This 'suggests that
the firm miscalculated and expanded its workforce by too much.
Two of the ICC firms did not expand their labour force. Was
this because they did not enjoy the improved conditions experienced
by most of the industry? This may have been true of one firm which
recorded a fall in R.P.S. This firm did, however, manage to raise
real profits by reducing real payments to workers. The other firm
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showed the signs that we would expect to initiate an expansion in
the workforce, i.e. a rise in R.P.S. and real profits. It chose,
however, to continue to reduc~ its workforce.
We will look briefly at the experiences of the original sample
of capitalist footwear firms in 1972/73. Thirteen added to their
employees in 1972 and/or 73. Ten of these also experienced a rise
in real profits in the same year. Unfortunately data on average
earnings is only available for four of these expanding firms. In
only one firm did real average earnings fall, and this was the only
one of the four which experienced a fall in real profits at the same
time. This would appear to be another example of over-expansion
of the workforce.
Three firms in this sample did not expand their workforce in
1972 or '73. Two of the firms enjoyed a substantial rise in real
profits in both years. For one firm in which earnings data is available,
both R.P.S. and real earnings rose. The third firm suffered a slight
drop in real profits in 1972, but recovered strongly in '73.
We may summarise the experiences of the ten ICC firms and the
five C.F.'s for which wages data was available. This is shown in
Table 4.4.
TABLE 4.4 SUMMARY OF FOOTWEAR FIRM EXPERIENCES 1972/73
No., f'Lr-ms
1-'
2 tR.P.S. + +L + no rise in real earnings (pure profit maximizers)
8 tR.P.S. + +L + rise in real earnings {impure profit maximizers)
2 tR.P.S. + ~L + rise in real 'earnings (perverse response)
2 -VR.P.S. + .f.L+ no rise in real earnings (over-expansion of L)
1. tR.P.S. + ..J..L + no rise in real earnings (no rise in demand)
t-.
15
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This small sample of footwear manufacturers displays evidence
of a shift in the footwear market in the early seventies which raised
the potential surplus which could be earned by firms. Only one of
the fifteen firms appeared not to experience these improved conditions.
Twelve firms responded by expanding their labour force. Two of
these firms appear to have over-expanded and found both real profits
and R.P.S. falling. The majority (10) of the firms expanded the work-
force, but also had to pay an increase in real earnings to their em-
ployees. As a consequence, three out of the ten suffered a fall in
real profits. It is not possible to ask whether this rise in employees'
earnings induced firms to reverse the expansion. This is because most
firms cut back in 1974 in response to a sudden contraction in demand.
Two firms fitted the neoclassical model of toe firm, i.e. they
experienced a rise in R.P.S., expanded the workforce while holding
down real average earnings, and consequently enjoyed a rise in real
profits. Two firms reacted in the reverse way. Although R.P.S. rose,
and real earnings also improved, these firms cut back on their work-
force. This behaviour is exactly that predicted for the L.M.F.
Furthermore, two C.F. firms for which earnings data is not available
also cut back their labour force while enjoying a very substantial
rise in real profits. It seems very likely that these two were also
behaving perversely.
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7. Capitalist Footwear Firms 1977/8
TABLE 4.5 EXPERIENCES OF THE ICC FOOTWEAR SAMPLE 1977/78
Increased IN THE SAME YEAR AS WORKFORCE ROSE
No. of workforce Real Poten- Real Real Ave. Ave.Earnings
firms in 72 or 73 tial Surplus Profits Earnings rose more
Rose Rose Rose than ave. in
footwear
2 YES YES .YES YES YES
2 YES YES YES YES NO
4 YES YES NO YES YES
1 YES YES YES NO NO
1 N) YES(77) YES(77) NO(77) NO(77)
YES(78) NO(78) YES(78) YES(78)
Table 4.5 summarises the experiences of ICC footwear firms in 1977/8.
The scene is very similar to 1972/3 .. Almost half of the firms which
expanded their workforce did not manage to improve their real profits,
although the R.P.S. rose. In all four cases average earnings rose
by more than the national average.
One firm did not expand employment although R.P.S. rose in both
1977 and 1978. 1977 also saw a big rise in the real profits of this
firm (82% higher than 1976), while average earnings, which were
well below the national average, fell back even further. By 1978,
however, labour managed a striking improvement in its earnings, and
this held back any further improvement in profits.
Only ten of the 16 original footwear sample increased employment
in 1977 or '78. All but one of these enjoyed an increase in real
-profits in the same year. Six firms did not expand their labour
force, but all of these experienced a rise in real profits in 1977
and/or '78.
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Data on wages are available for five of the original footwear
sample. All of these increased employment in 1977 or '78. One firm
suffered a drop in R.P.S., real profits, and real earnings. This
appears to be an example of over expansion. Three firms followed
the more usual pattern of an increase in labour, profits and real
earnings. The fifth firm managed to hold down real earnings, while
enjoying a rise in R.P.S. and real profits.
TABLE 4.6 SUMMARY OF FOOTWEAR FIRM EXPERIENCES 1977/78
No. of l'
Firms
2 +R.P.S. + tL + no rise in real earnings (pure profit maximizers)
11 tR.P.S. + 4'-L + rise in real earnings (impure profit maximizers)
1 t-R.P.S.+ vL + rise in real earnings (perverse response)
1 +R.P.S. + ~L + no rise in real earnings (over-expansion of L)
0 .j.R.P.S.+ -}L+ no rise in real earnings (no rise in demand)
15
Table 4.6 shows much the same pattern as Table 4.4. The majority
of firms might be classified as "impure" profit maximizers, i. e.
they expanded the labour force in response to a rise in demand, but
labour managed to win back a large part of the rise in R.P.S. In
some cases this caused firms to suffer a loss in real profits.
~irms showing a perverse response are probably under-
represented in Table 4.6. Six out of the original 16 footwear firms
did not expand their labour force in either 1977 or '78. They all, ,
however, enjoyed a rise in real profits in at least one of these
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years. All of these may have been behaving perversely. Unfortunately
earnings data is not available to confirm this.
8. Footwear Cooperatives 1970-78
If cooperatives enjoy an increase in demand at the same time
as private firms in the industry, then the neoclassical model of
the pure L.M.F. would predict that they would decrease their work-
force while enjoying an increase in real earnings per worker.
-~
Two different measures might be used for real earnings of
cooperative members. One is the earnings distributed to workers,
i.e. their wages plus the annual bonus. A purer measure would also
include profits per worker after payment of the bonus, Le. R.P.S.
per worker. In theory members would want to maxi~ize potential
surplus per worker in order to benefit from an immediate distribution
of this surplus, or by enjoying an increase in earnings in the future
as a result of judicious reinvestment of the surplus. This model
is more convincing for cooperatives, such as those in Mondragon,
in which members may withdraw their share of the undistributed profits
on leaving the cooperative. CPF members formally own a part of the
cooperative's assets through their ownership of shares. Under British
law, however, cooperative shares may only be redeemed at their nominal
value. Members are therefore unable to retrieve their share of the
undistributed profits via the appreciated value of the shares.
It is questionable, therefore, that CPF members would wish to
maximise the potential surplus unless this is directly related to
their take home pay. In this section we will consider how both
measures of incom~ change.
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TABLE 4.7 EXPERIENCES OF CPF FOOTWEAR COOPERATIVES 1972-73
Increased IN 1972 OR 73 TREND WAS UP FOR
Name of Workforce Real Po- Real Real Ave. Earn- Real Po-
Co-op in 72 or 73 tential Profits Ave .. ings as % tential
Surplus Earnings national Surplus I
(1) ave. in per workerfootwear
Equity YES YES YES YES NO YES
Avalon NO YES YES* YES YES YES
NPS No data - - - - -
St. Crispin NO NO NO YES YES YES
* Fall in real trading loss
TABLE 4.8 EXPERIENCES OF CPF FOOTWEAR COOPERATIVES 1977-7a
Increased IN 1977 OR 78 TREND WAS UP FOR
Name of Workforce Real Po- Real Real Ave. Earn- Real Po-
Co-op in 77 or 78 tential Profits Ave. ings as % tential
Surplus Earnings national Surplus
(1) ave. in per workerfootwear
Equity YES YES YES YES YES YES..
Avalon YES YES YES NO NO NO
NPS NO YES YES NO NO NO
St. Crispin YES YES YES YES NO YES
(l»Average Earnings are calculated by adding the annual wages and
salaries bill to the annual bonus and dividing by the number of
workers.
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Four footwear cooperatives continued to operate through the
1970's. Their experiences are describes in Tables 4.7. and 4.8.
We will look at each in turn.
Equity Shoes followed the same pattern as the majority of the
footwear firms. The workforce was increased in 1973 and also in
1977 and '78. The real value of profits, potential surplus and average
earnings all rose at the same time. Real potential surplus per worker
also increased in 1973 and 1977. It fell back slightly in 1978,
although was still well above the 1976 level.
Avalon Footwear suffered a continuous decline in its workforce
between 1969 and 1975. This is not surprising when we observe that
it also made a loss on trading for every year between 1969 and 1975.
It managed to remain solvent because of the exceptionally large income
that it derived from its investments. Income from this source decreased
rapidly, however, as the investments were sold off. 1973 did witness
the trading loss being almost halved from the previous year. The
rapid decline in labour was also momentarily halted, with only one
less worker recorded. The two previous years had seen drops of 14
and 7. After 1973, however, the workforce was once more cut back
sharply, with a reduction of 7 between 1973 and 74 and of ten the
following year. Workers' earnings also rose from well below the
national average in 1972 to just above the industry average in 1973.
By 1974, however, average earnings were once more falling behind
the average in footwear.
From 1976 onwards Avalon Footwear managed to move back into
profit, and increased its workforce slightly in 1976 with a larger
increase in 1977. 'Average earnings fell back in 1977, but had caught
up by 1978.
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Unfortunately information on the number of workers is not avail-
able for NPS Shoes for the years 1970-72, and 1976. We therefore
cannot be certain whether the labour force was increased in 1972.
The records show, however, that N.P.S. had the same number of workers
in 1973 as in 1969, which suggests that the cooperative maintained
a fairly stable workforce throughout the early seventies. The same
pattern continued to 1978, with the workforce never being more than
68 or less than 66. Average earnings decreased as a percent of the
industry average between 1975 and '78. Real profits improved signif-
icantly in 1977 and '78. They were not sufficient, however, to outweigh
the fall in earnings and R.P.S. per worker fell back.
Finally we come to st. Crispin Productive Society. St. Crispin
reduced its workforce from 99 in 1971 to 84 in 1972 and 80 in 1973.
This was combined with a fall in real profits (in fact it made a
loss in '72 and '73), as well as a fall in the real value of potential
surplus. Both the R.P.S. per worker and real average earnings rose
substantially in 1972, but fell back compared with the average rise
in footwear earnings in 1973.
The real value of st. Crispin's profits in 1977 and '78 were
considerably better than previous years. The cooperative did in-
crease its workforce, but only by one in each year from a base of
91 in 1976. In other words, the labour force remained almost constant.
Real average earnings were low in 1977 although they improved in
'18. As a percent of national average, earnings remained almost
constant. The R.P.S. per worker showed an improvement in both years.
What, if anything, can we conclude from the behaviour of the
footwear cooperatives in the '70's? Certainly there was no widespread
tendency to cut back on the labour force when capitalis~ firms were
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expanding. Avalon did reduce the workforce in years when most firms
were growing. The improvement in trading conditions in 1973 did,
however, enable Avalon Footwear to stem the decline in its workforce.
In fact, employment remained virtually the same between 1972 and
'73. Similarly, NPS maintained an almost constant labour force in
the late seventies, even though real profits were improving. Only
one cooperative showed any evidence of a neoclassical reaction to
improved trading conditions. This was St. Crispin Productive Society,
which reduced its workforce in 1972 and 1973, but at the same time
suffered a fall in the real value of both profits and the real potential
surplus. The real potential surplus per worker did improve slightly
in 1972, but fell below the 1971 value in 1973. It would be possible,
therefore, to accept St. Crispin's behaviour in 1972 as the classic
short-run reaction of the labour managed firm to an increase in
demand. On the other hand, it must be remembered that St. Crispin
made a loss in 1972. The loss occurred in 1972 because average earnings
were well up on the previous year, although the increase was only
slightly more than found throughout footwear. Did the cooperative
plan to maximize members "income by cutting back the labour force,
or did it miscalculate the rise in wages which could be paid, and,
finding that it was running into loss, cut back the workforce?
Certainly the cooperatives did not show a general tendency to
react perversely to changes in demand. Equity Shoes, which earned
a reasonable rate of profit through the 1970's behaved exactly as
its capitalist counterparts. Other cooperatives displayed a tendency
to maintain a more stable workforce than capitalist firms.
\.
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9. Footwear before 1970
Most companies were exempt from f'Ll.Lngaccounts with the Registrar
of Companies until the passing of the 1967 Companies Act. Consequently
there is a dearth of information about both aggregate and individual
companies prior to 1970. Unfortunately far more is knovm about the
footwear cooperatives before 1970, as most of them ceased trading
in the late 1960's.
One period does stand out, however, as moving against the trend
of steady decline in the footwear industry. This was the first few
years of the 1960's.
The Department of Employment Gazette recorded an increase in
employment in the industry in the years 1959, '60 and '61 (using
figures for July of each year). Footwear employment reached a peak
in 1961 and then fell back in 1962 and '63. It made a slight recovery
in 1964, but then went into continuous decline for the rest of the
decade.
Profits are not available for the footwear industry on its
own. Figures for both clothing and footwear manufacture are reported
in the Annual Abstract of Statistics. They are shown in Table 4.9.
TABLE 4.9 DEFLATED INDEX OF COMPANIES GROSS-TRADING PROFITS 1957-65
YEAR 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65
-,
Clothing &~ 67.7 59.8 72.1 84.9 73.0 63.8 73.5 71.2 79.4Footwear
All Manu- j 100.0 93.9 105.2 115.6 105.2 101.4 107.0 115.7 113.9
facturing
Source: Annual Abstract of Statistics.
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The Clothing and Footwear industries followed the same pattern
as other manufacturers. Real profits rose to a peak in 1960 from
a low in 1958. Profits then dropped sharply to a low in 1962, and
then began to recover. The rise in real earnings in the footwear
industry, shown in Table 4.10 mirrored shi.ftsin profitability in
the industry.
TABLE 4.10 AVERAGE EARNINGS IN THE FOOTWEAR INDUSTRY 1957-65
PERCENTAGES
Year 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65
Rise in Ave.* 5.6 5.3 3.0 5.3 3.3 4.3 5.8 6.0 10.0
Earnings
Rise in Re-
tail Prices 3.7 3.7 -0.1 1.0 3.4 4.2 2.0 3.2 4.8
Rise in real--earnings 1.9 1.6 3.1 4.3 -0.1 0.1 3.8 2.8 5.2
*Average earnings were calculated as in Table 4.2. For years in
which there was no Census of Production, the % rise was estimated
using Employment Gazette figures.
Real average earnings among footwear employees rose rapidly
in 1959 and '60, they then remained constant in 1961 and '62, and
began to improve once more in 1963. Once again we see an example
of capitalist firms behaving in the way predicted for labour-managers,
i.e. increasing payments to labour in response to an improvement
in profits.
Aggregate employment in the footwear industry continued to
increase into 1961, even though trading conditions apparently reversed
in this year, and all manufacturing suffered a drop in profits.
Unfortunately, information on employee strengths in the early
sixties is only available for six firms in the footwear·sample.
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Their experiences support the aggregate picture. Five of the firms
recorded an increase in employment in 1961. At the same time four
out of the five experienced a drop in the nominal value of their
profits. The fifth firm experienced a 10% increase in real profits.
The sixth firm, which held its labour force constant between 1960
and 1961, increased its profits by more than 300%, even though its
1960 profits were fairly average.
All in all, the evidence suggests that the expansionary years
of 1959 and 1960 mislead footwear firms into further expanding employ-
ment in 1961. This was a mistaKe, and, along with the worsening
trading conditions, resulted in a heavy fall in profits.
We can now compare the behaviour of the footwear cooperatives
over the same period. Information is available for ten cooperatives.
All but one of these cooperatives employed less people in 1965 than
in 1957. In other words, the cooperatives experienced the same
general decline in employment as found throughout the industry over
the same period. Even so, every cooperative increased employment
in at least one of the years 1959 to 1961.
TABLE 4.11 CHANGES IN EMPLOYMENT IN FOOTWEAR COOPERATIVES 1957-65
Year 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65-
Increase in L 4 1 5 7 6 4 3 4 3
Constant L 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 0
Decrease in L 6 9 5 3 4 5 6 4 6
-,
Total Coops 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 9 9
Number of firms
Total employ:-
ment in foot- 119.5 109.2 111.4 113.8 116.5 113.1 110.0 113.0 107.1
wear (July) Thousands
Source: Dept. of Employment Gazette
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It is clear from Table 4.11 that the trend of employment among
the cooperatives was very similar to that of capitalist firms. All
but one of the cooperatives cut back employment in 1958, a year which
saw a fall in real profits throughout the industry. By 1960, however,
seven of the ten cooperatives were expanding their labour force.
After 1962 the position began to reverse, with the majority of the
cooperatives reducing employment.
Only two out of the ten cooperatives reduced employment in both
1960 and 1961. Were these two behaving as expected of pure income
maximizing labour managed firms? In both cases the real value of
income per worker (profits plus wages) were higher in 1960 and '61
than in 1959, while average earnings also increased more than the
average for the industry. Two out of ten cooperatives may, therefore,
have restricted growth in employment in order to enjoy an improvement
in income per worker. We also saw, however, that one out of six
capitalist firms also chose to hold back employment while enjoying
a massive improvement in profits. Overall, there appears very little
difference between the two groups.
10 .. Long-Run Behaviour in the Footwear Industry
We saw in Section 4 that 1976 marked the end of a long period
of declining profitability for the British footwear industry, (although
there had been a short lived improvement in 1972/73). We will, there-
fore, compare firms in 1976 with their position in 1969 (the earliest
year for which data was available for most firms). The I.C.C. series
did not report information on capital until 1971, and so for this
group the comparison is confined to 1971 and '76.
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Some firms began to respond to the short-term improvement in
demand as early as 1976, although as we saw earlier, expansion did
not usually begin until 1977. In order to check whether this early
expansion may have influenced the 1976 results, 1975 figures will
also be reported.
The first hurdle met when estimating K/L ratios is the question
of what measure should be used for capital. Accounting measures
of fixed capital are notoriously inaccurate. The "value" placed
on an asset depends on the method and rate of depreciation used.
Once an asset is fully depreciated its written down value will be
zero, although it may still be productive. Assets are also valued
at historic cost, i.e. the price at which they were purchased. Con-
sequently, the higher the rate of inflation the more their value
will appear to faLl
Four measures of fixed assets were used: (i) Total fixed assets
not depreciated (FA); (ii) Total fixed assets depreciated (FA-d);
(iii) Plant, machinery and vehicles not depreciated (PMV); (iv) Plant,
machinery and vehicles depreciated (PMV-d). Both F.A. and P.M.V.
were tried because the stated value of land and buildings can be
exceptionally inaccurate. Land and buildings tend to last much longer
than other fixed assets, while the application of depreciation may
not reflect any decrease in their real value. Consequently the
historic cost of land and buildings is likely to bear no relation
to its true value. Furthermore, some firms rent land and buildings.
This may make them appear.far less capital intensive than firms which
own their premises. Machinery may also be rented, but not usually
on such a large scale.
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In a few cases firms revalued fixed assets over the period studied.
In this case earlier measures of capital were adjusted using the
measure employed in later years.
An alternative measure of capital which is frequently used is
"net assets" or "capital employed", i.e. the sum of nominal capital,
reserves and long-term loans. In theory this long-term capital is
used to purchase fixed assets, whereas current liabilities are used
to pay for the day to day running of the firm. Capital employed
may therefore be a better measure than fixed assets of the capital
used by the firm.
Table 4.12 indicates the correlation between the measures of
fixed assets and capital employed for both cooperatives and capitalist
firms.
TABLE 4.12 CORRELATING FIXED ASSETS AND CAPITAL EMPLOYED
Measure Correlation Coefficient between Capital Employed
of 1973 1978
fixed CPF Coops Original ICC CF CPF Coops Original ICC CF
Assets (Allr- CF CF
(Footwear) (Footwear (All*) (Footwear)(Footwear)
1. FA 0.284 0.933 - 0.829 0.859 -
2. FA-d -0.161 0.909 0.412 0.950 0.780 0.681
3. PMV 0.322 0.886 - 0.802 0.820 -
4. PMV-d -0.248 0.761 - 0.814 0.735 -
-,
* All coops were·used as very few footwear coops survived into
the '70s.
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The original sample of capitalist firms do show a good correlation
between capital employed and the various measures of fixed assets. The
undepreciated value of total fixed assets displays the best correlation.
The cooperatives show a similar level of correlation in 1978,
but a very poor rate in 1973. The explanation is straightforward.
The sample of cooperatives in 1973 contained enterprises which had
been making a loss for some years and were on the point of closure. In
some cases shareholders funds (nominal capital plus reserves) were actually
negative. The 1978 results were only for those cooperatives which survived
the decade. It is these cooperatives which will be studied in this section.
The 1973 results for the cooperatives illustrate how sensitive
"capital employed" may be to profits earned. This implies that capital
intensity may well reflect the profits earned by the firm (and therefore
the internal funds available). The neoclassical model avoids this
obstacle by assuming that all capital is externally financed. It
could still be argued, however, that even if firms are restricted by
their profits when deciding on the desired level of capital, that
their capital/labour ratio would not be so affected. This would be
because they would adjust labour downwards in line with capital
availability.
The ICC footwear firms show a poor correlation between fixed
assets and capital employed. It is open to question which measure
bet~er reflects real capital use. Unfortunately, because the I.C.C.
did n6t report the value of fixed assets before 1973, we will have to
rely on measures of capital employed.
Table 4.13 reports the 1975 and 176 capital/labour ratios as
<.,
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a proportion of the 1969 K/L ratios for 16 footwear firms from the
original sample of C.F. 'so Whatever measure of capital is used,
it is clear that the 16 firms pursued diverging paths., For this
reason both the minimum and maximum results were reported as well
as the average. The median result has also been included.
Nearly all of the firms show an increase in the capital/labour
ratio in later years, whatever the ,measure used. This was a
consequence of inflation, and undoubtedly many would have shown
a fall in the K/L ratio if the measure of capital had been adjusted
to 1971 prices.
The ratio using capital employed as a measure' of capital was,
on average, lower than measures using fixed assets, although the
average result using FA-d was very similar. This, in fact, is just
what we would expect. In theory c~pital employed should reflect
the written down value of all fixed assets, i.e. FA-d.
Table 4.14 reports the 1975 and '76 capital/labour ratios as
a proportion of the 1971 K/L ratio for the sample of ICC footwear
firms. In this case only capital employed was used as a measure
of capital, as data for fixed assets was not avail~ble in 1971. The
ICC firms, like the original sample of footwear firms, displayed
a wide variety of fortunes.
Table 4.14 reports the ratios for the four footwear cooperatives
which survived through the 1970's. It is apparent that the cooperatives
show no consistent difference from the capitalist firms. Nearly
all the results lie within the range reported for the C.F. 'so (The
numbers were too-small to test whether there was any statistical
difference).
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TABLE -4.14 1.C .C. SAMPLE OF FOOTWEAR CAPITALIST FIRMS
(K/WRATIO 1975 OR 76 DIVIDED BY (K/L) RATIO 1971
1975/71 1976/71
Measure of K CE CE
Max. 2.22 2.79
Min. 0.94 0.84
Ave. 1.59 1.63
Median 1.56 1.61
Number of obser.vations = 8 ('75)and 9 ('76)
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The PMV-d result for St. Crispin was very high for both
1975/69 and 1976/69, but the other measures used for capital
were well within the C.F. range. This suggests that, although some
adjustment was made to the St. Crispin data to allow for re-
valuation of assets in 1971, that this adjustment was not
satisfactory for the PMV-d ratios.
The change in the N.P.S. capital employed ratio between 75 and
69 was higher than that recorded for any capitalist firm, although
the change in other measures of fixed assets was below the average
for C.F.'s.
If anything then, the CPF cooperatives might have shown a
tendency to increase their K/L ratios more than the C.F.'s. This
is exactly the opposite result to that predicted by neoclassical
theory. The fall in profitability would have led us to expect
the coops to increase their K/L ratios less than the C.F.'s.
On the whole, however, the data suggests that the experience
of the footwear coops waS as diverse as that of the footwear C.F.'s,
but that their behaviour was not consistently different from that
of the capitalist firms.
11. Short-Run Behaviour in Clothing and Printing
It has proved far more difficult to identify short-run, or
sudden, shifts in demand in the clothing and printing industries.
There are two reasons, first the absence of information on individual
capitalist firms, and second the much greater diversity within
these industries as compared with footwear manufacture.
,
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It was not possible to obtain data on employee strength for
the sample of clothing and printing firms. These firms were~small
enough to be exempt from declaring the size of their workforce
even after the 1967 Act. Unfortunately the ICC Business Ratio
Series covering Printers did not begin until 1977. The ICC Reports
do go back further for clothing manufacturers. However, different
sectors of the clothing industry e~perienced quite different conditions
during the 19701s, and it was impossible to pick out anyone year
when a majority of the ICC sample increased or decreased their
workforce.
The clothing industry is far less homogeneous than footwear.
Firms tend to be smaller but are far more numerous. As with foot-
wear, the industry experienced a massive decline in its workforce
between 1950 and 1978. Not all sectors, however, suffered the
same set-backs. A noticeable exception is the Standard Industrial
Classification (SIC) No. 4450, "Dresses, Lingerie and Infants
8Wear" which increased its workforce by 7.5% between 1968 and 1978.
Even so, average empl,oyment per enterprise in this sector fell
from 45.4 to 31.8 over the same period.
The printing industry has remained far more buoyant than
clothing or footwear. General Printers and Publishers (SIC 489)
managed to maintain a fairly stable workforce until the early
seventies. Since then there has been a significant drop in employ-
, 9ment, which fell by 14% between 1970 and 178. The average
enterprise workforce had, however, been declining over a much
longer period. In 1958 each enterprise employed an average of
30.8 workers, by 1978 the figure was 19.3.10 Total employment
in the industry was maintained by a steady increase in the number
of printing firms.
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For both industries, therefore, there has been a general decline
in the average employment per enterprise. But for both groups one
period stands out against this trend.
TABLE 4.16 EMPLOYMENT AND PROFITABILITY IN CLOTHING AND PRINTING
mp oymen 1n thousands
YEAR 66 67 68 69 70
Clothing a
Total employment 417 392 384 389 380
Index of Real 77.6 72.5 72.3 66.6 65.4
profits c
P . t· brln ~ng
Total employment 651 640 642 649 655
Index of Real 99.6 104.7 117.3 103.1 103.3
profits
Elt .
Sources: Employment from the Department of Employment Gazette,
June of each year.
Profits were taken from the Annual Abstract of Statistics
and deflated by the R.P.I.
a. "Clothing" = all SIC categories under "CLothIng & Footwear"
excluding footwear.
b. "Printing" = SIC category "Paper, Printing & Publishing".
c. Real profits are for both clothing and footwear.
We can see from Table 4.16 that both industries suffered a
fall in employment from 1966 to '67. After this the printing industry
'(including General Printing and Publishing) picked up and increased
'its workforce in 1968, '69 and '70. After that employment fell back.
The largest increase in the workforce was in 1969, one year after
-the peak in real profitability.
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The clothing industry also managed to reverse the rapid decline
in its workforce in 1969, although real profits never recovered.
They did, however, remain almost constant between 1967 and '68.
1968 was a year which saw a peak in the real profits of all manu-
facturers, and appears to have stimulated expansion among both
clothing and printing firms.
Let us now compare the clothing and printing cooperatives
over the same period. Data is available for two clothing coopera-
tives. Ideal Clothiers had seen a continuous decline in its work-
force since 1960. 1969 was the first year in which it recorded
an increase in employment. Queen Eleanor, which operates in the
Dress, Lingerie and Infants Wear Sector, had, as expected, not
endured the contraction suffered by Ideal Clothiers (Mens Outfitters).
Employment fell back heavily in 1967, however, and then by a smaller
amount in 1968. 1969 reversed this trend, with the workforce
rising by 21 to 182. It then fell back again in 1970. Clearly
both cooperatives responded to the late sixties boom in the market
in exactly the same way as their capitalist counterparts.
Data is available for seven printing cooperatives over the
same period. All of these suffered a fall in their workforce
between 1965 and 1975. Four of the coops, however, increased
employment in either 1968, '69 or '70. Thesa coo;::>eratives,then,
behaved as expected of capitalist firms. 'fhatof the remaining
three firms, ,were they behaving as income maximizers?
One, Gloucester Printers, made a loss from 1967 until 1969, and
again in 1971 when it was dissolved. The earnings of the workforce,
as a percentage of the average among general printers, also declined.
The failure of Gloucester Printers to expand during this period was
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apparently due to its own particular difficulties rather than to
income maximizing policies.
A similar picture emerges from Bristol Printers. After a good
year in 1967, the profits fell away in 1968. From 1969 until its
dissolution in 1977, the cooperative made a loss in every year except
1970. Average earnings fell as a percentage of the national average
in both 1968 and 1969, although had recovered to their 1967 level
by 1970. The real income per worker (earnings plus share of profits),
rose slightly in 1968 but fell below the '67 level in 1969.
This leaves Hull Printers, which, after a bad year in 1967,
managed to sustain its profits at a little below the 1966 figure
between 1968 and 1970. Both earnings as a percent of the national
average, and real income per worker increased in 1968 and 1970, when
labour was reduced. This then could be seen as an example of income
maximization, although in 1969 both workers' relative earnings and
their real income fell back while the workforce remained constant'.
Out of nine cooperatives working in printing and clothing, only
one displayed a possible perverse short-run response. Once again,
the evidence does not support the neoclassical predictions.
12. Alternative Explanations of Short-Run Behaviour
There have been many attempts to explain away the predicted
short-run perversity of L.M.F.'s while retaining a neoclassical frame-
work. These were described in Chapter 1. They may be summarised
as follows:
TABLE 4.17 REMOJING SHORT-RUN PERVERSITY IN THE L.M.F.
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Explanation of Rise in Demand .6.Lb..X
1. Fixed L (no variable inputs) o o
2. Fixed L (other variable inputs) o
3. Variable L + other variable i.nputs ?
}
+ve
.. S.S.L
-ve
S.S.L.
Utility function with Y_ & h4. o
Supply schedule of L (8.8.L.) o
5. Inegalitarian Cooperative
6. Hiring of non-members
7. Wage Adjustment with w adjusting more
slowly than L
8. Imperfect Competition ? ? o
~X = change in output
1:;). L = change in labour
bh = change in hours
~y = change in real income per worker.
Most of the explanati.ons outlined in Table 4.17 show no change
in the hours per worker. This is not to say that we might not expect
hours to change, but that such a change is not essential to explaining
away the perverse short-run predictions.
The authors who developed these alternative models were concerned
to eliminate predictions of a negative supply curve among L.M.F.'s.
Very few of the models predict that the labour force would expand
with a rise in demand I as vie would expect of capitalist firms. The
o
o
o
o l'
o I)'
?
?
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most frequent assumpti.on i.sthat the labour force will be held con-.
stant.
The evidence from the C.P.F. cooperatives suggests that fixed
membershi.p is inadequate to explain their short-run behaviour. By
far the majority of the cooperatives responded just like C.F.'s and
expanded their labour force when trading conditions improved. The
second most frequent response was to continue to reduce the workforce.
Usually this went hand in hand with a continuous loss on trading.
Only 'two cooperatives showed any sign of maintaining a stable
workforce. These were N.P.S. shoes and St. Crispin in 1977 and '78.
We can see from Table 4.17 that all but one of the models which hold
L fixed would predict an increase in income per worker as a consequence
of a rise in demand. Did this occur in N.P.S. and St. Crispin?
N.P.S. in fact suffered a sharp fall in the average take home
pay (wages and bonus) of workers between 1975 and '78. The index
of real average earnings fell from 3.95 in 1975 to 3.68 in 1977 and
3.86 in 1978. Earnings were 81.5% of the national average in 1975
but fell to 78.3% in '77 and 78.5% in 1978. Although real profits
improved considerably in 1977 and '78 this was not sufficient to
compensate for the drop in real earnings, so that the R.P.S. per
worker also fell after 1975.
Earnings in St. Crispin remained almost constant as a percent
of the national average between 1976 and 1978, although they were
down on the 1975 figure. The R.P.S. per worker did show an improvement
in both years, even when measured as a percent of average earnings
in footwear.
Neither cooperative, therefore, lends a lot of support to the
fixed labour models. In both cases, although profits'rose, take home
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pay did not. These models would only apply if workers were more
concerned about their share of the R.P.S. than their take home pay.
Even if this were true, onl~ st. Crispin would fit the evidence.
One model was described in Table 4.17 in which workers income,
y, might not increase, with a rise in demand while labour remains
constant. This was the example of a negative supply schedule of labour.
In this case we would always expect earnings per hour to rise. As
a consequence members would reduce the hours worked. In theory it
is possible that they would reduce the hours enough to produce a drop
in total income. In practice this is highly unlikely, and can probably
be ruled out.
If neoclassical models of the short-run behaviour of the L.M.F.
are to have any credibility in describing the behaviour of the C.P.F.
cooperatives, then they must explain why most cooperatives expanded
their workforce at the same time as capitalist firms. Table 4.17
describes three models which may satisfy this criterion. We will
consider each in turn.
One explanation of C.P.F. behaviour might be that they hired
non-members in expansionary phases, paying them a fixed wage. C.P.F.
cooperatives do employ non-members. This process will be described
in more detail in Chapter 5. This model assumes that the distribution
of any surplus after payment of wages is only shared among members.
This is not true of the C.P.F. cooperatives which pay a bonus to all
workers. The only income received by members as opposed to non-
members is the interest on share capital. British law requires,
however, that cooperatives pay a fixed interest on share capital.
Consequently members' earnings from the share dividend is unrelated
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to the profits earned by the cooperative. Furthermore, CPF members'
earnings from share dividends formed an insignificant portion ~f
their annual income (rarely more than 1%). We must conclude that
the use of hired labour by C.P.F. cooperatives cannot explain their
short-run behaviour.
Another explanation is that C.P.F. cooperatives are inegalitarian.
That is that they recruit new members at lower wage rates than found
among existing members. This is then justified by arguing that old
members have longer service, more experience, are more skilled,
etc. Undoubtedly C.P.F. cooperatives are inegalitarian. To show
that this might explain the C.P.F. cooperatives' behaviour we would
need to show that new workers were recruited at rates below that of
existing members. Unfortunately we do not have information on this,
and must leave this as a possible explanation of C.P.F. short-run
behaviour.
Next we come to wage adjustment theories. Horv'at claimed that
Yugoslav firms set wages at the beginning of the period, and then
adjust labour so as to maximize profits. That is, the Yugoslav firm
will behave just like the C.F. in the short-run. Vanek and Miovic
argue that, if in each period wages are adjusted until all undistributed
surplus disappears,then the short-run perverse behaviour could still
appear. The question becomes empirical. Which adjusts more rapidly,
labour or wages?
In this model we must look for a divergence between workers'
wages and their "income". Their "income" might be thought of as
their wages plus end of year bonus, 'or alternatively as H.P.S. per
worker. We can now look again at those cooperatives which expanded
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their labour force at the same time as capitalist firms in their
industry. How did average wages, average earnings (wages + bonus)
and R.P.S. per worker behave? Table 4.18 describes what happened
to cooperatives which increased their labour force during periods
of expansion in their industry.
TABLE 4.18 WAGE ADJUSTMENT AMONG COOPERATIVES
Number
Number of Coops which increased L once 10
Number of Coops for which (W+B)/W increased same year 1
Number of Coops for which R.P.S./W increased same year 3
Number of Coops which increased L two years running 8
Number in which (W+B)/W increased both years 0
Number in which R.P.S./W increased both years 3
Number in which (W+B)/W increased one year 5
Number in which R.P.S./W increased one year 7
W = annual wage bill. B = annual bonus.
If the slow wage adjustment theory is correct then we would
expect wages to fall as a proportion of "income", i.e. wages plus
bonus or wages plus profits (= R.P.S.).
There are 18 examples of cooperatives which expanded their work-
force at the same time as capitalist firms. Ten of these increased
labour in one year only. Eight coops increased labour for two
consecutive years.
We can see from Table 4.18 that wages kept up well with the
total take-home pay (wages + bonus) in the years concerned. There
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were 26 examples of cooperatives increasing labour (10 coops for
one year and eight coops for two years). Out of this there were only
six examples in which the bonus increased more than wages.
Wages lagged behind the R.P.S. more frequently. In thirteen
out of the twenty-six cases the R.P.S. increased as a proportion of
the wage bill.
It is possible, therefore, that the fact that wages adjust
more slowly than labour to changes in profitability is one explanation
of why cooperatives may behave like capitalist firms. Even so, this
would only serve to explain half of the examples described in Table
4.18.
Finally we come to imperfect competition. The three industries
that we have described here are probably some of the most competitive
manufacturing industries in Britain. Each industry has its giants,
but there are also a large number of small and medium sized firms
in the field. It is true, however, that footwear firms face a high
degree of monopoly in the wholesale market (see Chapter 7). There
can be little doubt that all the cooperatives face some degree of
imperfection in the market, so that we cannot rule this out as an
explanation of the cooperatives' behaviour. Imperfect competition
would, however, only serve as an explanation in the rare occasions
when the rise in demand induced a rise in the elasticity of demand
sufficient to induce the cooperative to expand the workforce. It
would seem inadequate, then, to explain the preponderance of coop-
eratives which conformed to capitalist behaviour in fairly competitive
industries.
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13. Conclusion
We have seen that the majority of the C.P.F. cooperatives did
not behave as predicted by the neoclassical theory of the L.M.F. in
the short-run. Furthermore, very few capitalist firms conformed
to the neoclassical model of an exogenous wage rate.
The existing explanations of why the predicted short-run
behaviour of the L.M.F. might not occur have not been very successful
in explaining the behaviour of the C.P.F. cooperatives.
The slow wage adjustment theory may give a partial explanation.
It is also feasible that the cooperatives use of an inegalitarian
system of wage payments was also effective.
It could be argued that the C.P.F. cooperatives are so undemo-
cratic that the behaviour of the cooperative is entirely determined
by a small group of managers. If this is true, would we expect the
managers' objectives to be different from that of other workers?
If managers' income is related to the average income per worker this
would lead us to expect managers to pursue the same goal of income
maximization.
Managerial theories of capitalist firms have suggested that
management may wish to maximize sales or workforce. This would help
to explain why cooperatives expanded along with other C.F.'s, but
it does not accord with the steady run down of the workforce of most
of the cooperatives since 1950.
Profit ma~imization is the objective which would best fit the
short-run behnviour of most of the C.P.F. cooperatives. Is it possible
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that undemocratic cooperative managers simply pursued maximum. profits
The problem here is to explain why managers might pursue this goal
rather than income maximization. This would suggest that managers'
income is directly related to total profits rather than income per
worker. It is difficult to explain why this should hold true.
Alternatively, it might be that managers are large shareholders
and their earnings from share dividends might be more important to
them than their salaries. British cooperative. law rules out this
explanation. The maximum shares which any individual may hold is
£5,000, while share interest is fixed and unrelated to profitability.
Members from outside the cooperative usually sit on its manage-
ment committee (usually representatives from other cooperative societies
or trade unions). These members represent the institutional share-
holders. Just like other shareholders, their earnings from share
interest is fixed and unrelated to profits. Once again, it is
difficult to understand why they might set the cooperative on a
path of ruthless profit maximizing.
To conclude, the..data presented in this chapter is insufficient
to prove or disprove anything. The results do not, however, lend any
support to the neoclassical theory of the L.M.F. It will be argued in
Chapters 7 and 8 that the failure of neoclassical theory to explain the
behaviour of cooperatives working within capitalism is because of its
failure to take account of the dominant forces acting on firms working
within capitalism today. The Neo-Ricardian model described in Chapter 9
also misses out many of these forces. It will be suggested, however,
that the latter model is much more adaptable to realistic conditions
than is the neoclassical system.
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CHAPTER 5
HAVE BRITISH COOPERATIVES FAILED?
Chapter 3 described the most commonly advanced theories of why
cooperatives fail. In this chapter we ask whether, in fact, British
cooperatives have "failed" any more frequently than capitalist firms.
Evidence is drawn from the C.P.F. cooperatives and literature published
on other British cooperatives. In the next chapter th e C.P.F. coop-
eratives are examined for behaviour which might support the failure
theories.
For some authors cooperati.ve failure occurs when the enterprise
ceases to trade. It is more usual, however, to describe failure in
relative terms, i.e. in comparison with capitalist firms. It is
surprising, then, that comparati.ve studies are few and far between,
especially for British cooperatives.1 It is much easier to find
descriptions of cooperative performance in isolation.2
The absence of comparative studies might be partly explained by
the shortage of cooper,atives, in Britain at least, which have been
operating for more than ten years. In their first years both C.F.'s
and coops are very fragile, and so to compare new coops with long-
standing capitalist enterprises would be very misl~ading. This is
why most comparative studies, including this thesis, have had to rely
on data from the C.P.F. coops, even though these are far from many
~eople's idea of the ideal coop.
Why not compare the failure rate of the many new coops formed over the
last decade with capitalist firms of a similar age? This would be a very
difficult task, because many capitalist firms will not register until after
several years of operation. Often they will continue for some time
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under the guise of self-employment, perhaps using casual labour.
We have no way of knowing how many capitalist firms fail at this stage,
but we can guess that the numbers are probably very high.
The nature of cooperatives is such that they will tend to reg-
ister early in their formation in order to formalise rules about the
division of profits, assets and liabilities. Registration is also
necessary for access to the special funds earmarked for coops. The
budding capitalist can acquire a bank loan as an individual. A group
of people asking for a bank loan must make clear who is responsible
for repayment. Registration under the l.P.S. rules is the usual
method of doing so.
It is, therefore, misleading to compare the failure rate of
new cooperatives with that recorded for capitalist firms. We must
compare established coops and C.F.IS to reach any sensible conclusions.
Existing evidence does suggest that coops growing out of failed
capitalist firms have not been a great success. It is open to dis-
pute whether the poor performance of these cooperatives is a
consequence of some inherent quality of coops. Certainly the cooperatives
fared no worse than their capitalist predecessors, and it is not very
enlightening to observe that cooperatives could not succeed in markets
where C.F. IS also failed. '"Defensive" cooperatives will not, therefore,
be discussed in this chapter.
'1. Comparing the Ages of Enterprises
However well a cooperative may perform, if it cannot maintain
this per-For-manceover a respectable length of time, then it might
be considered to have failed in all the objectives listed in Chapter
3.
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Derek Jones compared the average age of producer cooperatives
and small private firms in Britain in 1963. He concluded "that the
average P.C. (producer cooperative) is an older enterprise than its
private counterpart. It seems that P.C.'s have a greater ability
to survive.,,3 This conclusion is mistaken. The figures merely
indicate that very few new cooperatives were formed between 1900 and
1963, and those that were, such as the Building Guilds in the 1920's,
quickly disappeared.
All of Jones's sample of coops had been formed by the early
1900's. In 1963, however, 38.9% of private registered companies
had been registered in the five previous years.4 This level of
company formation will make for a very low average age of companies.
Er-onica lLy , the wave of new cooperatives in the late seventies
has reversed the situation. A glance at the Directory of Industrial
and Service Cooperatives in 1980 shows that by far the majority of
producer cooperatives are now less than five years old.5
Comparing ages is, therefore, a fairly useless exercise.
What we must do is .compare rates of survival of established capitalist
and cooperative enterprises.
-------------------------------------------------
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2. Survival Rates
TABLE 5.1 COMPARING THE SURVIVAL OF COOPERATIVES WITH SIMILAR
CAPITALIST FIRMS.
COOPERATIVES CAPITALIST FIRMS
INDUSTRY Sample Alive 1979 % Alive Sample Traced Alive Alive As %
1979 of Traced
Footwear 15 4 26.7 120 118 64 54.2
Printing 10 4 40.0 80 74 41 55.4
Clothing 4 2 50.0 32 30 18 60.0
Other 3 2 66.7 25 22 17 77.3
Total 32 12 37.5 257 244 140 57.4
and C.F. IS
Table 5.1 compares the sample of cooperatives,Mhich are described
in Appendix 3.. Although some of the capitalist companies could not
be traced at the Registrar of Companies, they did appear in Stubbs
1980 Directory. We cannot, therefore, assume that all untraced firms
have been dissolved. Consequently live capitalist firms as a percent
of traced firms are used for comparison with the cooperative sample.
A glance at Table 5.1 would suggest that ca?italist firms have
been much more successful at surviving than coops in the same industry.
It is interesting to observe, however, that the ranking of industries
by rates of survival is exactly the same for P.C.IS and C.F. IS.
This would suggest that t~e causes of cooperative failure are closely
linked to problems within the industry, but that perhaps coops are
more vulnerable than C.F.ls.
If we look at how capitalist firms have survived, a very different
picture emerges. Table 5.2 describes the situation of capitalist
firms in Sample One6 which were still alive in 1979.
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If we compare line 2 of Table 5.2 with cooperatives in Table 5.1,
we find that in every industry proportionately more cooperatives have
managed to continue working as independent enterprises in the same
business. In fact, all the coops which were still operating in 1979
had remained in the same line of business since 1950.
Seven of the first sample of capitalist firms were found to have
been subsidiaries in 1950. Three of these were still trading in 1979,
all in footwear. If we add these to the eight independent footwear
C.F. IS stili operating, the percent (21.1%) of the original sample is
still far below the percent of surviving footwear cooperatives.
What happened to the other capitalist firms which were still
registered in 1979? Twenty nine (45.3% of all live C.F.ls) were taken
over between 1950 and 1979. Ten of these have since ceased trading,
and are companies on paper only. Four changed the nature of their
business following the take-over. One footwear company converted to
a small wholesale company, marketing the products of the parent company.
The other three companies turned into holding or investment companies.
Essentially, they too were only paper companies.
This leaves 15 companies which were taken over, but continued
to manufacture products. We can add these 15, plus the three companies
which were subsidaries in 1950, to the independent companies which
have remained in the same trade.
with the coops.
Table 5.3 compares these figures
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TABLE 5.3 COMPARING COOPERATIVES AND CAPITALIST FIRMS STILL TRADING
IN 1979 .
.
Footwear Printing Clothing Other Total
% of coops trading in 1979 26.7 40.0 50.0 66.7 37.5
% of C.F. IS trading in same
business in 1979 35.1 30.5 16.7 75.0 35.9
Overall there is no difference between the survival rates of coops
and capitalist firms, although in footwear coops have been slightly
less hardy, ·while in printing, and particularly clothing, they have
displayed a much greater staying power.
This is not the whole story, however. We must also ask if there
is any difference between the decision to dissolve cooperatives and
capitalist firms. All of the cooperatives which ceased trading ran
into serious difficulties before closing their business. Of the 15
for which this information is known, six were wound-up by creditors,
but most of those which wound-up voluntarily were in heavy debt by
the end. Was the same true of C.F.IS?
Unfortunately the records of limited companies dissolved before
1961 have been destroyed, and so we know nothing about why these
companies were dissolved. Table 5.4 describes the other dissolved companies
in more detail:
\,
TABLE5.4 DISSOLVEDCAPITALISTFIRMS
Foot....; Print- Cloth- Other
wear ing ing
Dissolved before 1961 20 4 3 1
Dissolved 1961 to '79 of which:- 34 29 9 4
a) Independent when dissolved (excl. (c ) ) 17 24 7 3
b) Taken over by company 9 1 2 1
c) Taken over by persons owning similar firms 6 4 0 0
Dissolved by:-
a) Voluntary winding-up 23 15 6 3
b) Receiver 1 6 0 0
c) Notice in London Gazette G 8 3 1
d) Not known 2 0 0 0
No information on company 2 0 0 0
TOTALDISSOLVED 5<1 33 12 5
Twenty-three (31%) of the companies dissolved .1 ner 1960 were known
to have been taken over by other companies, or PCI'14,QIH owning similar
business. Probably several more would have been {\t\!llcl to fall into this
latter group if the information had been ava iLabl.o , \111fortunately company
annual returns only require directors to state ot.h-u' directorships.
Major shareholders who were not directors may hnvo 1\ \ so held shares
in related companies. Several more companies wel'p 1111'eady owned in
1950 by shareholders who had interests in r-eLat.cd f'i rms .
There was therefore c_ertainly no more than fi rly--one (68%) of
companies dissolved after 1960 that were genu ino 1y iudependen't , Many
of the firms taken over were dissolved for cony ('III t II II ~e• This does not
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necessarily mean that they had ceased trading. Some may even continue
in the same premises. In other cases the assets were split up and
transferred to plants belonging to the parent company. We cannot
assume that dissolution in these cases necessarily coincided with
poor performance. Unfortunately, private companies were not re-
quired to return their accounts to Companies House until 1966. For
many companies we must therefore rely on other performance indicators.
In Table 5.4 we see that only seven firms (9%) were forced to a
creditors winding-up by the appointment of a receiver. This is a much
smaller proportion than that found among coops. This suggests two
possibilities: (a) Some C.F.'s ceased trading for reasons other than
business failure, or (b) Because cooperates provide their members with
wages as well as dividends, and because the share-out to members on
dissolution would not be enough to retire on, then cooperatives will
struggle on until forced to close.
Probably both of these explanations apply. 'I'herf'or-ewe must
assume that at leastpome capitalist firms which were dissolved might
have continued trading if they had been cooperatives. This implies
that success rates (rather than survival rates) were slightly higher
among capitalist firms. However, we must also ask how these C.F. 's
survived. 43% of companies 'still alive and trading in the same
business in 1979 were subsidaries of other companies. Undoubtedly,
,CPF cooperatives have been far more successful than capitalist firms
at surviving as independent enterprises. Unfortunately no other
British coops have been operating long enough to provide evidence on
survival rates:
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3. Comparative Economic Performance
There have been several studies of the comparative economic per-
formance of coops and capitalist firms. The measures of success are
usually based on profitability, productivity and growth rates.
Fortunately Derek Jones has summarised much of this work and
concludes that, "though comparison with capitalist firms are often
difficult to draw, diverse indicators of "efficiency" rzveal that many
. 8 ,P.C.'s perform well. Jones conclusion is based mainly on the
experience of cooperatives operating outside of Britain, in the U.S.,
Spain and Israel.
Jones notes that the best performers are the Mondragon Coops in
Spain. A recent study by Thomas and Logan confirm that Mondragon
cooperatives have performed just as well as other Spanish firms.9 The
success of Mondragon is well known, but evidence from other countries
is more ambivalent, with British Cooperatives tending to fall to the
bottom of the pile.
In the British case we run into a familiar problem. Jones is the
only person to have conducted a truly comparative study, and this
only considered the CPF coops. Jones compared various measures of
t f t 't I d 1 b d t' 't 10ra es 0 re urn on cap1 a a~ a our pro uc 1V1 y. He concluded
that the average performance of the P.C.'s was worse than C.F. IS, and
deteriorating relative to C.F.'s over time. His latest measures were
for 1968.
Jones compared cooperative statistics with published figures for
British firms .'He admits that in many cases the statistics used for
comparison with the coops were so aggregated, that the conclusions
were of doubtful validity. The study of labour pr-oductivity used figures
\,
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for total manufacturing. Data on wages and profitability were usually
broken down by industry, but took in all sizes of firms. Only
one of the measures used for comparison, i.e. profits before
tax over net assets, was available for small firms by industry.
c:f
Table 5.5 compares footwear coops with the sample/capitalist
footwear firms which were still operating at the end of the
1960's. The five business ratios are those commonly used as
measures of efficiency and productivity of companies. They
were calculated as follows:
1. PROFITABILITY = (Profit before tax Total assets) x 100.
2. PROFIT MARGIN = (Profit before tax Turnover) x 100
3. SHAREHOLDERS RETURN = (Profit before tax .;-(equity + reserves)) x 100.
4. RETURN ON NET CAPITAL = (Profit before tax .;-(equity + reserves +
long-term loans)) x 100.
5. SALES PER EMPLOYEE Turnover Number of employees.
The figures in Table 5.5 must be treated with much caution.
The samples are tiny. Secondly, profits were so volatile that only
the fifth measure (sales per employee) had a standard deviation which
was less than half of the estimated mean. In 1968 the standard devia-
tions for the first four measures were more than the means. Except
for measure 5, we cannot, therefore, draw any significant conclusions
about differences between cooperative and C.F. performance.
A first glance at Table 5.5 suggests that in 1968 capitalist
firms were doing far better than footwear cooperatives, but that by
1977 the situation had been partially reversed. This change in fortunes
was not due to tooperatives whipping themselves into shape during
_.
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the 1970's, but because two cooperatives which suffered heavy losses
in 1968 had disappeared by 1977. Five capitalist firms also ceased
trading during the same period, but their poor performance in 1968
did not have such an effect onthe average figures.
When we compare columns three and four (the performance in 1968
of coops and capitalist firms which were still alive in 1977), the
difference between the two samples disappears.
It is a well known fact that the manipulation of transfer prices
between par-ent;companies and their subsidaries can have strange effects
on declared profits and on the value of sales. Parent companies often
transfer assets or reserves of subsidaries into their own accounts,
and so the denominators used to calculate the first four ratios may
also be unreliable. The figures for independent firms (some of which
were consolidated accounts for parent companies) are therefore more
likely to give an honest picture.
For all ratios, and in both years, the average results of indep-
endent firms were poorer than subsidaries (although only the figures
for sales per employee in 1968 were significantly different). A
comparison of "live" coops with independent capitalist firms shows
cooperatives ahead in both years, except on productivity (sales per
employee) .
Sales per employee is not a good measure of labour productivity
because, for example, a firm buying expensive leathers and selling
high quality shoes would appear more productive than a firm operating
at the cheaper end of the market, with low costs and low value of
sales. A much better measure of productivity is value added per employee,
but, unfortunately, value added could not be calculated from the figures
"
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reported in firms' annual returns. The use of sales rather than value
added may explain why coops in 1968 appeared to have lower product-
ivity, but better rates ,of return than independent footwear firms.
The final two columns of Table 5.5 show the Dunn and Bradstreet
estimates of the same five ratios for small and medium sized footwear
manufacturers in 1977. All but one of the cooperatives fell into
the small category, i.e. they'had a turnover of less than £1 million
in 1977. Ten of the capitalist firms were medium in sjze (sales between
£lm. and £5m), the remaining eight had sales of less than £lm. It
is reassuring to see that, although the sample of capitalist firms
was small, the 1977 estimates fell between Dunn and Bradstreet's
estimates for small and medium companies in every case.
If we compare coops in 1977 with Dunn and Bradstreet's results
for small companies, cooperatives come out on top every time.
Unfortunately there is insufficient data to make any sensible
comparison between CPF coops and capitalist firms operating outside
of the footwear industry.
With such limited data we cannot draw any definite conclusions
about the comparative economic performance of British coops and
capitalist firms. The data does suggest, however,. that at least
some CPF coops have managed to perform as well as C.F.'s, even when
applying capitalist measures of success.
4. Employment Creation
In recent years many people have turned to cooperatives in the
hope that they might stem the rising tide of unemployment. There
has been an explosion of local cooperative development groups and
.'
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of Local Authority funding for cooperative ventures. Even so,
Wilson estimates that by 1980 British cooperatives (including CPF
and ICOM) only constituted 0.1% of employment in the small business
11sector.
There is some evidence to suggest that cooperatives may be coping
better than the private sector in preserving jobs. In his survey
of fifty-five British cooperatives Wilson found a 32% increase in
employment between the time they were set-up and the end of 1980.
At that time most of the coops were less than three years old. Over
the three years 1977 to 1980, total employment in Britain fell by
0.5%, and in manufacturing industries by 7.6%.12
Unfortunately, Wilson's figures only refer to "surviving" coops,
i.e. the ones that still existed when the questionnaire was sent out.
We do not know how many coops collapsed over the same period, and
so we cannot be certain that total cooperative employment has increased.
Even if the number of jobs in cooperatives has grown in recent years,
this may only reflect the growing popularity of the cooperative form.
Perhaps 'capitalist firms working under the same conditions could
have created more jobs.
We will get more idea of cooperatives' job creating~ci~
by comparing the change in employment of coops and similar capitalist
firms. We begin by comparing the change in employment in the C.P.F.
'coops with levels of employment in their particular industries.
The majority of the cooperatives in the sample are working in
what are traditionally considered to be declining industries, i..e.
footwear and clothing. Certai.nly footwear manufacturing has seen
a tremendous contraction since 1950, but we can see in Table 5.6
~ ..
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that this was not true of the clothing sectors in which the cooperatives
13operated.
TABLE 5.6 INPEX OF EMPLOYMENT IN CLOTHING, FOOTWEAR & PRINTING
1950-78
YEAR Footwear Mfr. Clothing l'~fr. Printing
Coops All Firms Coops All Firms Coops All Firms
1950 100 100 100 100 100 100
1958 73.0 89.5 53.8 102.3 81.0 98.6
1968 36.9 79.0 40.2 110.6 77.0 103.7
1978 25.6 61.2 23.2 92.7 32.9 91.5
Sources: (i) CPF Cooperatives Annual Returns
(ii) Census of Production.14
The cooperatives appear to have performed very badly compared
with the rest of their industry, but we must remember that the index
for all firms in Table 5.6 includes new firms created since 1950.
New clothing and printing coops have been formed ir.recent years.
If these were added,in, cooperatives may not appear quite so unsucces-
f'ul ,
To make a genuine comparison of employment creation in cooperatives
and capitalist firms we must compare the same group of C.F.'s from
1950. Unfortunately prior to 1966 companies were not required to
declare the size of their workforce in their annual returns, and since
1966 small firms (less than 100 employees) have still been exempt.
The Northamptonshire and Leicester and County Footwear Manufacturers As soc ia tk
have, however, provided information on employee strength which may
be used·to supplement the annual returns.
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Data is available for fifteen footwear firms in sample one which
continued to trade between 1968 and 1978. In Table 5.7 they are
compared with the four footwear cooperatives which continued to trade
over the same period. Groups of companies often shift assets and
jobs between subsidaries, and so changes in subsidary employment may
not reflect total employment within the group. For this reason indep-
endent and subsidiary companies are also described separately in
Table 5.7.
TABLE 5.7: INDEX OF TOTAL EMPLOYMENT WITHIN COOPS AND C.F.'s.
YEAR Footwear FOOTWEAR C.F's.Coops All Indep. Subsid.
1968 100 100 100 100
1978 93.3 102.7 104.6 99.8
The figures in Table 5.7 also give the impression that coopera-
tives have been less successful than C.F.'s in maintaining jobs.
In fact,·the variance in the experience of indivi dua'l,firms is such
that we cannot confirm that coops are less successful. The mean
percentage change in employment of capitalist firms was 114.1%, and
for coops 92.5%. These means were not significantly different at
the 10% level.
With such a small sample it would in fact be difficult to find
a significant difference. The size of the sample is, however, not
the only reason for this result. Undoubtedly there has been a wide
divergence in the experience of different enterprises. Seven of the
fifteen capitalist firms suffered drops in employment over the decade
while one of the four coops increased its labour force. Furthermore,
t :
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if one subsidiary which enjoyed more than a doubling of its workforce
is excluded from the total for C.F.'s, then employment among the
capitalist sample also fell between 1968 and 1978.
We must conclude, therefore, that the huge difference between
cooperatives and C.F.'s in Table 5.6 was mainly due to the exclusion
from the data of new cooperatives formed after 1968, but even if new
cooperatives had been taken into account it is highly likely that
coops would still have shown badly compared with C.F.'s. This would
have been due to the low rate of formation of coops in these industries.
,
5. Democracy and Participation
There is another concept of cooperative failure, that of degeneration
into capitalist style control or ownership. Once again the evidence
is very sparse, and the majority of British coops have existed for
too short a time to experience "degeneration".
The reassertion of traditional managerial roles in S.D.N. and
Triumph Meriden are sometimes quoted as examples of this inevitable
process. Here we run into the problem of distinguishing between a
division of labour between production and management, and a difference
in power between these two groups. Even where formally cooperative
members maintain power over management, it is often argued that differ-
ential access to information puts most of the power into the hands
of management. This is an issue which has been given much study by
researchers into industrial democracy, and it will not be pursued
here. In this section degeneration is measured purely in terms of
members' formal aecision making power, and the degree to which member- ,
ship coincides with employees.
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Derek Jones claims that the C.P.F. cooperatives have shown no
tendency towards reduced democracy. He pointed out that in 1890 only
an average of 34% of the Manag~ment Committees were employees. By
1948 this figure was 60%, although it has since declined.15 The
proportion of the membership that are employees remained fairly stable
over the period 1948-70. The proportion of employees who are members
declined from 63% to 53% over the same period. Even so, it seems
true to say that the concept of inevitable degeneration appears a
fallacy. Furthermore it should be realised that nearly all non-employee
members are either ex-employees or other cooperative societies. Ex-
employees are encouraged to retain their shares in order to prevent
a flood of funds out of the coops. Coops differ from firms in that
equity capital may be withdrawn, making coops vulnerable to a sudden
liquidity problem.
The dynamics of employee membership have not been adequately
explored for CPF coops. The rules of the majority of these coops
require employees to become members. Membership is usually achieved
by a proportion of each workers' bonus being retained until they own
the necessary value of shares to qualify for membership. This can
be as much as £300, although is often far less.
In recent years,when profits were poor, workers' bonuses have
frequently not been paid. Consequently new employees have rarely
achieved the level of shareholding necessary for membership. Thus,
we cannot assume that a drop in employee membership is a sign of
degeneration.
We can expect a regular turnover'in cooperative workers. Given
this, then the proportion of employee members might be expected to
steadily decline unless regular workers' bonuses resulted in sufficient
shareholdings. So we might predict a strong relationship between
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the level of bonus per workers and the proportion of the workforce
who are cooperative members.
The link is more complicated than this, however, because an
increase in the workforce will suddenly increase the proportion of
non-members. Since members will usually be the longest serving
employees, they are the ones least likely to be laid off. A drop
in the workforce will, therefore, probably see a rise in the propor-
tion of employee members. Two examples are described in Table 5.8.
We can see in Table 5.8 that Equity Shoes maintained a very
high level of membership among its employees. This was the result
of a rule requiring employees to capitalize their bonus into shares,
along with a regular bonus payment and a steadily ieclining workforce.
Toytown Shoes had the same rule about capitalizing employees' bonus.
Continuous non payment of this bonus resulted in a rapid decli.ne in
the percentage of workers who were members.
The examples shown in Table 5.9 are more complicated. Up to
1962 Nottingham Printers maintained a high level of employee member-
ship by regular bonus payments, even though the workforce increased
considerably between 1955 and 1961. No bonus was paid in 1963 or
'64, but a drop in the workforce, and presumably no new workers em-
ployed, ensured that the percent of workers who were members remained
very high. Once again, there were no bonus payments between 1966
, and 1969. This resulted in a rapid decline in the percent of employees
who were members. One year later (1970) a bonus was paid
and level of employee membership began to rise. After three years
-of regular bonuses, the coop had reached 100% membership.
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TABLE 5.8: CHANGING EMPLOYMENT AND MEMBERSHIP IN TWO FOOTWEAR COOPERATIVES
.Year EQUITY SHOES TOWTOWN SHOES
Workers Work- Member % Work- Workers Work- Member % Work-
Bonus £ force Workers ers as Bonus £ force Workers ers as
members members
1950 7000 445 410 92.1 0 88 69 78.4
51 6650 399 0 90
52 2800 358 0 92
53 7175 380 0 94
54 6125 383 0 93
55 8400 398 380 95.5 0 95 55 57.9
56 8750 396 0 92
57 6650 354 0 80
58 7200 339 0 77
59 6000 317 0 75
60 9800 332 326 98.2 0 84 36 42.9
61 12496 345 0 91
62 3744 313 0 97
63 10720 277 0 90
64 10932 283 0 90
65 10500 272 246 90.4 0 75 15 20.0
66 10400 239 209 87.4 0 70 12 17.1
67 8520 217 198 91.2 0 64 10 15.6
68 12150 197 186 94.4 0 na na na
69 13050 190 172 90.5 In liquidation
70 12650 196 189 96.4
N:B.: Information on membership was only available for 1950, '55, '60 and
1965 onwards.
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TABLE 5.9 CHANGING EMPLOYMENT AND MEMBERSHIP IN TWO MORE
FOOTWEAR COOPERATIVES.
Year NOTTINGHAM PRINTERS BIRMINGHAM PRINTERS
Workers Work- Member % Work- Workers Work- Member % Work-
Bonus £ force Workers ers as Bonus £ force Workers ers as
members members
1950 320 21 20 95.2 2950 100 69 69.0
51 526 21 3101 100
52 196 20 3302 102
53 139 20 3439 101
54 353 20 3767 104
55 230 21 19 90.5 3800 98 59 60.2
56 253 22 4214 102
57 635 23 4473 102
58 660 24 4719 103
59 813 27 4793 101
60 920 29 25. 86.2 5760 104 52 50.0
61 543 29 5440 102
62 689 27 5656 101
63 0 27 ,- 5180 102..
64 0 26 5164 94
65 170 26 25 96.1 4400 93 48 51.6
66 0 26 25 96.1 5440 91 46. 50.5
67 0 22 15 68.2 4900 91 44 48.4
68 0 18 13 72.2 0 95 44 46.3
69 0 19 13 68.4 840 89 35 39.3
70 320 19 11 57.9 0 86 33 38.4
71 1230 20 18 90.0 Dissolved
72 910 _ 19 19 100
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Birmingham Printers stands out as the exception. Although
bonuses were paid to workers every year up to 1967, and the workforce
was reduced, the level of membership among employees steadily declined.
The explanation lies with the rules of the cooperative. The rules
did not require the capitalization of workers bonuses, and merely
noted that workers would be eligible for membership after two years
of employment.
It could be argued that the direction of causation is not from
workers' bonus to employee membership, but in the opposite direction,
i.e. high employee membership results in pressure for workers' bonuses
to be paid. There is, however, a strong correlation (r = 0.876 for
all coops) between the level of profits and the bonus paid to workers.
This would indicate that the direction of causation is from good
profits, to payment of a bonus, to a boost in membership among
workers. We can also see that the Nottingham Printers and Toytown
Shoes stopped paying a bonus when employee membership was high. It
was only after the end of the bonus that membership declined.
The evidence in this section must lead us to doubt the validity
of Jones' use of employee membership figures as a sign of democracy
within the CPF coops. Most of the cooperatives have rules which require
employees to apply for membership. In the case of Birmingham Printers,
where employee membership was voluntary, most workers apparently chose
not to do so. The implication is that workers in other coops became
members through coercion rather than any desire for participation.
It is dangerous, however, to generalise from the experience of the
Birmingham Printers, because such a cooperative, which chose not to
require membership of its employees may have actively discouraged
membership.
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We must also avoid concluding that rules requiring employees
to become members are a sign of the cooperatives' commitment to indus-
trial democracy. These rules are often a means of raising capital
for the coop. This is one reason why employees are often required
to allocate their bonus for the purchase of shares up to values well
above the amount necessary for normal membership. In 1975, loans
from members also formed 82.5% of cpoperatives long-term borrowing
(see table 6.1, Chapter 6).
Clearly, the evidence available in the CPF cooperatives' annual
returns is totally inadequate to assess the degree of democracy or
workers' participation in these coops. This can only be discovered
by close observation of individual coops, which is a task beyond
the limits of this thesis. It does seem fair to conclude, however,
that complete degeneration into a virtual capitalist firm, with a
few members employing a majority of non-members, is not at all
inevitable.
6. Retrieving the Surplus taken by Capital
One of the driving forces behind the founding of retail coops in
Britain was to break the monopoly of capitalists, and to make goods
available to members at a reasonable price. For the producer coop-
eratives, recovering the surplus expropriated by capital in the form
of higher labour incomes, was also important. However, improving
'working conditions, and giving control to workers, were other principles
which were basic to the early producer cooperatives.
In recen~ years, perhaps because of the much improved standard
of living in Britain, this issue has faded from cooperative discussion.
Indeed, it is well known that many so-called alternative coops earn
135
abysmal incomes almost as a matter of principle. But if coops are
to be anything more than a home for friends of the earth, then they
must at least be able to provide their members with an income comparable
to, if not better, than employees of capitalist firms.
Although ,there is a general impression that the cooperatives
pay low wages, it is often forgotten that many of the newer coopera-
tives operate in sectors, such as retailing, where wages are generally
very low. As usual, there has been no systematic comparison of wages
in modern coops and similar private firms. Secondly, when a cooperative
has only been operating for a few years, much of its revenue must
be recycled into capital accumulation, and wages will inevitably
be low initially. Perhaps in twenty years time some of the new coops
will be reaping the return of today's accumulation, and enjoying
exceptionally high incomes.
In the meantime, this leaves us, as always, with the CPF coops
as the only established coops in Britain which might be used for
any sensible comparison.
Not surprisingly, Derek Jones made exactly this comparison.16
He compared the average weekly remuneration per worker in the CPF
coops with industry figures published by the Department of Employment
and found that capitalist firms performed consistently better than
coops.
Tables 5.10 to 5.12 support Jones' finding that cooperative wages
are below the national average in printing and footwear firms. In
recent years, however, the two surviving clothing coops appear to
have been doing better than average.
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.TABLE 5.10: FOOTWEAR, AVERAGE ANNUAL WAGE BILL PER EMPLOYEE
Year Coops Census of Coops with CapitalistProduction Bonus firms
1967 727(7) - 738(7) 727(5)
1968 785(4) 811 810(4) 830(9)
1969 871 (4) - 898(4) 923(8)
1970 906(3) 961 935(3) 904(5)
1971 1052(3) 1062 1095(3) 1023(6)
1972 1167 (3) 1157 1206(3) 1186( 6)
1973 1285(3) 1354 1328(3) 1248(7)
1974 1594(2) - 1704(2) 1411(8)
1975 1821(4) 1975 1887(4) 1827(6)
1976 2187(3) 2303 2327(3) 2110(5)
1977 2378(4) 2583 2523(4) 2266(6)
1978 2706(4) 2925 2863(4) 2710 (6)
TABLE 5.11: CLOTHING, AVERAGE ANNUAL WAGE BILL PER EMPLOYEE
Year Coops Census of Coops with
Production bonus
1967 531(3) 537(3)
1968 528(2) 606 559(3)
1969 571(2)
1971 788(2) 777 807(2)
1972 950(2) 861 967(2)
,
1977 2090(2) 1890 2118(2)
-
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TABLE 5.12: PRINTING, AVERAGE ANNUAL WAGE BILL PER EMPLOYEE
Year Coops Census of Coops withProduction bonus
1967 878(7) 913(7)
1968 953(7) 1059 981(7)
1969 950(6) 964(7)
1970 1101(7) 1288 1112(7)
1971 1176(5) 1479 1208(5)
1972 1373(5) 1622 1395(5)
1973 1499(4) 1791 1549(4)
1974 1623(3) 1653(3)
1975 2151(6) 2620 2235(6)
1976 2481(6) 3033 2570(5)
1977 2578(5) 3445 2701(5)
1978 3267(4) 4004 3499(4)
Sources: (i). Coops: Cooperatives' annual returns to the Cooperative
Union and the Registrar of Friendly Societies.
(ii) Census of Production: Minimum List Headings; Footwear,
General Printing & Publishing, Mens & Boys Tailored
Outerwear, Dresses, Lingerie & Infants Wear.
The final two categories were combined under the heading
"clothing" and were the two categories under which the
clothing coops surviving in 1968 had been placed for the
Census .
. (iii) Capitalist firms: C.F.'s annual returns to the Registrar
of Companies.
N.B. /Figures in brackets indicate no. of firms or coops.
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Many capitalist firms do not declare the size of their wages bill
in their annual returns, and so average employee remuneration could
not be calculated for most of ~he capitalist firms in the sample.
Figures have been quoted for footwear firms in Table 5.10. For most
years, the sample of firms paid on average a lower rate than found
nationally by the Census of Production. Footwear coops appeared no
better or worse than the capitalist firms. These results suggest
that there are factors,acting on our sample of both coops and capitalist
firms, which pushed their wages below average. Two probable causes
are (i) the size of the establishments, and (ii) the location of the
plant.
The Census of Production breaks down the wag8s and employment
statistics by size of establishment. In Table 5.13 the industry
figures are compared with figures for establishments with a workforce
similar in size to the average cooperative workforce.
TABLE 5.13 AVERAGE REMUNERATION PER WORKER BY SIZE OF
ESTABLISHMENT.
Footwear Clothing Printing
1968
1. All establishments 811 606 1059
2. Estab. size = ave. coopsize 789 592 1075
2 as a % of 1 97.3 97.7 101.5
1978 (clothing 1977)
2925 1890 40051. All establishments
2644 1948 39382. Estab.size = Ave. coop size
103.1 98.32 as a % of 1 90.4
Sou~ce: Census of Production
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Comparing Table 5.13 with 5.10 we can see that once allowance
is made for the size of the footwear cooperatives, then the difference
between the average remuneration of workers in footwear coops and
capitalist firms disappears. Once the workers bonus is added in,
the cooperative workers appear to have been better of.
In 1968 the earnings of workers in clothing coops compared badly
with that of C.F. employees. Even the adjustment for size, and the
addition of the workers' bonus did not recover their position. By
1971, however, the situation had reversed. Even after adjusting for
the fact that the two clothing coops were larger than the average
clothing firm, the coops paid on average more than their capitalist
counterparts.
The National Board for Prices and Incomes reported that adult
males working in Central England earned on average 94% of the national
rate, and females 97%18 in 1968. All of the surviving clothing coops
operated in the Midlands. Adjusting for both the size and location
of the clothing coops brings the cooperative workers earnings in 1968,
including their bonus, in line with C.F. earnings. Without the
bonus cooperatives still fell behind.
The printing cooperatives showed up very bad~y against the Census
of Production figures. Adjustment for size of the coops does nothing
to rectify the situation. Allowing for the location of the coops
does reduce the difference, but the gap remains substantial.19
We cannot draw any definite conclusions from these figures
because the samples of both coops and capitalist firms are so tiny.
Secondly, the data used for comparison is of dubious validity. Dividing
the annual wage bill by the number of employees does not take account
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of part-time workers, differences in hours, differences in skill and
occupational structures, and changes in the size of the workforce
during the year. We can only hope that conditions were similar in
the cooperatives and capitalist firms with regard to these character-
Lst ics ,
Although it is impossible to draw any firm conclusions, the evidence
does not rule out the possibility that workers in the footwear and
clothing coops have enjoyed higher incomes than their counterparts
in capitalist firms since 1970.
7. Have British Cooperatives Failed?
There is no evidence to support the theory that British coopera-
tives are doomed to failure. The CPF coops have apparently done no
worse than similar capitalist firms over the last thirty years. The
enormous drop in the number of C.P.F. cooperatives reflected the grow-
ing concentration within their industries, and the almost negligible
formation of producer cooperatives between 1950 and the mid 1970's.
Nick Wilson bas provided evidence that in recent years the producer
cooperative sector has been growing much more rapidly than other small
b· . B·t· 20US1nesses 1n r1 a1n (although coming from such a small base,
this is no great feat).
In line with other studies of cooperatives, this section has
concentrated on comparing coops to similar capitalist firms. For
the CPF coops this meant comparing the coops to small firms in declining
industries. The surviving clothing coops were, in fact, much larger
than the average British clothing manufacturer. In 1977 the two
coops employed 94 and 540 workers each. At that time 80% of clothing
firms employed less than 50 workers. Even so,.the clothing coops
were small employers by manufacturing standards. In 1977 only 0.9%
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of manufacturing enterprises employed one thousand or more workers,
but these large enterprises provided 64.6% of employment in manu-
f t . 21ac urlng.
New coops are certainly not breaking the mould. It is well
known that most are very small. None of Wilson's sample of fifty
five coops employed more than fifty workers, and half employed
ten or less.
In this chapter we have discovered that British coops are not
so different from many other small British firms. But it is no secret
that small businesses are being squeezed out of manufacturing. (In
1958 only 54.9% of employment in manufacturing was with firms employing
one thousand or more people). If we are to understand why producer
cooperatives have remained on the periphery of the economy, then we
must asl<why no cooperatives have broken through the size barrier.
This issue will be taken up in Chapter 8.
I
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CHAPTER 6
DO THE THEORIES OF COOPERATIVE FAILURE FIT THE EVIDENCE?
A number of theories about why cooperatives fail or perform
badly were described in Chapter 3. The evidence reported in the
previous chapter does not support the view that cooperatives under
capitalism face more problems than capitalist firms, and so are more
prone to'failure •. Perhaps then, we should abandon all the theories
at this point. It may be, however, that these theories can help to
explain the experience of British coops in recent decades. In this
section we judge the theories against the evidence from the CPF coops.
1. Raising Funds
Table 6.1 compares the balance sheet structure of the CPF coops
with that of public companies, small manufacturing firms, and the
sample of capitalist footwear firms still trading in 1975.
It has been suggested that cooperatives'inability to issue shares
has been a severe restraint on their fund raising. It is clear from
Table 6.1 that over the 20 years from 1955 to 1975 there has been a
very marked drop in the significance of equity capital for both listed
companies and the CPF coops. In 1975 small manufacturing firms relied
on share capital far less than listed companies. The average capital
employed (equity + reserves + long-term loans) of cooperatives in
1975 was £189,400. Coops therefore fall into the category "smaller"
firms designated by the "Committee to Review the Functioning of Financial
Institutions". The Committee found that in 1975 only 6.4% of this
group'q total liabilities were taken up by equity. This was marginally
less than the average cooperative figure of 7.5%. The sample of
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capitalist footwear firms showed a su~isingly high reliance on equity
in 1975 16.9%.of the total liabilities of the independent firms.
This may be partially explaine~ by the larger size of the footwear
firms. The capital employed by the C.F. IS averaged £271,330 in 1975.
Consequently they would just slip into the "intermediate" category
of firms.
Measuring equity capital on its own is, however, very misleading.
Although seven of the independent footwear firms increased the nominal
capital taken up between 1955 and 1975, only three of these actually
raised funds by doing so. The remaining four merely "capitalised
undivided reserves". In other words, the rise in equity was exactly
matched by a drop in reserves. Of the three firms which did raise
funds, one was a public company. This company iss..ledshares to raise
funds for the purchase of a subsidary. Consequently, the share issue
could not be seen as a scheme for raising funds for new investment,
but only for the purpose of transferring the ownership of existing
assets. A second firm issued shares to the International Sports Company
Dunlop & Slazenger , and turned to concentrating on sports footwear.
The funds were said to be provided "to further the trading activities
of the company". In this case the International Sports Company, although
it did not take a controlling interest, acted almost like a parent
company feeding funds into a subsidary. The third company raised a
total of £89 between 1955 and 1975.
Over the twenty years up to 1975 the nominal value of the footwear
firms'equity increased by 47%, of which 29% was accounted for by the
capitalization of reserves, and most of the remainder was taken up
with t~ share issue of the one public company in the sample.
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SOURCES:
Small Firms: "Committee to Review the Functioning of Financial
Institutions". Research Report No.3, "Studies
of Small Firms' Financing." p. 10.
Listed Companies: Annual Abstract of statistics, 1955, 1965 and
1975.
Figures in brackets indicate size of sample.
"Smaller" Companies - Capital employed < £250,000
"Intermediate" Companies - Capital employed £1~m. ~ £4m.
*Includes under other long-term loans.
A Owed by Parent Company, fellow subsidary , or subsidary company
B Owed to Parent Company or fellow subsidary.
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The fourteen cooperatives still operating in 1975 saw a very
slight increase (0.2%) in the value of their share capital between
1955 and 1975. Cooperatives are quite unlike limited companies in
that their share capital may be withdrawn on demand. Many coopera-
tives therefore suffered a drain on funds as the labour force shrank
and as other cooperative societies (usually holding a sizeable
proportion of cooperative shares) went into liquidation. The coopera-
tives were able to compensate for this by raising the minimum share-
holding necessary for membership. Even so, eight of the fourteen
cooperatives suffered a drop in their nominal capital between 1955
and 1975, although only four suffered a drop of more than 10%.
By 1975 share capital formed such a minor part of Cooperative
funds that the drop in value suffered by some coops probably had a
negligible effect on funds available. Certainly none of the coops
raised this as a difficulty in their annual reports. We can see in
Table 6.1 that the coops more than compensated for the fall in the
share of nominal capital by increasing reserves.
We have seen that nominal capital is, of itself, a meaningless
value. This is not only because limited companies transfer funds
from reserves into equity by capitalising profits, but also because
a share issue may raise much more than the nominal value of the shares.
This additional sum, the share premium, will be recorded as part of
the shareholders 'reserves. It is far more interesting, then, to look
at the debt/equity ratio of enterprises. This term (long-term loans
divided by shareholders'funds) gives us some idea of the degree to
which an organisation reli.es on external as opposed to internal funds
for long-term finance.
It is clear from Table 6.2 that cooperatives' reliance on external
long-term funds is very similar to that of other small manufacturing
TABLE 6.2 DEBT/EQUITY RATIOS IN 1975
TYPE OF ENTERPRISE MEAN D/E RATIO
firms. As with the smaller manufacturers, most of these so-called
"external" funds are made up of loans from existing shareholders.
The sample of footwear firms made very little use of directors loans,
and consequently had an exceptionally small debt/equity ratio. For
all three categories (coops, footwear c.f., and smaller manufacturing
firms) long-term bank loans or mortgages formed a negligible part of
long-term funding.
CPF Coops
Independent Footwear CF
Listed Companies
Smaller Mfr. Firms
Intermediate Mfr. Firms
0.20
0.01
0.28
0.23
0.17
Short-term borrowing, usually in the form of overdrafts, was
the main source of bank loans for coops and small firms. Coops'
reliance on this form of funding was little different from other small
firms. The major source of short term funds was, however, trade credit.
Here we find a noticeable difference between coops and other small
firms. Coops apparently relied far less on trade credit, and this
explains why coops' current liabilities formed a much smaller proportion
of total liabilities than generally found among small firms. Over
the twenty years since 1955, trade credit has become a growing source
of short-term finance. Cooperatives have followed this trend, but
have not exploited it to the same extent as capitalist firms. It is
not known whether this is due to the cooperatives' tendency to be
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over cautious, or because prejudice against cooperatives restricted
the credit available to them.
The arguments outlined under section 3 of Chapter 3 suggested that cooperB-
tives faced more difficulties in raising finance than small firms
because of
(a) the prejudice of financial institutions, or
(b) their limited ability to raise money through share issues.
The evidence does not support the latter argument. Very few small
firms raise funds by share issues. The big investors are no more
interested in putting money into small firms than into coops. Even
for large companies, equity has become a negligible source of funds.
Minns reports that less than 5% of new capital for companies is raised
by share issues.1 For most firms, internal funds are now the main
source of long-term finance.
It is possible that equity is still an important source of funds
for new businesses. The Wilson Committee reported, however, that
"few new businesses now have any source of equity other than that
provided by the proprietor himself".2 Unless it happens that
potential new businessmen are universally richer than potential
cooperators, then there is no reason to believe that new capitalist
firms enjoy any better starting conditions than new coops. For both
groups, raising funds is extremely difficult. Chaplin and Cowe made
a survey of new coops and found that the initial difficulties are
"similar to those of any small business, i e ,e. finance and premises" 3
Once cooperatives are established, the CPF coops provide no
evidence to support the theory that they face more difficulties, because
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of the prejudice of financial institutions, in raising external
finance. It is well documented that all small firms have difficulty in
4raising external funds, but apparently the CPF coops were no less
successful than other firms in obtaining bank loans and overdraft
facilities. The only area where prejudice may be apparent is in the
availability of trade credit for cooperatives.
The information presented in Table 6.1 is not entirely satisfactory
because we cannot know if cooperatives might have grown more quickly if
more external loans had been available. It may be that they maintained
a similar debt/equity ratio to other small firms by growing more slowly.
Unfortunately sales figures are not available for most of the sample of
small firms before 1967. In Table 6.3 the growth in turnover from
1968 to 1978 is compared for organisations which continued to trade
over this period, and for which sales figures are available.
TABLE 6.3: COMPARING GROWTH IN TURNOVER
Type of Enterprise Mean % t Degrees T statis- Signifi-
(number in sample) Increase value of tic @ 10% cant
in Turn- freedom signif. differ-.. 1968- levelover ence
1978
All footwear CF (17) 246.9 ., .,
~ 0.277 26 1.701 No
All coops (11) 224.8 "i -
>' 1.773 20 1.725 Yes
Indep .footwear CF (11) 325.8 -I -
> 0.577 13 1.771 No
Footwear coops (4) 276.7 .J ...
The increase in turnover is measured in money terms. Over the
same period the retail price index rose by 202% so that, in fact,
none~of the categories displayed an exceptional rise in real turnover
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On average, the coops have grown less quickly than the capitalist
footwear firms, but the difference is not significant at.the 10% level.
The growth of subsidaries is very dependent on the decisions of parent
companies, who often shift operations from one subsidary to another.
The independent footwear firms did display a significantly higher
growth in sales than the coops. But the footwear coops enjoyed a
faster growth in sales than other coops, and their growth, although
less than that of independent firms, was not significantly different
at the 10% level.
Cooperatives do appear to have lagged slightly behind the indep-
endent footwear firms in terms of sales. Is this because of their
shortage of funds for new investment? To answer this, we must look
in more detail at exactly how the capitalist firms achieved their
growth. This will be discussed in Chapter .7 .
2. The Self-Extinction Forces
Jones and Backus looked for evidence of Vanek's self extinction
forces among the CPF footwear coops. It was explained in Chapter 1
that, according to the neoclassical theory of the labour-managed firm,
an LMF relying entirely on external finance will ai.mto produce at
local constant returns to scale. The LMF using internal finance, will
however, if operating with a production function with decreasing returns
to scale, operate in the inefficient increasing returns to scale zone.
Jones and Backus predicted, therefore, that the worker managed (internally
financed) firm "will be in (or tending towards) long-run equilibrium:
(i) in the increasing returns to scale zone of the production function;
(ii) at a lower level of output;
(iii) where it is underinvesting and consequently operating with a
lower capital-labour ratio.,,5
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Jones and Backus began by estimating production functions for
CPF footwear firms from 1948 to 1968. The initial estimates showed
no evidence of returns to scale, which consequently excluded the
possibility that the coops could be operating in the increasing returns
scale.
Next Jones and Backus divided the coops into those with more
than 100 employees, and those employing less than 100 people, arguing
that returns to scale are dependent on the level of output. The returns
to scale estimate was now strongly significant for the small P.C.'s,
but much less so for large P.C.'s. The authors took this as evidence
that internal financing did have a significant effect on the operation
of cooperatives. Since the large coops had appar~'ntly succeeded in
breaking out of the inefficient zone, this conclusion is not entirely
convincing. It may be true that small.P.C's are operating at inefficient
returns to scale, but is there any evidence to suggest that this is
because of internal financing, rather than other factors inhibiting
the growth of cooperatives?
Jones and Backus tried to answer this question by introducing
a measure of internal financing into the production function estimates.
They argued that the greater the degree of internal financing then the lower
would be the producti vity of the coop. The prediction was, therefore,
that value added per worker would be negatively related to the degree
of internal finance (= shareholders funds + long-term loans). A nega-
tive (but very weakly significant) sign did appear for small coops,
but not for those employing more than 100 persons. The authors admit
that the results of this test "offer only limited support for Vanek's
theory of financing".
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A simpler test of the theory of financing might have been to ask if
small P.C.'s, those which apparently have not escaped from the zone
of increasing returns to scale, are more reliant on internal financing.
If we look at 1958, the middle year of the Jones and Backus data,
there were twelve footwear coops still operating from the original
sample. Four of these employed more than 100 persons, and had a mean
debt/equity ratio of 0.37. Eight employed less than 100 workers, and
had a mean debt/equity ratio of 0,.64. In other words, the smaller
coops relied less on internal financing than did the large footwear
coops. This contradicts Vanpk's prediction, and suggests that small
coops remained small for some reason other than their use of internal
funds.
The second prediction tested by Jones and Backus was that internally
financed coops working under a "u" shaped technology would operate
at a lower level of output than their capitalist counterparts. To
do this they compared the growth of producer cooperatives and capitalist
firms over the.period 1948 to 1968. Two indicators that they used
were growth in average value added and average labour force size per
establishment. Both measures indicated a much slower growth rate
among P.C.'s than for capitalist firms.
The results quoted in Table 6.3 and Section 4 of Chapter 5
would seem to contradict Jones and Backus. The difference appears
because Jones and Backus derive their figures from aggregate industry
statistics, whereas our measure of C.F. growth was derived from
small firms. ,
The average British footwear firm it is true has grown more
quickly than footwear cooperatives over the last 30 years. It will
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be argued in Chapter 7 , however, that a significant proportion of
this growth was the consequence of a flood of mergers and takeovers,
rather than internal growth. The difference observed between P.C. 's
and C.F's is, therefore, not a consequence of internal financing
among P.C.'s,but because cooperatives have not participated in the
mergers and takeovers found among capitalist firms.
The work of Jones and Backus began by assuming the existence
of economies of scale in the footwear industry. If, in fact, the
industry faced constant returns to scale, then we would not expect
to find cooperatives operating in the zone of increasing returns to
scale. On the other hand, under CRS, Vanek's self-extinction forces
should act more powerfully.
The first est.Lmates that Jones and Backus applied to all sizes
of footwear cooperatives did not indicate any significant economies
of scale among footwear cooperatives. Other evidence suggests that
economies of scale are quite small. Pratten and Dean's study in the
1960ls found economies of scale to exist, although to be small compared
with industries such as engineering.6
TABLE 6.4: INDEX OF UNIT PRODUCTION COSTS FOOTWEAR 1962
Output Capacity*
Unit production costs
300
100
600
97
1200
95.5
2400
94
4800
93
Source: Pratten & Dean.
*Pairs per day
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Pratten and Dean did not study the other two sectors in which
the CPF cooperatives mainly operated, i.e. clothing and printing.
The Census of Production, however, includes estimates of net output
(turnover + change in stocks - cost of materials, fuel and transport)
per employee. This figure does not accurately reflect economies of
scale, because the average capital/labour ratio may be significantly
different across the range of establishment sizes. The estimates
reported in Table 6.5 suggest,however,that there was no consistent
increase in economies with increasing size.
TABLE 6.5: NET OUTPUT PER PERSON EMPLOYED
.,
I
Ave. Number Footwear Printing Mens & Boys Dresses, Hosiery
employed Tailored Lingerie & other
Outerwear & Infants knitted
Wear 2,;oods
25-49 722 853 567 544 665
50-99 646 846 522 500 706
100-199 683 858 561 546 685
200-299 661 913 468 530 679
300-399 744 985 503 495 721
400-499 701 920 575 440 725
500-749 768 865 534 506 688
750-999 663 926 421 450 826
1000-1499 708 532 787
All sizes 700 905 516 516 728
NB. In 1950 the maximum number of employees per CPF coops were:
Footwear 445; Printing 180; Clothing 1273.
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If economies of scale do not fall drastically with decreasing
size, then we might expect that the four forces described by Vanek
could help to explain the failure of so many coops since 1950.
One way to check Vanek's theory of financing, is to ask whether
cooperatives which have ceased trading relied more on internal finance
than those which have continued to operate. We would expect Vanek's
forces to operate over a number of years, and so we must look at the
cooperatives'reliance on internal finance some time before they ceased
to operate. Table 6.6 compares the financial position in 1950 of
cooperatives which were still trading by 1978, and those which ceased
production. Five ratios are compared.
(i) Debt/Equity Ratio 1 = members' loans + other long-term loansshare capital + reserves
(ii ) Debt/Equity Ratio 2 = other Long-t.er-mloansshare capital + reserves + members' loans
(iii) Debt/EquitytRatio 3 = non-employee shares + members' & other lit loansreserves + employees' share holdings
(iv) Gearing Ratio 1 = members'& other lit loans + overdraftsshare capital and reserves
(v) Gearing Ratio 2 = all l/tloans + overdrafts & tr.cred. + deferred tashare capital + reserves
TABLE 6.6: COOPERATIVES'USE OF INTERNAL FINANCE IN 1950
Mean Ratios DIE Ratio 1 DIE Ratio 2 DIE Ratio 3 G Ratio 1 G Ratio 2
-
All coops 0.42 (31) 0.02 (31) 0.68 (25) 0.54 (31) 0.78 (31)
Coops Alive 1978 0.62 (12) 0.03 (12) 0.72 (10) 0.66 (12) 0.85 (12)
Coops Dead by'78 0.30 (19) 0.01 (19) 0.66 (15) '0.46 ·(19) 0.74 (19)-
-
~l
158
Debt/Equity Ratio 1 measures the proportion of long-term finance
not funded out of share capital or reserves. Live coops, on average,
used more external finance than did those which were dissolved. The
great majprity of this external finance was, however, loans from members.
This could be seen as a form of internal finance. Debt/Equity 2 Ratio
shifts members' loans from the numerator to the denominator. Live
coops still made more use of external finance, although the proportions
were so small as to be insignificant. Debt/Equity Ratio 3 takes account
of the fact that a large proportion of share capital is not held by
employees. In one sense, non-employee members provide a form of external
finance. The fixed interest paid on their shares (cooperatives pay
fixed interest rather than dividends on shares) makes share capital
very similar to loan finance. Indeed, a prime motive for encouraging
non-worker members is to boost the funds available for investment.
D/E Ratio 3 is, once again, higher for live coops than those which
ceased operations.
Vanek's theory of financing was referring to the financing of
capital expenditure. This is generally paid for out of long-
term loans or shareholders' funds. The importance of internal finance
for capital is measured by the three debt/equity ratios. Sometimes,
however, short-term funds may also support capital expenditure. The
two gearing ratios in Table 6.6 include short-term funds in the measure.
Once again, live coops,in 1950 used on average a higher proportion
of external finance than coops which have since closed down.
It would be wrong to attach a great deal of importance to these
results, as none of the five ratios were significantly different between
live and dead coops. Even so, these results certainly do not rule
out Vanek's hypothesis. On the other hand, it is quite possible that
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the dead crops' weak position made it difficult for them to raise
external funds. Alternatively, their own poor use of outside finance
may have made them more prone to failure. In other words, coops which
rarely make use of external funds may be more likely to cease trading,
but not for the reasons postulated by Vanek.
Vanek believed that cooperatives relying on internal funds would
choose to run down their operations. In order to find out if this
happens, we must look more closely at the behaviour of cooperatives
before they closed down. Unfortunately Vanek did not specify how
long he expected this process to take. It would certainly have to
be within a working lifetime. No members would benefit from a build up
of income or reserves after they have left the cooperative(especially
since shares may only be withdrawn at their nominal value). Most of
the cooperatives in the sample were dissolved in the mid '60's, and so
these cooperatives could only be traced for a period of 15 years prior
to closure. For some, 15 years of data was not available. The minimum
period studied was nine years. It may be that Vanek's forces took more
than 15 years to run their course, but hopefully their impact will still
be visible in the final years.
Vanek described four forces, as explained in Chapter 3. One of
these, the under-investment force, has been discussed by Jones and
7Backus. In this section, therefore, only the first, second and fourth
force will be monitored. The fourth force, the "never employ" force, is the
easiest to test. Information is available for 14 cooperatives which stopped
operating in 1959 or later. Although most of these saw a large run
down of the workforce in the final years,we can see from Table 6.7
that all of them increased their labour ,force at least once in the'
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6 years before closure. Three of the cooperatives actually increased
their labour force in the year that they ended operations.
An increase in the labour force need not necessarily coincide
with a rise in membership. Existing members may choose to run down
the membership by replacing departing members with hired employees.
Unfortunately, the information on membership among employees was
not sufficient to determine any pattern. The information would be
misleading anyway, for we saw in section 5 of Chapter 5 that membership
among employees is basically a function of b.nus payments to workers.
Most of the cooperatives had a rule requiring workers to capitalise
their bonus until they had acquired sufficient shares to qualify for
membership. Consequent.Iy, a decision to recruit new workers was, in
effect, a decision to acquire new members.
It is possible that existing members were cunning enough to vote
against bonus payments in the final years. Seven of the cooperatives
did, however, pay a bonus during the last five years. The high corre-
lation between bonus payments and profits reported in section 5., Chapter 5,
is a sign that bonus payments were stopped because of falling profits,
rather than to exclude membership. The experience of these CPF coops
does not, therefore, give any support to Vanek's .prediction of a "never
employ" force.
Vanek's first two self-extinction forces predict that remaining
members will increase their income by allowing both the workforce and
capital assets to run down. These members will then be able to enjoy
the income foregone (as internal financing) by members who have left.
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If these forces are effective we would expect to see members' income
rising in the years before dissolution.
Members of CPF cooperatives receive income from four sources:
(L) Wages and Salaries; (ii) Bonus Payments; (iii) Share
Dividends; (v) Payments to shareholders on dissolution. The
boost in income predicted by Vanek may be shared out regularly by
the first three methods, or saved to the end and paid out to share-
shareholders when the assets are liquidated. (N.B. Liquidation
is the only time when British cooperatives may payout more than
the nominal value on shares'.
Let us begin by looking at payments to contributors on
dissolution. The amount paid to shareholders is known for eleven
of the fourteen cooperatives. Seven of these did pay more than
the nominal value of the shares, i.e. shareholders received
more than they had paid for their shares. The premium received
on the shares was estimated to be, at most, a third of members'
salaries in the final year,
less.
and in most cases considerably
It might seem, therefore, that some cooperatives at least,
had stored up wealth to distribute on closure. At this point we
must ask whether members had added to this store of wealth in the
final years. Given the existence of inflation (and the f~ct that,
if cooperatives did pay dividends on shares, it was usually at a
fixed rate below the rate of inflation) then the undivided wealth
of the members would have to show a significant increase in
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the final years to lend any support to Vanek's theory. This increase
in collective wealth would normally be recorded as a build up in the re-
serves of the ooperatives. In fact all but three of the cooperatives
suffered a drop in the value of their reserves in the final years (see
Table 6.7). Seven had even been reduced to negative reserves when
they went into liquidation.
Three cooperatives managed to increase their reserves. One (Bristol
Printers) did so by selling buildings at well above their written
value. The underlying trend of the reserves was, however, downwards,
and the final reserves would have been negative without this windfall
profit.
Birmingham Printers, who also enjoyed an increase in reserves,
are an unusual case. This cooperative was earning reasonable profits
right up to the end, and there was no obvious reason for ending opera-
tions. This was the cooperative, mentioned in section 13, that had
not passed a rule requiring workers to capitalise their bonus. By
1970 only 38% of the employees were members. The non-employee members
sold their shares to the Cooperative Press, and "all engagements were
transferred to the Cooperative Press". None of the employees of the
Cooperative Press were members of that Coop. This was the only example
of a takeover or merger found among the cooperatives.
Out of the fourteen coops described in Table 6.7, only Wigston
Hosiers displayed any evidence of accumulating collective wealth prior
to closure, and most saw a decline in their reserves before they ceased
operations. One would not normally expect cooperatives acting under
Vanek's first and second forces to behave in this way, but it is
possible that they compensated for the drop in collective wealth by
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paying themselves exceptionally high wages, bonuses and share dividends.
We look at this next.
Information on average share dividends to employee members
which equals ( employee shareholdings share dividendxtotal shareholding employee members
is.only available for a limited number of years for each cooperative.
The dividend paid in these years was, however, never more than 1% of
the average annual wage, and usually considerably less.
The annual earnings from wages and salaries and the workers'bonus
were traced for the fourteen cooperatives during the final fifteen
(or nine) years. These average employee earnings were translated
into a percentage of the national average of the industry and year
concerned. The method by which these national averages were estimated
is explained in appendix 3.
Table 6.7 describes how workers' earnings changed as a percent
of the national average during the final years. Nine of the fourteen
displayed a downward trend. Only two of the cooperatives managed to
boost workers' earning. For three of the cooperatives there was
no definite trend, but only one of these managed an overall improvement
in members earnings over the final years.
Only four cooperatives,out of the fourteen studied,displayed
any evidence of increasing members' relative income during the final
years. Wigston Hosiers did so by boosting reserves (although the fall
in annual earnings may have outweighed this), and Excellon, Glenfield
and Holyoake did so by increasing annual payments (although their
reserves fell over the same period). All of these cooperatives, however,
increased their labour force not long before they closed. The longest
gap was three years prior to closure. Two of the cooperatives,
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Excellon and Holyoake, enjoyed several years of good profits which
apparently encouraged them to expand their labour force - exactly
the opposite of the behaviour predicted by Vanek. Unfortunately they
then suffered a sudden catastrophic downturn in trading conditions,
which forced them into liquidation.
The other two cooperatives, Glenfield and Wigston Hosiers, showed
a more steady downturn in performa~ce, and the increase in the work-
force before closure was very slight. We can see from Table 6.7,
however, that neither of these cooperatives provide very convincing
evidence of Vanek's theories. The overall increase in the income of
Glenfield members was very small, while employees of Wigston Hosiers
probably suffered a fall in relative income (the fall in annual income
was unlikely to be outweighed by the premium paid on contributors shares).
We must conclude, therefore, that these fourteen CPF cooperatives
showed no evidence of responding to Vanek's self-extinction forces.
3. Criticisms of Vanek's Theory of Financing
The CPF Cooperatives are not good subjects for a test of Vanek's
theory of financing. The existence of non-employee members acts as
a form of external finance. The fixed interest that must be paid on
their shares, makes them very similar to a loan. The external membership
will weaken Vanek's forces, as workers will want to keep up their numbers
in order to spread the load of share capital payments to non-employee
members. This factor should not be over-emphasised. Share interest
has typically been low - ~sually 5%, although in recent years some
cooperatives have adjusted it in line with prevailing rates. In 1965"
shape dividend paid to all members only absorbed 20% of the gross
profits of the cooperatives.
Non-worker members may influence cooperative behaviour for a diff-
erent reason. Like capitalist shareholders, they may wish to enjoy
a steady and continuing income from their shares. On the other hand,
if they want to benefit from the decline in labour they can only do
so by closing down the cooperative and liquidating the assets. British
cooperative law requires that fixed interest bepai d on shares, so that
share holders cannot funnel off profits by paying out high dividends.
Neither can cooperative shareholders retrieve retained profits by selling
their shares at appreciated prices. Cooperative shares may not be
transferred, and may only be redeemed at their nominal value. Even
non-employee shareholders would, therefore, have more reason for closing
down an enterprise than would shareholders in the standard limited
company. If the cooperative is paying a fixed interest which is well
below the market rate, shareholders may well prefer to liquidate the
assets and invest elsewhere.
It is possible that Vanek's forces were not evident among the
CPF cooperatives because of their admission of non-employee members,
but thera are other reasons why the forces might be ineffective.
Several criticisms have been aimed at Vanek's theory. The most
obvious is his assumption that members single-mi~dedly maximize income.
The most usual objection to'this is that workers will be concerned
to provide employment for all the members. They will not, therefore,
layoff workers, even if this would raise the income of those remaining.
Vanek gets round this by assuming that the reduction in labour is
achieved through attrition rather than redundancies •
. Similarly, it might be argued that non-employee shareholders
invest their money for the good of the cause, rather than to maximize
their income. Indeed, any profit maximi.zing investor would be very
\1
167
unlikely to choose the fixed interest bearing shares of the cooperatives.
For the CPF cooperatives it is almost certainly true that the non-employee
members (mainly composed of previous employees and other cooperative societies)
would put the survival of the cooperative before their own personal gain.
This takes us to the next point. Why would any member choose to
leave once their income has been boosted by the departure of the first
member? Vanek assumes that the cooperative operates under the same con-
ditions as the C.F., and therefore earns the same rate of profit, which is
absorbed in the rate of interest in the case of external finance. Of
course, if the cooperative is able to save enough to start relying on
internal finance, we can see immediately that on average profits must be
above the prevailing rate of interest. Therefore members would do better
to remain in the cooperative and enjoy this profit, than extract their
capital and deposit it·in the bank. Secondly, once one member leaves,
the workers income will be raised even further above the wages available
in firms outside of the cooperative. Members who are ruthless income
maximizers would, therefore, be expected to cling on to the cooperative
until they died. Apparently the CPF cooperative workers were not ruth-
less income maximizers. Half of the fourteen cooperatives managed to
pay wages above the national average for at least some of the final years,
but many of these showed a decline in the labour force at the same time.
Probably the most plausible explanation for the failure of Vanek's
forces is that Vanek has overestimated the importance of rental income
as a proportion of total income. We saw that share dividends were usually
less than 1% of annual earnings, and the final payment to contributors
was never more than 30% of salaries in that year. Members are .unlikely
to forego regular wages for a very small one-off capital payment.
Vanek's hypothesis is also based on the assumption of a perfect
product market, into which cooperatives can·feed anything they produce.
\.
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In reality, if the cooperatives are to maintain any sales, then they
must show themselves reliable and able to produce orders on time.
When a worker leaves she must be replaced in order to ensure that orders
are completed. To keep their position in the market, cooperatives
must also invest in new technology in order to keep their products up
to date. If members allow capital and workers to run down, then
they are likely to find themselves forced out of the market much more
quickly than they had intended.
Finally, we might note, that even if Vanek's forces were effective,
they can easily be overcome by the passing of a few laws. Vanek has
used his theory to advocate external financing for cooperatives. If
cooperatives followed his advice, they would be moving very much against
the trend of other firms in Britain. Such a move is not necessary,
however. All that is needed is to introduce the Yugoslav requirement
that cooperatives maintain the book value of their assets. Alternatively
the Mondragon system might be used, whereby members may withdraw their
share of retained profits when they depart. I.C.O.M. model rules also
require that any cooperative assets left on liquidation must be donated
to another cooperative society, or put into funds available to other
cooperatives. This would discourage members from breaking up the assets
for their own gain, although it would still be possible for them to
rake off assets by paying exceptional wages in the final years.
4. Is Degenera~ion Inevitable?
In Chapter 3 we discussed three forms of degeneration. First
there was straightforward degeneration into a capitalist firm. This
has 9learly not happened to CPF cooperatives, and is simply not possible
under the Industrial and Provident Societies Act. After the experience
of the Rochdale Cooperative Manufacturing Society, cooperative shares
were made non-transferrable. In other words, shares could not be sold
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to outsiders without the knowledge and agreement of existing members.
Second, cooperatives must allow one vote per member. Individuals
who build up a large stock of shares cannot, therefore, use this power
to over-rule the wishes of other members. As with Vanek's self-
extinction forces, the imposition of a few simple rules can remove
the risk of this form of degeneration.
The other two forms of degeneration described in Chapter 3
have already been discounted by the evidence in section 5 of Chapter
5. Employee membership is basically a function of workers' bonuses,
which is directly related to the profitability of the cooperatives.
This relationship is the exact opposite of that predicted by Chiplin
and Coyne who thought that cooperative members would raise their
income by replacing members with hired workers. This is another example
where a few rules can easily remove the problem. At the moment the
Industrial and Providence Societies Act does not require employees to
become members, most C.P.F. cooperatives did, however, have such
a condition within their own rules. I.C.O.M. model rules require
all employees to become members. Such a rule immediately removes
the danger of degeneration foreseen by Chiplin and Coyne.
5. Conclusion
The purpose of this chapter was to test published theories of why coop-
eratives fail. This is not to imply that neoclassical theories could not
be adjusted to take account ofthe C.P.F. cooperatives apparent lack of
failure. For example, we saw in Chapter 2 that the introduction of slow
wage adjustment into models' of cooperatives, or of utility
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maximization, is likely to produce predictions for cooperatives
which are very similar to that of capitalist firms. Even so,
it will be argued in the next chapter that however much neo-
classical theory is adjusted, it will still be missing the dominant
forces operating on cooperatives (and private firms) working within
capitalism.
The literature abounds with excuses for cooperatives' poor
performance. None of these explanations appear to fit the
experience of C.P.F. cooperatives between 1950 and 1978. In many
cases the doom forecast by the analysts can be circumvented by the
introduction of a few simple rules. In fact, the cooperatives
appear to have been just as successful as independent capitalist
firms of similar size. But are these small capitalist firms
typical? The question we must next ask is why cooperatives have
remained on the scale of "small businesses"?
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CHAPTER 7
THE EXPERIENCE OF CAPITALIST FIRMS 1950-1979
In Chapters 4, 5 and 6 we considered whether the experiences of the
C.P.F. cooperatives and the sample of capitalist firms supported western
theories that there would be distinct differences in the behaviour of
the two types of enterprise. The questions that were addressed in those
chapters were limited by the predictions made by existing theories.
In this and the following chapter we concentrate on those experiences
of the firms which have not drawn the attention of cooperative 1itera-,
ture. It is suggested that the vital differences between the behaviour of
cooper·atives and capitalist firms have not been identified by this literature.
The next chapter will look more closely at the motives behind the
behaviour of the sample of capitalist firms, and asks why the cooperatives
followed a different path. This chapter begins by highlighting the
importance of acquisitions and mergers among the sample of capitalist
firms. It then goes on to describe the changing structure of the industries
in which these firms operated.
A. THE FIRMS
1. The Sample of Capitalist Firms 1950-1979
For each cooperative operating in 1950, four firms operating in both
the same industry and the same geographical area were selected. This pro-
duced a sample of 60 firms in footwear, 40 in printing and 16 in clothing.
A second set of samples was also selected for each industry as a cross-
check on the experiences of sample 1. These second samples were not ,
followed tipin such detail. The data is described in more detail in
Appendix 3.
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TABLE 7.1 COMPARING THE SURVIVAL OF SAMPLES 1 & 2
Industry Footwear Printing Clothing
Sample 1 2 1 2 1 2
Size of Sample 60 60 40 40 16 16
Corrected sample* 57 59 37 37 12 16
Number alive 1979 29 33 21 20 7 9
Per cent alive 1979** 50.9 55.9 56.8 54.1 58.3 56.3
* Some firms could not be traced. Others were in the wrong sector
(usually wholesale or retail rather than manufacturing). The corrected
sample excludes these two groups.
** Per cent of corrected sample.
Table 7.1 compares the survival of each sample. The rate of survival
is surprisingly similar both for the samples working in the same industry,
and across industries. This result is encouraging and suggests that
the samples were not atypical of small firms in their industry.
Table 7 .2 describes the changing ownership of sample 1 of the
capitalist firms. Unfortunately the Registrar of companies destroys
the records of companies dissolved more than twenty years ago, and
only keeps a record of the names of these companies. We do not know,
therefore, if these companies were taken over before being dissolved.
It is interesting to observe that footwear manufacturers lost more
than a fifth of their firms in the 1950's, whereas the decline in printing
and-clothing started later.
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TABLE 7.2 OWNERSHIP OF CAPITALIST FIRMS 1950-79
Footwear Printing Clothi.ng
No. % No. % No. %
Corrected Sample 1 57 100 37 100 12 100
Remained. Independent 23 40.4 28 75.7 6 50.0
Manufacturer in 1979 9 15.8 9 24.3 2 16.7
Changed to Wholesale 1 1.8 4 10.8 0 0
Dormant or in liquidation 1 1.8 1 2.7 1 8.3
Dissolved 12 21.1 14 37.8 3 25.0
Taken over 20* 35.1 7 18.9 5 41.7
Subsidiary manufacturing 11* 19.3 3 8.1 0 0 I
Changed to Wholesale 2 3.5 1 2.7 0 0
Dormant 5 8.8 3 8.1 4 33.3
Dissolved 2 3.5 0 0 1 8.3
Subsidiary in 1950 1 1.8 1 2.7 1 8.3
Subsidiary Manufacturing 0 0 0 0 0 0
Changed to Wholesale 0 0 0 0 0 0
Dormant .. 0 0 0 0 1 8.3
,
Dissolved 1 1.8 1 2.7 0 0
Dissolved before 1961 13 22.8 1 2.7 0 0
* Two companeis merged. The remaining firms were taken over.
Take-overs have been far more prevalent in the clothing and footwear
industries than in printing. If we consider only those firms for which
we have records of ownership, (i.e. not dissolved before 1961), then
50.0% of clothing manufacturers, 47.7% of footwear manufacturers, and
22.2% of printers, had been taken over by'1979.
,.
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None of the clothing subsidaries continued to trade as distinct firms.
Four out of the five were dormant in 1979 and one had been dissolved.
This does not mean that in practice these firms have ceased to trade.
They may be operating as branches of the parent company.
Footwear firms have, on the other hand, often continued to operate
as subsidaries, although two had been reduced to wholesale only.
Only a quarter of the firms acquired were dormant by 1979, while
10% had been dissolved.
Take-overs were uncommon among small printers. Of those acquired,
about half continued to operate as subsidaries, while half were dormant
by 1979.
2. The Nature of Acquiring Firms
TABLE .%3 ACQUIRING COMPANIES
Footwear Printing Clothing
Number of firms acquired 21 8 6
Parent companies were predominantly:-
Manufacturers of same product 13 4 3
Wholesalers/Retailers of same product 6 2 0
Suppliers of materials 0 0 3
Consumers of product 0 2 0
Conglomerates 2 0 0
The pattern of take-overs has varied between industries. We can
see from table7.3 that horizontal take-overs have dominated footwear
manufacturer. Most of these firms have been absorbed into larger groups
of footwear manufacturers, often held under the umbrella of a holding
company. Several firms in the sample were taken over by the same groups.
l~b
Two firms in tnesample, which had already expanded by buying other
footwear manufacturers, then merged to form one of the major footwear
groupings.
There was also a significant number of vertical take-overs by
footwear wholesalers or retailers. Two firms were acquired by the British
ShreCorporation, which is the largest wholesaler and retailer of foot-
wear in Britain. Three firms were taken over by owners of multiple
retail stores (Debenhams, United Drapery Stores and Great Universal
Stores). The other firm was acquired by a smaller retail footwear
chain.
Two footwear manufacturers were acquired by firms not previously
operating in this field. One was bought by a group manufacturing textiles
and gloves, the other by a very large and diverse conglomerate. These
were the,only examples of conglomerate mergers among the three samples.
Horizontal mergers were also observed among printing firms. Four
of the printing sample were absorbed into larger printing groups.
Vertical take-overs were also popular. Two firms were acquired by
wholesalers and retailers of stationery and office equipment. Two
firms were purchased by publishers.
The clothing sample had been selected to contain four hosiery
manufacturers and twelve manufacturers of other forms of clothing.
The three clothing companies described in table7.3as having been acquired
by manufacturers of the same product were all producers of hosiery
and knitwear. The remaining three companies were all acquired by Courtaulds.
This firm started life as a producer ~f man-made fibres, but in the
1960's and 70's made huge in-roads into textile production, and, to
a lesser extent, into clothing manufacture.
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3. The Fate of Acquired Firms
Footwear firms which were subject to horizontal take-overs usually
continued to trade as subsidaries (8 out of 13). Only two companies
were dissolved, while two became dormant and one converted to a small
wholesale branch of the parent company. The two conglomerate parent
companies also maintained their subsidaries as distinct firms. The
wholesale and retail firms tended to absorb their acquisitions (3 dormant,
1 dissolved, 1 converted to wholesale). Only one of of the six footwear
manufacturers acquired by a retail distributor continued to trade as
a subsidary.
Clothing and printing firms do not display any obvious link between
the type of take-over and the fate of the acquired company. All of
the acquired clothing firms disappeared into their parent companies
(or an intermediatesubsidary). In printing, half of the acquired firms
were subject to horizontal mergers, and half of these were still trading
as subsidaries in 1979.
We do not know what happened to the employees and assets of acquired
firms which were dissolved, converted to wholesale, or became dormant.
In some cases these plants will have ceased to trade on the dissolution
of their parents. Occasionally the annual report describes the break
up of the assets. It seems probable, however, that in many cases these
firms continued to operate as branches of their parent company.
4. Surviving Independent Firms
Out of a total'corrected sample pf 106 firms, twenty were still
trading as independent firms in the same business in 1979.
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Nine footwear firms were still operating ffiseparatefirms. Four
of these had acquired subsidaries in both footwear manufacture and
retail. Five companies had no records of subsidaries, although it
is possible that they had acquirffifirms and absorbed them into their
own operations. One of these five, however, had a senior associate
in retail footwear, Timpsons, (itself a subsidary of treu. D.S. Group),
to which it supplied a large proportion of its output. In two cases
the firms' shareholders also owned other companies in footwear manufacture
and retail. There remained, then, only two independent footwear firms
which still, in 1979, had no obvious links with other firms operating
in footwear.
Only tvoclothing firms had survived as independent firms to 1979.
One had four subsidaries, all dormant by 1979. The other company,
which was the only hosiery manufacturer in the sample not to be taken
over, had the same shareholders as another hosiery company.
Nine printing firms managed to survive as independent concerns.
Their experience wffinoticeably different from that of clothing and
footwear. Only two of these firms had subsidaries in 1979. One company
owned another printing firm, but the subsidary of the second firm was
an investment company only. Seven firms apparently survived on their
own, with the exception of one firm whose owners also owned another
printing firm in the sample. This latter firm has been dissolved,
and possibly its operations hcwebeen absorbed into the surviving company.
Both companies operated in Gloucester.
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B. THE INDUSTRIES
5. Production and Employment 1950-79
Table 4 describes the employment recorded by the Census of Production
in the four sectors in which most of the cooperatives operated. Data
reported in later years by the Census of Production is generally
more reliable. Some of the increases in employment recorded here may,
therefore, be partly the result of improved coverage.
TABLE 7.4 EMPLOYMENT IN CLOTHING, FOOTWEAR AND PRINTING
1948 1958 1968 1978
Footwear Manufacturers 111.5 107.2 94.7 73.3
General Printing & Publishers 167.9 194.7 204.8 180.6
Clothirig*Manufacturers 364.2 421.2 349.9 311.5
Hosiery and other Knitted Goods 94.8 108.3 133.7 108.8
Thousands
Source: Census of Production
*In this section "clothing" does not include hosiery and knitwear.
7.4When we look at table lit becomes clear why there were so many
dissolutions before 1961 in the sample of footwe~firms. During the
1950's the British footwear industry was already in decline, whereas
clothing manufacturers did not start to suffer serious set-backs until
the 1960's, and among printers and hosiery manufacturers the rot did
not set in until the 1970's. By 1978, employment in footwear was only
66% of the figure in 1948·. For clothing the decline was less serious,
with employment in 1978 at 86% of the figure in 1949. General printers
and'manufacturers of hosiery and knitwear were actually employing more
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people in 1978 than in 1948, although as with many other manufacturers,
they experienced a drop in employment during the 1970's.
TABLE 7.5 PRODUCTION & IMPORTS OF FOOTWEAR (millions of pairs)
1950 1958 1968 1979
Output of U.K. footwear
manufacturers 170.0 166.2 200.8 149.3
Imports as % of U.K. sales
of pairs of footwear 4.4 12.7 26.2 45.8
Source: B.F.M.F. "Footwear Industry Statistical Review."
Employment in the British Footwear industry has declined for
two reasons. Much of the explanations lies with the huge and accelerating
level of import penetration. This is not the whole story, however,
for production by volume in 1979 was 88% of output in 1950, while the
number of pairs produced increased between 1958 and 1968. Changes
in productivity is, therefore, a second explanation of falling employ-
ment. Over the period footwear technology has changed considerably,
especially with the introduction of synthetic materials and the moulding
of synthetic soles. The Economists Advisory Group (E.A.G.) reported
that by 1975 leather only accounted for 5% of soling materials used.1
In 1975 the source of the greatest number of footwear imports
was Hong Kong (23% of pairs imported). Footwear from Hong Kong tended
to be serving the cheaper end of the market, so that in value terms
Hong Kong only produced 8% of imports. Italy was by far the largest
source of imports by value (33% in 1975), followed by Spain (11%),
2France (9%) and then Hong Kong.
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The success of footwear imports are usually put down to the low
labour costs in the producing countries. The E.A.G. found design to
be just as important, however, especially among the more expensive
imports. Availability of styles and speed of delivery were also reported
by the E.A.G. as a frequent explanation given by distributors for turning
t· t 3o l.mpors.
TABLE 7.6 CATEGORIES OF FOOTWEAR IMPORTERS IN 1975
% of imported pairs
Multiples, department stores, variety
and cooperative retail stores 64
Footwear manufacturers 19
Wholesalers 8
Independent Retailers 4
Mail order houses 5
Total 100
Source: Footwear Industry Study Steering Group.
The estimates reproduced in table7•6show that it is the large
retail groups that are responsible for the majority of footwear imports.
Import penetration has also increased in the clothing industry,
although not to the same degree as in footwear. Clothing manufacturers
have been more successful than those in footwear at increasing exports.
TABLE 7.7 SHARE OF IMPORTS IN U.K. CLOTI:ING SALES
Share of imports(% on weight basis ) 9 13 29
1962 1969 1979
Source: O.E.C.D. (1983) "Textile and Clothing Industries. II
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Exports of clothing were 63% of imports in 1979. Once again, competition
from countries with low labour costs is seen as a major reason for
the success of import penetration in clothing sales. The O.E.C.D.
believe this to be a significantly more important explanation of the
decline in employment than improvements in productivity. The nature
of clothing manufacture, which is highly labour intensive, with much
time spent on loading and unloading fabric from sewing machines, has
made technical progress slow and uneven in this sector.4
Hosiery and knitwear manufacturers have also had to face an expansion
of imports. They have, however, been even more successful than other
clothing manufacturers in boosting exports. By 1979 imports of hosiery
and knitwear were 24% of the value of home consumption, while exports
5absorbed 19.6% of manufacturers sales.
The performance of general printers is closely tied to the performance
Df the entire economy. The British Printing Industries Federation
(B.P.I.F.) point out that much of the output from printers has "a purpose
only as an adjunct to other goods and services.1I6 The fall-off in
employment in the 1970's can, therefore, mainly be attributed to the
deepening recession throughout the economy.
Overseas trade has been marginal to the printing industry. The
cost of shipping print is high in relation to its value. This has
held back import penetration, as has the fact that much print makes
use of local languages. The B.P.I.F. note that the widespread use
of the English language has, in fact,enabled British printers to main.tain
a favourable trade balance in printed matter.7 In 1976 imports amounted
to only 2.4% of all U.K. printers' sales (Le. newspapers, books , packaging
and general printing). In the same year exports took 6.3% of U.K.
printers' output.
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6. Structure of the Manufacturing Industries
*TABLE7.8 NUMBER OF ENTERPRISES INVOLVED IN MANUFACTURE OF CLOTHING,
FOOTWEAR AND PRINTING 1958-78
1958 1968 1978
Footwear 804 581 530
General Printers and Publishers 6643 7112 9357
Clothing 8505 NA 7058
Hosiery and Knitwear 1112 867 951
Source: Census of Productiod
*Enterprise = "One or more firms under common ownership or control."
Given the number of take-overs and dissolutions observed in the
sample of footwear firms, it is not surprising to find that the number
of enterprises manufacturing footwear has fallen dramatically over the
last twenty years. (See table 7.8 ). The big drop came in the 1960' s, ~hich
was a decade noted for its exceptional level of take-overs and mergers
throughout manufacturing.
The E.A.G. noted the unusually high average age of footwear manu-
facturers. This has come about because "very few new footwear companies
have been formed since the Second World War and the majority of the medium
8and large companies date from the nineteenth century." This might be
expected. Having seen the decline suffered by the industry since 1950,
we would not expect this to be a sector attractive to new enterprise.
Consequently, the impact of dissolutions and take-overs was not offset
by company formation, and the number of enterprises rapidly decreased. ,
We can see from table 7·~hat footwear manufacture is dominated by
small firms. More than 40% of firms employ less than 25 people. Many
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TABLE 7.9 PERCENT DISTRIBUTION OF FOOTWEAR ENTERPRISES BY SIZE
1958e 1968 1978
Number Employees per enterprise
Less than 25 43.2 42.9 }25-49 10.8 9.0 77.2
50-99 17.3 14.9
100-199 13.9 15.1 8.7
200-299 4.9 5.3 } 8. 1300-499 5.1 5.8
500-999 3.1 3.4 3.4
1000 and over 1.7 3.6 2.6
Total 100 100 100
e= estimate
Source: Census of Production.
of these very small enterprises perform only part of the manufacturing
process, and will sub--contract to larger firms. Between 1958 and 1968,
the merger boom produced a slight shift to firms employing more than
a hundred people. By 1978 this process had reversed, presumably because
of the continued contraction of most firms along with the slowing down
of acquisitions.
The figures for clothing manufactures quoted in tables 7.8 and7.10
should be treated with some caution. The industry is large and fragmented,
so that coverage by the Census of Production has tended to be imperfect.
It is clear from table7.8 however, that the clothing industry is
mucQ larger tharifootwear, and that it has not suffered the decline in
enterprises experienced by footwear. To a considerable extent the difference
TABLE 7.10 PERCENT DISTRIBUTION OF CLOTHING ENTERPRISES BY SIZE
I Number of
Employees per Clothing Nanuf'acturers Hosiery and Knitwear
Enterprise 1958e 1968 1978 1958e 1968 1978
Less than 25 66.5 - }
45.7 46.5
} 83.725-49 12.8 - 93.5 18.3 13.4
50-99 10.2 - 14.7 15.2
100-199 5.6 - 3.3 9.7 10.8 7.5
200-299 2.1 - } 4.2 } 8.0}2.0 4.7300-499 } - 2.9500-999 2.9 - 0.7 3.1 3.5 2.4
1000 and over - 0.6 1.3 2.7 1.7
Total 100 - 100 100 100 100
Source: Census of Production
lies in the fact that the entire clothing industry has not contracted
at the same rate as footwear. A consequence of this first fact has been
the continued formation of clothing manufacturers over the last thirty
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years. Finally, as we shall see later, many of the take-overs in clothing
have been vertical rather than horizontal, as in footwear. Vertical
mergers will not produce a reduction in the number of enterprises working
in this sector of the industry.
It can be seen from table 7.10that clothing manufacture is even more
concentrated in small firms than footwear. 93.5% of clothing manufacturers
employed less than 100 people in 1978. The proportion of small firms
( < 100) has apparently increased since 1958, although this result may
appe~r because of improved coverage of'small firms in later years.
Interestingly, hosiery and knitwear experienced a considerable decline
in enterprises between 1958 and 1968, even though employment increased
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over the same period (see table 7. 4.)This would indicate that horizontal
mergers were important in this sector during the 1960's. The figures in
Table 7 .10 support this. They show a rise from 21.2% of firms employing
100 or more people in 1958, to 25% in 1968.
Employment in hosiery and knitwear dropped back in the seventies,
although the number of enterprises increased. Between 1968 and 1978,
however, the number of establishments decreased. This would imply that
enterprise growth was fueled by the formation of new firms, while large
established enterprises cut back on employment.
Finally, we come to General Printers and Publishers, who have seen
a steady increase in the number of firms operating in the industry between
1958 and 1978. The sample of printing firms suggests that mergers and
take-overs have been relatively uncommon among printers, and that where
they have occurred they have frequently been vertical. The industry
h~s remained bouyant compared with clothing and footwear, so that company
failures have also been less common. Meanwhile, the formation of new
enterprises has apparently been responsible for the rise in the number
of firms.
When measured by number cf firms,general printing and publishing bf
which only about 17% of employment is in publishi~g) had, by 1978, grown
to be the largest sector of the four being discussed here. General
Printers are, however, dominated by very small firms. In 1968, 83.5%
of general printers and publishers employed less than 25 people, as
compared with 42.9% of footwear manufacturers, 46.5% of hosiery and
knitwear firms, and probably less than 70% of other clothing manufacturers.
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TABLE 7.11 PERCE~T DISTRIBUTION OF GENERAL PRINTING AND PUBLISHING
ENTERPRISES BY SIZE
Number of Employees per enterprise 1958 1968 1978
Less than 25 80.9 83.5 }25-49 8.5 7.6 97.6
50-99 5.4 4.7
100-199 3.1 2.1 1.2
200-299 0.9 } }1.4 0.7300-499 0.6
500-999 ? 0.4 0.5 0.4
1000 and over 0.2 0.3 0.2
Total 100 100 100
Source: Census of Production.
The dominance of small firms has increased over time. In 1958 5.2%
of firms employed more than one hundred people. By 1978 this figure
had fallen to 2.5%
7. Structure of Distribution in the Industries
Both footwear and clothing distribution has experienced a massive
shift away from the small independent retailers since 1950. Increasingly
they have been replaced by multiple retail chains, department stores
and "variety" stores such as British Homes Stores and Marks and Spencers.
Tables 7.12 & 7.13 describe the structure of distribution in the 1970' s.
"Clothing" incorporates hosiery and knitwear in this section. ,
We can see from table 7.12that mul tiples (including department and
variety stores) dominate both footwear and clothing distribution. The
share taken by multiples increased in all three sectors between 1973
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TABLE 7 12 TURNOVER BY TYPE OF OUTLET IN FOOTWEAR & CLOTHING £Millions
Mens' and boys'
Footwear wear Women and Girls' wear
1973 1976 1973 1976 1973 1976
Multiples* 294 462 316 422 1180 1955
Independents 137 190 288 369 786 1055
Cooperative
Retail Stores 8 10 8 10 29 40
All Retailers 439 662 612 801 1995 3050
*Multiples = 10 or more outlets
Source: The Economist Intelligence Unit. "Retail Business".
TABLE 7.13 TURNOVER BY SIZE OF OUTLET 1979 £ Millions
275 840Footwear Shops
Small Businesses Large Businesses
Men's Wear Shops 475 705
Women's Wear Shops 1540 1045
Total 2290 2590
Source: "Retail Business."
"Small"businesses have a turnover of less than £5million at 1976 prices.
and 1976. The greatest increase was in women's and girls' wear, rising
from 59.1% of turnover in 1973 to 64.1% in 1976.
The multiples held the greatest share in footwear, 69.8% of turnover
in 1976. Women's and girls' wear was catching up at 64.1% in 1976, with
Men's and Boy's wear at 52.7%.
Some multiples , however, may be relatively small. Table_7.13 demonstrates
the degree to whi.chfootwear distribution was dominated by large businesses.
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75% of footwear was sold through large businesses in 1979. The equivalent
figure for men's wear was 60%, and for women's wear only 40%.
There is, of course, no equivalent distribution sector for printing.
Outlets for printing are very diverse, and probably include most sectors
of the economy.
8. Concentration in the Industries
The footwear industry is generally considered to be one of the more
competitive sectors of the economy. Goodman remarked that "a major
feature of the industry ..•is its low level of concentration.,,9 Even
so, the 1978 Census of Production reported that the five largest footwear
manufacturers produced 33% of the "sales and work done" by British footwear
firms.
The true nature of concentration in British footwear is not revealed,
however, until we consider footwear distribution
The I,3ritishShoe Corporation Ltd (B.S.C.) operated the following
chains in 1978 - Freeman, Hardy:- & Willis; Saxone, Lilley and Skinner;
Trueform; Curtess; Dolcis and Manfield. In all, B.S.C. had 1742 outlets
in the U.K. in 1978 and supplied roughly 20% of the market.10 Furthermore,
B.S.C. is a subsidary of Sears Holdings Ltd., which also owns Selfridges,
another outlet for shoes. B.S.C. focuses on the fashion market, with
particular emphasis on the 15-25 age group. In this segment of the market
it has control of considerably more than 2(% of the market.11 Through
its manufacturing subsidary, B.S.C. Footwear Ltd., B.S.C. produces about
50% uf its turnover.12
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The British Shoe Corporation is by far the largest footwear retailer
in Britain. In 1978 the next largest, Great Universal Stores, was only
one-quarter the size of B.S.C.13 The Economists Advisory Group estimated,
however, that in 1974 the top 15 footwear retailers controlled 40% of
14the market.
Concentration in the clothing industry is less easy to assess. Many
manufacturers operate in a c1early defined sub-group of the industry
e.g. mens outerwear. On the other hand, some firms supply several clothing
sectors, and it is not impossible for manufacturers to swap production
between sectors. On the whole, clothing manufacture does appear to be
considerably less concentrated than footwear.
The O.E.C.D. recorded that the largest 100 firms operating in U.K.
clothing manufacture in 1973 accounted for 8.7% of U.K. output.15 The
clothing cooperatives operated in three sectors, i.e. "Mens and Boys
Tailored Outerwear, II "Dresses Lingerie and Infants Wearll and "Hosi er-y
and other Knitted GOOdS.11 The 1978 Census of Production reported that
the top five enterprises in these sectors produced, respectively, 19%,
18% and 34% of "t.ot.al.sales and work done by the sector.
We saw in table 7.12that clothing distribution, like footwear, is
increasingly dominated by the multiple retail stores. The domination
by large retail firms is still apparently less severe than in footwear,
and certainly there appears to be no equivalent to the B.S.C. in clothing
distribution.
We have already discussed the highly diverse structure of the printing
industry. Among General Printers and Publishers concentration is very
low. In 1978 the five largest firms only produced 10% of the sales and
work done by General Printers.16 Outlets for printers are probably more
widespread than for any other type of manufacturing.
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CHAPTER 8
COMPARING THE BEHAVIOUR OF COOPERATIVES AND CAPITALIST FIRMS
In the last chapter we saw how central company take-overs were
to the experience of clothing and footwear firms since 1950. This chapter
begins by contrasting the experience of cooperatives, and discusses
why cooperatives did not follow a similar path. What, if anything,
did cooperatives lose by remaining outside of the merger boom? To
answer this, we consider why capitalist firms were so preoccupied with
acquisitions. In the final sections we will return to reconsider the
comparisons made between cooperatives and capitalist firms in chapters
4, 5 and 6 .
1. Why didn't Cooperatives Participate in Acquisitions?
None of the cooperatives under study either acquired enterprises
or were acquired between 1950 and 1979. One cooperative, Birmingham
Printers, transferred its assets to another printing cooperative.
In ,this section we ask three questions. (i) Why were none of the
cooperatives acquired by capitalist firms? (ii) Why did none of the
cooperatives take over capitalist firms? (iii) Why did none of the
cooperatives acquire or merge with other cooperatives?
Under law (Industrial and Provident Societies Act), any corporate
h· t· 1body may hold s ares ln a coopera lve. In theory, then C.F.'s may
acquire cooperative shares. In practice, the only corporate bodies
holding shares in the cooperatives were other societies and trade unions.
Why was this?
The most straight-forward answer is that cooperative rules often
exclude companies from membership. Secondly, the maximum shareholding
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which could be held by any individual or corporate body (other than
another society) was £1000.2 This maximum was raised to £5000 in 1975.
Therefore, it was impossible under law for a company to own all the
shares of a cooperative. Furthermore, unlike companies, cooperatives
pay a fixed rate of interest on shares so that an associate company
could not absorb the profits of its junior associate (the cooperative)
through the payment of share dividends.
Section 52 of the Industrial and Provident Societies Act, 1965,
allows a society to amalgamate with or transfer its engagements to a
company. In order to do sO,a special resolution must be passed by three
quarters of the membership. Cooperative shares may, however, only be
transferred at their nominal value. Therefore, unless the cooperative
was in dire straits, members would lose out by selling the assets of
the cooperative at their nominal value to a potential purchaser. Even
when liquidation becomes inevitable members may prefer to break up their
assets and sell them individually for a higher value. We might also
expect employee members to vote against such a transfer when it might
put their own jobs, and control of those jobs, at risk.
Next we come to the question, why did none of the cooperatives
acquirecapitalist enterprises? It is perfectly legal for a cooperative
to own subsidaries. Indeed, it is quite common for the Cooperative
Wholesale Society to have subsidary retail societies. Why then,did
producer cooperatives not make acquisitions? One probable answer is
the method by which most -take-overs are financed. The vast majority
of take-overs are settled by an exchange of shares. Prais has documented
the rapid rise of share issues for acquisitions. He found that in 1970,
77.6% of take-overs were funded by securities.3
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There is nothing to stop cooperatives issuing shares in payment
for a company that they would like to purchase. It is unlikely, however,
that the owners of the company would wish to acquire shares which may
not be transferred, may only be redeemed at their nominal value, and
pay a fixed rate of interest which has usually been below the rate of
inflation. Furthermore, as we noted earlier, one owner could not receive
more than £5000 worth of shares(and only £1000 prior to 1975)
Finally, cooperatives face a risk when they issue shares that is
not met by companies. Cooperative shares may be redeemed at any time.
The former owners of the acquired company could, therefore, demand cash
in exchange for shares whenever they wished. If they did so the cooperative
would probably find itself facing severe liquidity problems. Shares
in limited companies are quite different. Such shares cannot be returned
to the issuing company and exchanged for cash. The holders of shares
can only liquidate them by selling them to other organisations or individuals.
Consequently, capitalist firms do not open themselves to the same risk
of a liquidity crisis when they issue shares.
Frequently companies buy other companies with poor profit records
at a knock down price. Even though profits may be low, the low rate
paid for shares will make the rate of return on the investment worthwhile.
If cooperatives followed a policy of profit sharing among all employees,
including those who came with the company, then acquiring an unprofitable
company would make the cooperative members worse off. Cooperatives,
therefore, would have little motive for taking over unsuccessful firms,
and could not afford to acquire prosperous companies.
The last question concerns the absence of amalgamations between
cooperatives. One cooperative did "transfer its engagements" to an
existing cooperative. However, such a transfer, only requires the transfer
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of assets and obligations, it does not guarantee the employment of
cooperative members. All that the members are certain to receive on
such a transfer is the nominal value of their shareholdings. It is
perfectly possible, however, for cooperatives to amalgamate their
operations. Why they chose not to do so is not immediately clear.
In the next section we will ask what were the benefits to capitalist
firms from mergers. This might help to explain the lack of such
activities among producer cooperatives.
2. What was the Motive for Take-Overs among Clothing, Footwear and
Printing Firms?
There has been a vast amount of research into company take-overs.
Unfortunately, the industries in which we are interested have not been
well documented. Understandably, interest has been concentrated on
the kind of giant firms which are not usually found among clothing,
printing and footwear manufacturers. These giants not only tend to
be seen as more important, but information on their activities is much
more readily available. Most studies of take-overs have been Hmi ted
to quoted companies. A few studies have looked at a broader spectrum,
but in these cases clothing and footwear have usually been lumped together,
while printing has been combined with paper and publishing - industries
which are considerably more concentrated.
Apart from a small number of case-studies, research into
acquisitions and concentration has also tended to focus on intra-
industry acquisitions. This method misses vertical acquisitions and,
al~hough horizontal mergers were important among our sample of capitalist
firms, it will be suggested that to understand the growth in horizontal
acquisitions we must be aware of what was happening in the sectors
supplying and purchasing from these firms.
196
Why do firms merge with, or take over, other firms? A frequent
answer is, for the benefits of production economies of scale. Does
this answer hold up for the three industries under discussion? Not
at all. Nearly all footwear subsidaries have continued to operate as
separate plants. We have already observed (Chapter 6, table cA) that
Pratten and Dean found economies of scale to be minimal in footwear
4manufacture. The Economists Advisory Group also observed that
"it seems generally agreed that production economies of scale ....
are not very great beyond 1,200 pairs a day(that is an
establishment employing about 150) and that at much beyond this
level diseconomies may set in." 5
Among clothing manufacture economies of scale are even less important.
The O.E.C.D. report a study by Elliot and Gleed which "found the
minimum efficient plant size to be well below 1% of output for all
branches of clothing.,,6
The main source of economies of scale in general printing is the
size of the print run. The British Printing Industries Federation observed
that many general printing orders are relatively small in size, and
so there is little to be gained from the technical advantage of large
scale production.7
Hosiery and knitwear is the only sector in which economies of scale
have apparently been important. Hart, Utton and Walshe suggest that
"technological innovation promoted scale economies.,,8 They quote a
report in the 'Hosiery Times' that indicated that "due to the advent
of larger machines, the trend in the knitwear industry is towards larger ,
9groups."
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Economies of scale cannot, therefore explain the boom in acquisitions.,
We must search for alternative explanations. Each industry will be
considered in turn.
a) Footwear
The British Shoe Corporation was formed in 1956. In that year
Sears Holdings Ltd., which already owned Freeman, Hardy & Willis, True-
Form, Phillips Brothers Character Shoes and Curtess Shoes, took over
Manfield and Dolcis. Out of, this group the British Shoe Corporation
emerged. As the directors of Dolcis observed in their annual report
for 1956, "the year witnessed a major change in the structure of the
retail footwear trade in the United Kingdom."
British Shoe manufacturers found themselves facing an exceptionally
powerful organisation when they tried to sell their products. The
Economists Advisory Group have documented in detail the control which
B.S.C. exerts over the manufacturers.
"Smaller made-to-order firms, especially those in woman's shoes,
claim to be under heavy pressure to reduce prices. They are told
(by B.S.C.) what price ticket the product is to sell at and,
therefore, what price B.S.C. will purchase at. There is no flexibility
in this price ...•Whilst manufacturers are allowed to look for export
sales or even some mail order business, they are discouraged
from supplying other multiples •..This discouragement, we were told,
may take the form of an implied threat by B.S.C. to reduce or stop
purchases from that manufacturer." 10
Even if footwear manufacturers are able to secure outlets other
than B.S.C., the buying power of other multiples is also considerable
and growing in importance.11
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The manufacturers constantly face the threat that the multiple
retailers will substitute imports if they cannot provide footwear at
the price offered by the multiples. We saw in chapter 7, table 7.6',trat
it is the multiple retailers that are responsible for the majority of
imports. B.S.C. imports 50% of its turnover.
Ironically, in footwear distribution, imports actually bolster
the monopoly power of the large retailers. Usually imports are seen
as a constraint on domestic monopolies.
How have footwear manufacturers responded to the growing
concentration of distribution? Goodman believes that this concentration
"led many of the
of their outlets
.in retailing, or
with retailers."
larger manufacturers to increase the security
either by increasing their direct involvement
by strengthening their franchise arrangements
12.
Our sample of surviving independent footwear firms supports this
view. Most of the companies owned, or had links with, retail outlets.
Goodman observes that this
"strategy of forward integration to secure control of outlets is
largely unavailable to the small manufacturers, and even the larger
manufacturers, unless they can produce the whole range of footwear
competitively." 13
This, then, would appear to be one explanation of the growth in
horizontaLmergers. In order to maintain their own retail outlets, firms
had to be large enough to produce the full range of footwear. Second-
ly , in order to try to tip back the balance of bargaining power with
the distributors, manufacturers might be expected to resort to horizontal
acquisitions. Furthermore, with footwear manufacture in decline, growth
through investment would have been very hazardous. I1orizontalmergers
bring about not only the merging of productive capacity, but more importantly,
the merging of existing outlets.
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(b) Clothing
Several studies have noted the growing concentration in textile
production and how this has also been manifested in forward integration
into clothing manufacture.
Uttbn made a study of diversification in manufacturing industries.
He found that the most diversified sector of U.K. manufacturing was
the combined orders Coal and Petroleum Products plus Chemicals and
Allied Products. The next most diversified group was textiles. Nearly
half of textile enterprise employment outside of their primary order
was in the Clothing and Footwear Industry. "A large part of the latter
is probably accounted for by Courtaulds' forward vertical integration
by merger into the clothing industry to protect its outlets for
cellulosic fibre. ,,16
The O.E.C.D.observed the s,ameprocess of forward integration by
fibre producers in nearly ail of its member countries. The movement
was strongest, however, in the U.K. By 1976 the f'Lvelargest British
textile firms accounted for more than half of textile employment.17
During the 1960's and early 1970's Courtaulds continuously acquired
textile and clothing manufacturers. Cowling et al document sixty
acquisitions by Courtaulds ~etween 1963 and 1974. In their study, Hart
et al suggest that economies of sale in textile production may have
been a partial spur to Courtaulds' expansion, but, like Utton, they
bel ieve the major motive to have been to make outlets secure. Hart et
al describe how Courtaulds had tried to sell its own elastomeric,
Spqnzelle, to Clutsom-Penn International. It was unsuccessful, Clutsom
imported Lycra from DuPont. Clutsom was taken over by Courtaulds in
1968.19 Courtaulds drive to secure outlets was probably all the more
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determined because of the strength of some of its competitors in fibres,
among them I.C.I.
We must assume that Courtau1ds' onward expansion into clothing
manufacture (although this was far less significant than the move into
textiles) was a further attempt to make its outlets more secure. Except
for such vertical acquisitions, the O.E.C.D. report that pressures for
concentration in clothing were weak. They remark that
"technological advance did not substantially increase the range of
scale economies ••. Rapidly changing fashions and hence short pro-
duction runs (ensures that) flexibility in adjusting output tends to ~O
outweigh cost reductions arising from the use of specialised equipment.
Furthermore, clothing manufacturers did not apparently face the
degree of concentration in distribution as was faced by footwear
producers. Undoubtedly there has been a growing move towards multiple
retailing in clothing as with footwear. But we saw in Chapter 7, Tables
7.12 and 7.13 that clothing distribution is still considerably more
fragmented than footwear. In 1980 the I.C.C. report on clothing manufacturers
commented that, "in clothing the partnership (between manufacturers
and retailers) appears to be fairly equal, with both sides having achieved
21good profits and growth over the last few years." I.C.C. use the
figures reported in Table 8.1 to support their observation.
TABLE 8.1 AVERAGE RETURN ON CAPITAL AMONG CLOTHING MANUFACTURERS AND
RETAILERS
1979/78 1978/77 1977/76
Clothing Manufacturers 21 24 23
Clothing Retailers 21 23 19
Percentages
Source: I.C.C. Business Ratio Report (1980): Clothing Manufacturers.
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It would appear that horizontal mergers were not a major determinant
of the structure of clothing manufacturing over the last thirty years.
Hosiery and knitwear is the one exception. Hart et al quote "knitted
outerwear" as an example of a trade in which concentration increased
as a result of mergers. Integration forward by fibre manufacturers
was again important. By 1968 three of the top five manufacturers of
22hosiery and knitwear were primarily fibre producers. Courtaulds,
of course, was the largest. Horizontal expansion was also important,
particularly by Nottingham Manufacturing, which acquired one of the
hosiery firms in the sample of clothing C.F.'s.
Hart et al explain the merger wave by
"The need to countervail the power of large buyers which resulted
from internal and external growth of retailers ... Secondly,
there is a suggestion that technological innovation promoted
scale economies." 23
Cowling et al put forward another explanation of Courtaulds' rapid
expansion into clothing and textiles. They suggest that "it was an
instrument by which its dominant position could be secured by political
influence.,,24 In particular, Courtaulds used its power to ensure that
imports of fibres and textiles were restricted by government policies.
"Courtaulds have been quite open about their attempts to secure
a more restrictive import policy for textiles and have linked
their acquisition of a dominant position in textiles to the
achievement of this aim. Arthur Knight, their current chairman,
explains that the acquisition of one third of the Lancashire
textile industry was "necessary to have any prospect of influencing
government attitudes about imports."11 25
It is interesting to contrast the role of Courtaulds with that of
the B.S.C. Not until 1977, following recommendations by the Footwear
203
Industry Study Steering Group (F.I.S.S.G.), were any restrictions placed
on the import of footwear into the U.K. Tariffs on the import of fibres
have existed since the 1950's. We have seen that B.S.C. profited from
the import of footwear, even though it was very damaging to footwear
manufacturers. We may speculate that B.S.C. was using its very
considerable power to prevent the introduction of restrictions on
footwear imports.
(c) Printing
Why were printing firms less prone to take-overs than those in
footwear and clothing? The answer probably lies in the structure of
the demand for the product. We have noted the very diversified and
fragmented demand for print. The British Printing Industries Federation
point out that the
"bespoke nature of the product limits the technical advantage
obtained from large scale production, and there is often a strong
marketing advantage arising from local knowledge of customers
and from geographical contiguity between printer and customer." 26
The structure of printing outlets was apparently such that small
printers could continue to find buyers for their product. Consequently
there was no great pressure towards horizontal amalgamations.
3. Cooperative Outlets
Our survey of capitalist firms suggests that one of their major
concerns is to secure outlets for their products. In the case of
Courtaulds, battling against other giant fibre producers, and imports,
this was achieved by forward integration. Similarly, some footwear
manufacturers acquired or opened retail outlets. Other manufacturers,
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both in clothing (especially hosiery and knitwear) and footwear,resorted
to horizontal expansion in order to strengthen their position vis a
vis the distributors. Printers, on the other hand, faced such a diversified
demand for their product, that they were able to survive without forming
permanent links with their outlets.
Producer cooperatives faced a similar struggle to secure outlets.
Traditionally, the footwear and clothing cooperatives enjoyed the
protection of regular orders from the Cooperative Retail and Wholesale
Societies. Since their formation, the C.P.F. Cooperatives enjoyed close
links with cooperative distributors. All three categories of cooperative
were members of the Cooperative Union, and producer cooperatives were
given priority in the buying policies of other cooperatives. The printing
cooperatives were ,not so tied in with cooperative distribution.
Traditionally they did work for both cooperatives and trade unions,
but as with capitalist printers, they tended to supply a variety of
customers.
In the mid 1960's cooperative distribution underwent a radical
overhaul. Cooperative retailers were facing increasing competition
from the growth of large supermarket chains. The response of the
cooperatives was to convert the retail societies (C.R.S.) into a similar
homogeneous chain of stores:
Although the Cooperative Wholesale Society (C.W.S.) had been in
existence for many years, the C.R.S. were free to purchase from whomever
they pleased. Many, of course, purchased from the C.P.F. cooperatives.
Con?equently, one C.R.S. might offer a very different range of products
from its neighbour. Each retail society was autonomous, and therefore
failed to benefit from bulk purchasing.
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The"Cooperative Wholesale Marketing Scheme" was introduced in 1963
to remove these weaknesses. Under this scheme, C.R.S. were encouraged
to amalgamate and many were taken over by the C.W.S. Secondly, the C.R.S.
were requested to make all their purchases from the C.W.S. so that the
same products would be available in all stores, and so that they could
benefit from scale economies in distribution.
The effect of the Marketing Schemes on the cooperative producers
can be illustrated by comments drawn from their annual reports. In
1965 Toy Town Shoes reported "a falloff in co-op trade". An "unprecedented
slump in sales" followed in 1967. Toy Town Shoes went into liquidation
in 1969. Kaycee Clothing reported that "Marketing Schemes are steadily
encroaching on sales to the Cooperative Market" (Annual Report 1966).
In 1967 Kaycee Clothing reported that
"C.W.S. Marke'ting Schemes now control virtually 80% of all
trade in menswear in our major outlets. This is having a
serious effect on our trading potential. The future depends
on our ability to find new markets."
In 1970
"the continuing amalgamation of Cooperative Societies has
r~sulted in a reduction of orders in the second half of the
year."
Kaycee Clothing went into liquidation in 1974.
The experience of Kaycee Clothing may be contrasted with that of
Ideal Clothiers. The cooperative reported a decrease in sales in 1967
due to "an increase in the garments covered by Marketing Schemes",
also
"a steadily increasing part of trade with the C.R.S. is
covered by Marketing Schemes which are not profitable. It
is therefore vital to find new sales outlets. New trade
almost doubled in the last year, and exports are up 50%
on the total for last year."
Later reports continued to emphasise Ideal Clothiers success in findingalternaU
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outlets. Ideal Clothiers was still trading in 1979. Unfortunately
there is no evidence as to why Ideal Clothiers was more successful in
finding new markets than Kaycee Clothing.
Similarly, although in 1970 Derby Printers reported that "trade
fell off, mainly due to amalgamations within the Co-op Movement." Derby
Printers survived until 1979 by turning to other customers.
There is no doubt that the Marketing Schemes hit the C.P.F.
cooperatives badly. The cooperatives survived if they were able to
find other outlets or become one of the selected suppliers to the
Marketing Schemes. We may note from the comments by Ideal Clothiers
that, although they complained about the poor profits available from
the Marketing Scheme, they were apparently one of the lucky cooperatives
selected to supply these 'schemes, and by 1973 they were able to report
an increase in cooperative trade. This probably goes far to explain
their survival. Queen Eleanor, another surviving clothing cooperative,
continued to report a significant amount of cooperative trade into the
1970's ..'
Printers were able to survive because their output had never been
so concentrated on the cooperative market, while the opportunity for
finding alternative outlets was much better.
4. Re-Assessing the Performance of Cooperatives
Chapters 4, 5 and 6 compared the performance of cooperatives with
the sample of capitalist firms. The comparisons were based on a neo-
classical perception of how the capitalist economy operates. In this
section we will reconsider the results in the light of the evidence
presented in this and the last chapters.
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(a) Short-Run Behaviour
In Chapter 4we found that most cooperatives increased their labour
force at the same time as capitalist firms. Neoclassical theory predicted
the opposite. Even modified versions of the neoclassical analysis predicted,
at most, that cooperatives would hold their labour force steady when
capitalist firms expanded.
So why did most cooperatives behave just like C.F.'s? Presumably
to hold on to existing outlets. The E.A.G. reported that a frequent
explanation given by distributors for turning to imports was "availability
of styles and speed of delivery." (Chapter 7, Section 5). One can
just imagine the response of the B.S.C. or the C.W.S. when, on asking
for an expansion of orders, the cooperative replied that it had decided
to cut back on production. If the cooperatives cannot provide the range
and number of orders requested by the purchaser they will no doubt
soon lose their custom to willing competitors.
(b) Survival
The literature contains a number of alternative explanations of co-
operative failure,but as we saw in Chapter 6, none of these appeared
to fit the evidence. Furthermore, none of these offered any ideas on
why printing and clothing coops survived much better than those in footwear.
(See Table5.1 Chapter 5). Here we suggest that the survival of both
cooperatives and capitalist firms depends on three factors:-
(i) The general performance of the industry
(ii) The enterprise's position within that industry
(iii) The enterprise's access to outlets, and the structure of
the sector purchasing the product.
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Let us first consider (i), general performance of the industry.
The footwear industry has been in severe decline since the 1950·s, much
more so than either printing or clothing. It is no surprise, then,to
find that footwear cooperatives failed much more frequently than those
in clothing and printing.
The state of the footwear industry is not, however, sufficient
explanation for the low survival of footwear cooperatives. It does
not tell us~hy a smaller proportion of footwear cooperatives survived
than C.F.·s.(Table 5.3, Chapter 5). Now we must compare the different
strategies used to secure outlets. Capitalist firms forged links with
footwear retailers by (i) acquiring their own retail outlets;
(ii) Becoming a subsi.dary of a footwear retailer; (iii) Franchise agree-
ments, often made more secure by broadening their bargaining power and
range of products through horizontal integration. Cooperatives followed
none of these procedures for the reasons outlined in Section 1.
The role of the C.R.S. and C.W.S. may help to explain why co-
operatives did not resort to amalgamation with fellow cooperatives.
For a long time producer cooperatives enjoyed secure outlets. Since
economies of scale were not important in their industries, they had
no motive for amalgamation. The effect of the M~rketing Schemes began
to hit many cooperatives in the second half of the 1960·s. By then
most of the footwear outlets had already been sewn up by the fast expanding
footwear manufacturing groups. For most cooperatives it was too late
to fight back, and their experience
cooperative network was very limited.
of marketing outside of the
Clothing cooperatives, on the other hand, did much better than
their capitalist counterparts. Here fact6rs (ii) and (iii) come into
I'
----~~~~-~~~~~~~~-~-------------------~-- --~~-- -------
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play. First we must remember that the clothing cooperatives were
exceptionally large compared with the industry average. In 1950 they
employed 1192 (Kaycee Clothing), 1273 (Ideal Clothiers), 155 (Queen
Eleanor) and 90 (Wigston Hosiers). Only Wigston Hosiers was average
for its sector. Hosiery and knitwear manufacturers tended to be larger
than other clothing sectors.
Queen Eleanor and Ideal Clothiers survived until 1979. How did
they manage. it? They did so by securing orders from the Cooperative
Wholesale Marketing Schemes and thereby maintaining a share of their
cooperative outlets, and secondly by finding new outlets. They were
more successful in this than footwear cooperatives because of their
relative size within their industry, and because clothing distribution,
although increasingly concentrated, was still much less so than footwear.
Finally we come to printing cooperatives, which displayed a better
survival rate than capitalist printing firms. The printing cooperatives
were of average size for their industry. They faced a large and diverse
demand for their output, and since few printing firms took part in either
horizontal or forward take-overs, the cooperative printers were not
at any great disadvantage compared with capitalist firms. In other
words, conditions were very similar for capitalis~ and cooperative printers.
The printing cooperatives, unlike clothing and footwear coops,
were not squeezed out of markets by the expansionary policies of capitalist
firms, nor were they small relative to the majority of firms in their
industry. The printing cooperatives might be seen as the only coops
in ,our sample that competed on equal terms with their capitalist counterparts,
and as .we have seen, they actually survived better than the sample of
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printing firms. This leads one to wonder whether, all other things
being equal, cooperatives would on average survive longer than capitalist
firms.
(c) Growth and Employment Creation
Cooperatives appear to have been slightly less successful than
C.F. 's in maintaining employment (Section 4, Chapter 5), although statistically
there was no significant difference between footwear cooperatives and
C.F. IS.
It is clear, however, that many firms have managed to maintain
employment by becoming subsidaries, while both subsidaries and independent
firms have grown by acquiring other firms. We do not know how far growth
among the sample of C.F. 's was fueled by acquisition of subsidaries.
Meeks found, however, that between 1964 and 1971 the acquisition of
subsidaries accounted for over 50% of the growth in net assets of all
U d . 27.K. quote companles. None of this growth creates new employment,
and may well decrease employment if the acquiring firm does not maintain
the subsidary at its full capacity.
thore
Against this result we must put the fact that/firms acquired and
then dissolved or dormant, may still exist physically as a branch of
the parent company. The results in Table5.7 Chapter 5, do not include
employment in C.F.s maintained in this way. Five of the thirteen acquired
footwear manufacturers ceased to trade as manufacturing subsidaries,
while footwear subsidaries formed 62%offirms surviving in 1979. In
theory, then,the employment maintained by capitalist footwear firms
could have been almost 40% more than the figure quoted in Table 5.7 of
Chapter 5.
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These comments leave us no clearer about the relative employment
creating capacities of cooperatives and capitalist firms. It w~s suggested
in the previous section, however, that clothing and footwear cooperatives
were put at a disadvantage as compared with capitalist firms as a result
of the numerous acquisitions in these industries. If the cooperatives
had not faced growing concentration in their sectors, they may have
been able to maintain a higher level of employment.
5. Does the Neoclassical Analysis Assist our Understanding of
Capitalism or Labour~Management?
Our study of clothing, printing and footwear firms has created
a picture of take-overs and growing concentration in both production
and distribution. These industries are certainly not unique. In fact
they have probably been less prone to this process than most other
sectors. This discovery is hardly anything new. Since the time of
Marx, people have predicted and described the growing concentration
of capitalist industry. Why then have commentators on labour-
management (along with many others) clung so tenaciously to the neo-
classical model?
The answer which is usually given is - yes, neoclassical models
may not capture every component of the capitalist economy, but they
do predict the direction of change. Isn't this true? Have we not seen
in Chapter 4 that capitalist firms tend to expand in times of increased
aggregate demand, and do the reverse in periods of recession. Of course,
if a model of the economy failed to make even one correct prediction
about the behaviour of the participants in the system, even its supporters
might have difficulty in justifying its existence. Inevitably, then,
the neoclassical analysis had to include spme predictions which appeared
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to fit the evidence. This is not to say that other forms of analysis
could not equally have confirmed those predictions, and been much more
successful in predicting other aspects of the economy.
The failure of the neoclassical model is highlighted once it is
translated to an analysis of labour-management. The neoclassical model
of the short-run produced results which economists were trying to explain
away even before testing the predictions empirically. Few people actually
expected to find labour-managed firms that contracted when demand expanded.
But, as we saw in Chapter 4, even the adapted versions of the short-
run analysis failed to describe the actual behaviour of the cooperatives.
If the neoclassical analysis of labour-management has any value,
it is its role in highlighting the failure of the neoclassical model
to get to grips with the dominant forces working in a market economy
(both capitalist and labour-managed). This is not to suggest that the
neoclassical model res failed. If its role was to cover'up a system of
exploitation and inequalities by describing it as one of harmony and
fair returns for services provided, then the neoclassical model has
been a'great success.
Where does the neoclassical model deviate from the realities of
a capitalist system? 'As Aaronovitch and Sawyer point out,
"the model of perfect competition is not able to explain how
oligopoly arises, in the sense that there is no mechanism in the
theory by which an industry of many firms changes into one
dominated by a few firms." 28
Why, they ask, should any firm go through all the bother and cost of
acquiring other firms for short-run monopolistic profits, when, in the
long run, these profits must inevitably disappear (~cording to neoclassical
theory) .
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The neoclassical explanations of firm growth is exogenous to the
firm, e.g. increased demand, reduced costs or changing technology.
Only the latter can explain growth through acquisitions rather than
internal investment. If two firms merge this does not add to the total
product and satisfy growth in demand.
What of technical change? Our own sample of firms displayed almost
no evidence of growth motivated by a pursuit of production economies
of scale. Aaronovitch and Sawyer, along with many other authors, have
found this conclusion to hold true across most industries.29 Furthermore, as Wo
shall see in Chapter 9, technical change is not unbiased. In a capitalist
system, if firms benefit from being large, then technical change will
inevitably be biased towards large production units.
The neoclassical model is one of harmony. Under perfect competition
real competition virtually does not exist, all firms merely accept the
given price and manufacture contentedly alongside similar firms. The
only competition is to maximise efficiency and so minimise costs. All
firms can sell their product if they offer it at the market price.
In reality it is difficult for a firm to sell its product when
all its outlets are owned by another manufacturer of the same product.
We saw that Du Pont, presumably by offering the best price,secured the
custom of Clutsom-Penn International. Courtaulds managed to win Clutsom's
custom from Du Pont. How was this achieved? Did Courtaulds endeavour
to.improve its efficiency and offer its product at a l~wer price thru1
Du Pont? No, Courtaulds merely acquired Clutsom and secured it as an
outlet.
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The above example brings us to another quality 0 f the neoclassical
analysis. That is the image that it creates of firms pursuing their
individual advantage, and by doing so, benefiting all participants in
the economy. Courtaulds' acquisition of Clutsom did not bring cheaper
clothes to the consumer. Nor does the monopoly power of D.S.C. with
its exceptionally high profit margins, benefit either the consumer or
the struggling manufacturers.
Aaronovitch and Sawyer describe a system of intense and continuous
rivalry between firms. In their system there is no tendency towards
an equilibrium in which firms operate together in harmony. According
to Aaronvitch and Sawyer, firms struggle to grow large in order to
enjoy both the benefits of market power and political influence. By
doing so they transfer income from both consumers and other firms to
themselves.
"Many of the gains accruing to the larger firm do not
correspond to any social gains. It is rather that the size
and bargaining strength of the firms determine the division
of spoils, rather than increase the total spoils." 30
Th~ neoclassical analysis denies both the long-run persistence of
profits and the struggle over the division of the surplus between
wages and profits. In the next chapter it will be argued that,
because of this, neoclassical methods fail to capture the important
differences between capitalist and labour managed systems.
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CHAPTER 9
A CRITICISM OF NEOCLASSICAL THEORIES OF
THE LABOUR-MANAGED ECONOMY
In this chapter I argue that the neoclassical model leads to
both contradictory and incorrect conclusions about the performance
of the labour-managed economy (L.M.E.). This is because the neo-
classical model ignores a characteristic of capitalism which has
long been a driving force behind the call for labour-management,
namely the exploitation of labour.
The majority of the published theory of the economic behaviour
of the labour-managed economy starts from a neoclassical perspective.
Fundamental to this perspective are the following:
(i) A labour supply curve.
(ii) Continuous and concave production functions.
Using these tools the neoclassical method creates a model of capitalism
in which General Equilibrium is seen as the most desired economic goal.
General Equilibrium is both -the most "efficient" and "just" economic
solution. It is efficient because all firms produce at the point of
minimum average cost, and just because each factor of production
receives its marginal product. Consequently Pareto Optimality is
considered the ultimate test to be inflicted on any proposed economic
order.
Application of the neoclassical method to labour-management
has led to two very contradictory conclusions about the L.M.E. They
are:
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(i) The L.M.E. will be inefficient because of a misallocation
of resources between firms. This is caused by the labour
market not clearing, and labour earning different incomes
in different firms.1
(ii) The L.M.E. will be just as efficient as a capitalist
economy under General Equilibrium. At this point both
systems will be Pareto Optimal.2
Why are these conclusions so different? The answer is that the
first refers to a situation in which both the L.M.E. and a capitalist
economy would be inefficient by Pareto's standards. Apparently the
entry of new firms has not competed away inequalities in the system.
The resulting misallocation of resources will be reflected in the
capitalist system as some firms earning a profit. In the L.M.E. the
same conditions will give rise to inequalities in labour incomes.
It is a well established result that if a capitalist and labour-
managed firm face exactly the same market and prod~ction function,
then their inputs and outputs will be identical, if the C.F. is not
making a profit. It should therefore come as no surprise that under
General Equilibrium the L.M.F. will be Pareto Optimal. This is why
the second conclusion has appeared in the literat~re.
The neoclassical model, therefore, leads us to a dead end. Either
both the labour-managed and capitalist systems are efficient, or they
are both inefficient. It all depends on the conditions you are assuming
at the time.
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General Equilibrium is, of course, not a condition that even the
most keen neoclassical supporter would argue ever exists. It is merely
an ideal to be aimed for. Once we remove General Equilibrium, however,
then capitalist profits inevitably reappear. According to the neo-
classical model the existence of profits does not lead to the exploita-
tion of labour. Workers will continue to receive the value of their
marginal product. The key word is "marginal". For once profits exist
then labour will certainly receive less than the full value of its product.
Such a situation might well be described as exploitation, and indeed
has been by many writers.
In order to make any sensible comparison between the labour-
managed and capitalist economies, we must begin by accepting that
capitalists do earn profits, and that therefore labour exploitation
occurs under capitalism. At the same time the imaginary world of
labour supply curves and continuous concave production functions must
also be dropped.
In the next sections a neo-Ricardian model is used to show that
the
the neoclassical conclusion that/LME might be less efficient or less
just than the capitalist economy is wrong. In fact the reverse is
true. The LME is a considerably more equitable and efficient system.
In the next sections I Clrawheavily on Ian Steedman's "Marx after
Sraffa".3 Both his models and numerical examples have been repeated
verbatim when the capitalist economy is being described. They have
then been adapted to take account of labour-management.
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1. A Model of Labour Exploitation
The first casualty of neoclassical economics in this model is
the continuous and concave production function. Choices of technology
do exist, but they are limited. Any adjustments tend to be abrupt.
There is little opportunity for smooth harmonious responses to changing
economic conditions.
Next to go is the labour supply schedule. In this model labour
has the choice of selling its labour power under the conditions deter-
mined by management, or of remaining unemployed.
Labour power is the only means of production owned by labour.
Labour cannot, therefore, trade its time between selling labour power
or alternative productive activities. Workers do not have the resources
to set up their own business or to earn a decent living through
investments.
The concept of a labour supply curve does not describe the true
position 'of labour, and therefore has no role in determining the wage
rate. Changes in conditions of employment under capitalism are won
through union/management conflict (sometimes observed as negotiation).
By organising, labour may be able to improve their working conditions,
but their ability to do so wHl be very dependent on the level of
unemployment throughout the economy.
Following Steedman we will begin with an exceptionally simple
model of an economy. In this economy only one choice of technology
exists. The conditions of employment, which are represented by the
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wage rate, are also fixed. We will start with a numerical example used
by Steedman, and then translate this into his more general roodel.
Imagine a simple economy of three industries. "One industry
produces the means of production, to be called iron, one produces gold,
and the third produces a necessary consumption good, say corn. In each
industry the production process uses only labour and iron as inputs
whichever industry iron is used in, it is completely used up in
Thus there is no fixed capital.,,4one year.
Table 9.1 shows the physical inputs and outputs of each
industry.
TABLE 9.1 SIMPLE REPRODUCTION IN A THREE INDUSTRY ECONOMY.
Irpn 'v Laqour Iron Gold Corn~--____,Inputs Outputs
Iron industry 28 56 56
Gold industry 16 16 48
Corn industry 12 8 8,
)
Total 56 80 56 48 8
Source: Steedman, p. 38.
Let gold be the money commodity, so that its price Pg becomes
the numeraire, i.e. Pg = 1. From Table 9.1 we can derive the
following:
(1 + r) (28 Pi + 56w) ::: 56 Pi (9.1)
(1 + r) (16 Pi + 16w) ::: 48 Pg ::: 48 (9.2)
(1 + r) (12 Pi + 8w) = 8 Pc (9.3)
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Where:
r = the rate of profit
Pi the price of iron
Pc = the price of corn
w = the wage rate in money units
This is an equilibrium model, in which the rate of profit 'r' is
assumed equal throughout the economy. This state of affairs is achieved
by the entry and exit of firms. Thus the imposition of a common rate
of profit is equivalent to the neoclassical general equilibrium condi-
tion of zero profits. In fact, as Steedman explains, this condition
could be relaxed, and a unique solution can be arrived at, so long as
we know the ratio of ~ate of profits between industries.
Equations (9.1) to (9.3) are not sufficient to determine the unknowns,
as there are four, r, Pi, Pc and w. A fourth equation is necessary,
and this is provided by the value of the real wage. The real wage is
determined outside the model, and either reflects subsistence levels
or some rate arrived at following a struggle between workers and owners.
In this case, let the money wages paid to workers just enable them to
purchase five units of corn. Then:
80 w = Q Pc (9.4)
Each unknown is now uniquely determined, and the approximate solutions
are:
r = 52.08%, w = 0.2685
Pi = 1.7052, Pc = 4.2960
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2. Labour-Management Compared
Next we introduce labour-management into the numerical model
described. The change to L-M is represented simply by labour receiving
all net output. Income per worker is equalised across industries by
entry and exit of firms. The same process that made profits equal.
Let I'i be prices under the LME and Y = labour income
in money units.
We can rewrite equations (9.1) to (9.3) as:
28 Pi + 56 Y = 56 Ii (9.5)
16 Ii + 16 Y = 48 (9.6)
12 Pi + 8 Y = 8 Pc (9.7)
Now we have three equations and three unknown. Thus the fourth
equation necessary for a capitalist solution (determination of the real
wage rate), is redundant. The solutions are:
Y = 1 = 2 = 4
..
It is important to note that not only is Y =t 'II I but that the
prices of iron and corn are also different under the two regimes.
This result contradicts the neoclassical solution, that all prices
of both inputs and outputs are the same for the LME and CE in general
equilibrium.
Can we say anything about the direction of the differences between
the two economies? To do so it is necessary to describe a more general
model ..
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3. A General Model (Of Simple Reproduction with no Fixed Capital)
Let the gross output of each commodity be unity by a suitable
choice of units, i.e. what was formerly known as 56 units of iron is
now one new unit of iron. Equations (9.1) to (9.3) may now be written
as:
(1 + r) (Pi/2 + 56w) = Pi
(1 + r) (2Pi/7 + 16w) = Pg
(1 + r) (3Pi/14 + 8w) Pc
which may be written as
(1 + r) m pm(p A + wa) =
(9.1a)
(9.1b)
(9.1c)
(9.8)
In which pm is a row vector of prices, A a matrix of input co-
efficients, and a the row vector showing the level of employment in
each industry.
Equation (9.8) may be re-written as:
pm" [I _ (1 + r)A] = (1 + r) wa (9.9)
or
= w (1 + r)a U: - (1 + r) A] -1 (9.10)
Let the sum of the elements of a = L. That 1S, L is the total
employment of labour power by the economy measured in units of time.
Equation (9.4) may now be written as:
wL = (9.11)
where CD is the real wage rate, a column vector of goods measured
in phys~cal units.
Combining (9.8) and (9.11) we find that
L = (1 + r)a [r (1 + r)A] -1 (9.12)
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This is an important result, for it shows clearly that, as L,A
and a are all fixed, then r and~ are inversely related to one another.
In other words, with given conditions of physical production, the rate
of profit is inversely related to the level of the real wage rate w.
The conflict between workers' and capitalists' interests becomes quite
clear.
Furthermore, if the real.wage rate is given, then the rate of
profit is fully determined by technological restraints, i.e. the size
of net physical output as represented by the matrix (I - A). Techno-
logical constraints ensure that the rate of profit cannot rise above
a certain level, even if real wages were forced down to zero.
At this point we can return to the labour-managed economy.
Equations (9.5) to (9.7) can be written as:
;om A + Ya = 'pm (9.13)
Ya =,Pm (I _ A) (9.14)
Quite simply, total real labour income (Ya;0m) is equal to total net
physical output (I - A).
Since, as we have already noted, the rate of real wages is
directly related to the rate of profit, the size of real wages can be
derived, as a function of th~ rate of profit, directly from equation
(9.10), without the need for equation (9.11). From (9.10) it is clear
that
W= Pm-1wa = [I - (1 + r )A](1 + r) (9.15)
rn-rTh~refore Ya,P > GJ as long as r > O. Thus, the real income
earned by labour in an L.M.E. must be greater than the real wage earned
under a capitalist system as long as the rate of profit is positive
under capitalism.
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Isn't this a tautology? If you define an economy in which there
is labour exploitation, i.e. profits are a direct deduction from labour
incomes, then you are certain to find that labour will be better off
in an economy of zero profits. This is quite true. But the purpose
of this exercise is to illustrate that if you build a model of an economy
in which labour exploitation does not exist (the neoclassical model),
then you are certain to find that labour will find itself no better
off under an L.M.E.
An underlying assumption of the model so far is that all profits
are consumed by capitalists. Accumulation and expanded reproduction
are ignored. Once the role of profits is seen as one of capital
accumulation as well as capitalist consumption, then the overriding
exploitative nature of profits becomes blurred. Accumulation will be
considered under Section 9, but first some more interesting results
can be derived from the model of simple reproduction.
4. Relative Prices
The numerical example described in sections 2 and 3, illustrated
that relative prices of products could be different for a C.E. and L.M.E.
in equilibrium. How will relative prices change? What will make them
rise or fall?
Let us return to the three industry economy - iron, gold
and corn. The input coefficient matrix A could be rewritten as:
a .. a. a.~~ ~g ~c
A = 0 0 0 (9.16)
0 0 0
where a .. is the input of iron required to produce one unit of iron~~
(Yz in the example). Because gold and corl!are not used as means of
production, the bottom two rows are zero.
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Under a capitalist system, equation (9.10) tells us that in
equilibrium
m r, J -1P = w (1 + r)a Ll - (1 + r)A (9.10)
From (9.16) we find that
~ - (1 + r)A] = 1 - (1 + r la ..11 - (1 + r ) a.. - (1 + r) a.J.g 1C
0 1 0
(9.17)
0 0 1
?The inverse of this is:
[1 - (1 + r)A] -1 =
1 a. (1 + r-) a. (1 + r)
19 1C (9.18)
0 {1 - a..(1+r~ 01l.
0 0 ~ - a.. (l+r~11
Returning to equation (9. 10 ) we find that:
P.
1 ..
Pc
w( 1 + r ) a .
11=
a.1C
(9.19)
where ali is the input of labour required to produce one unit of
iron, and alc to produce one unit of corn.
This can be simplified to:
Pi
Pc = (9.20)
For the L.M.E. we have, from (9.13), that: ,
m
;G Ya (I _ A)-l (9.21)
Now, 1 - a.. -a. -a.11 19 lC
1 - A =
0 1 0
0 0 1
and the inverse
(1 _ A)-l, = 1 a. a.19 lC
0 (1 - aii) 0
0 0 (1 - aii')
and
/'i YaH
,rg = Y(ali (1 - aii) )a. + alclC
or
Ii ali=fb ali a. + (1 - a..) alclC 11
(9.22)
(9.23)
(9.24)
(9.25)
Now we can compare relative prices in the capitalist and
labour managed economies by comparing (9.20)and (9.25). Two points
are clear: (i) there will be no difference in relative prices
as long as the rate of profit is zero; (ii) the direction of change
in relative prices depends on the sign of the term (ali aic - alc aii).
What is the meaning of this term?
The capital labour ratios of the iron and corn industries
measured in physical units may be written as
a ..= 11
ali
and (~) c = a.lC
ale
We must remember that the physical units used are the gross output
of each commodity (iron in this case), and units of time for labour.
Now let us say that the corn industry is more capital intensive
(has a higher K/L ratio) than the iron industry. Then:
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or
a.1.C
alc
a ..1.1.
ali > 0
In other words, multiplying through by alc ali' the condition
that the corn industry is more capital intensive than the iron
industry may be written as
(al' a. - al a ..)"> 01. 1.C C 1.1.
which is exactly the term derived earlier.
Returning to equations (9.20) and (9.25) we see, therefore
that as long as r ~ 0, then if the corn industry is more capital
,
intensive than iron, then the price of corn as a proportion of the
price of iron will be lower in the equilibrium LME than in the equil-
ibrium C.E. Why does this occur? Simply because labour is under
priced in a capitalist system with positive profits. Consequently,
the higher the proportion of labour directed into a product, the more
will its price rise relative to other products under an L.M.E.
This simple model has, of course, skirted round the major issue
of adding different kinds of capital. We only had one kind of capital
(iron), therefore comparing (K/L) ratios was no problem, because the
same units of measurement were used for the inputs of both the corn
and iron industry. The neoclassical solution has been to sum the
money value of capital, on the premise that the price of capital
accurately reflects its true value. However, we have seen that relative
prices are highly dependent on the distribution of net product
between wages and profit. To understand the underlying relationships
wit~in an economy, we must therefore find some common unit of measure other ,
than prices. It is at this point that we inevitably hit the labour
theory of value.
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5. Value
For neoclassical economists the value of a commodity is determined
by its marginal utility. Very conveniently, the construction of the
neoclassical model ensures that in equilibrium the price of a product
equals its marginal utility. Therefore prices are said to accurately
reflect value, and so it is argued that the price system is both
efficient and just.
As L.M.E. equilibrium prices are exactly the same as C.E.
equilibrium prices in the neoclassical model, then L.M.E. prices
also accurately reflect the value of products in this model.
A very different picture emerges from the Neo-Ricardian model.
But first, we must redefine the concept of value. Utility is no
longer a neutral concept in this model, and marginal utility even
less so. The pattern of demand for products is intimately tied to
the distribution of income. Furthermore the distribution of income
is determined by the final outcome of the struggle between wages and
profits. Therefore demand, as.the visible signal of utility, can
no longer be accepted as a neutral measure of value.
We must find another concept of value, and so we turn to Marx.
"By the value of a commodity, Marx meant the quantity of labour socially
necessary for the production of that commodity. This value, or quantity
of labour, includes, of course, not only the labour used directly in
the production of the commodity but also the labour used indirectly
in its production or, in ,other words, the labour required to produce
the means of production used up in the direct labour process. ,,5
Once again, following Steedman, let the values of a unit of
iron, a unit of gold, and a unit of cor-n, be denoted by li, Ig and
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and lc respectively. Returning to the numerical example in Table
(9.1), then:
28 li + 56 = 56 li (9.26)
16 li + 16 = 48 Ig (9.27)
12 li + 8 = 8 lc (9.28)
From which we can deduce that:
Li = 2; Ig = 1; lc = 4.
The (labour) value of iron, corn and gold is, therefore, quite
different from their prices (shown on page22~ under a capitalist
system.
Marx, of course, argued that labour values were essential in
the determination of equilibrium prices, i.e. those prices towards
which the economy is gravitating. Such an assertion leads to the
inevitable "transformation problem" of prices into values.
Here we accept the Neo-Ricardian conclusion that labour values
..have very little to do with prices in a capitalist economy. Marx
used labour value theory to illustrate the existence of surplus value,
and, therefore, labour exploitation. However, value theory is not
essential to an understanding of exploitation. We know from page Z 2. 5
that profits and wages are inversely related. Furthermore, under
a system of labour management, labour is certain to be better off
than under a capitalist system with positive profits (p.225 ).
Therefore posi tive pr-of'Lt.sare a clear sign of labour exploitation.
Rather than pursue Marx's position, that prices reflect labour
value, it seems more fruitful to argue that prices and values can
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never be equal under a capitalist system with non-zero profits, and'
that this should be a cause for concern. The insertion of capitalist
profits has distorted prices, and so all the inefficiencies and unjust
consequences described in the neoclassical model out of equilibrium,
may be expected of a capitalist economy in full equilibrium.
You will not be surprised to learn that, of course, under an
L.M.E. prices exactly reflect labour values. A glance at the solutions
at pp. 223 and 231 makes this clear. The reason becomes obvious
when we convert equations (9.26) to (9.28) into the more general
statement that:
lA + a = 1 (9.29)
(9.30)1 = a (I _ A)-l
where 1 is a row vector of labour values.
The similarity of equations (9.21) and (9.30) is obvious. By
coincidence, in the numerical example, Y = 1. Thus prices and labour
values were exactly equal. In fact under an L.M.E. labour values
will be reflected in real prices, i.e. nominal price divided by the
cost of one unit of labour, Y. The insertion of the rate of profit,
r, into equation (9.10) makes it impossible for either real prices
or relative prices to reflect labour values in a capitalist economy.
6. Introducing Fixed Capital
So far i~ has been assumed that all existing means of production
are consumed in one period of production. Fortunately, they are
fully replaced by the production process, and any extra production
(net output) is consumed by capitalist as pr-of'Lt.sor labour as wages.
Once again relying entirely on Steedman's. analysis, fixed capital
is now introduced. For clarity we begin with a numerical example
taken from Steedman, Chapter 10.
Now the only two products in the economy are corn and machines.
Consider a case of falling efficiency, i.e. old machines are less
efficient than new machines. Part of the output of a process using
new machines is old machines, which may either be set back into
production or scrapped. Table 9.2 describes such an economy. We
remain with simple reproduction, so that one period of production
uses as many new and old machines as it produces. There is therefore
no capital accumulation, and all other output is consumed. The
problem of realisation, when savings by capitalists or labour might
result in some net product being left unconsumed, is, therefore,
abstracted from
TABLE 9.2
Industry Inputs Outputs
Corn New Machines Old Mach- Labour 'Corn New Old
ines
Machines 3 0 0 3 -----7' 0 3 0
..
Corn (NM) 49 3 0 30 ----7 88 0 3
Corn (OM) 3 0 3 30 ~ 30 0 0
Total 55 3 3 63 --7 118 3 3
Source: Steedman, p. 145.
From Table 9.2 we can derive the following equations for a
capitalist economy:
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(1 + r) (3 Pc + 3 w) 3 Pn (9.31)
(1 + r) (49Pc +3Pn + 30w) ::= 88 Pc + 3Po (9.32)
(1 + r) (3 Pc + 3 Po + 30w) ::= 30 Pc (9.33)
Now let the price of corn be the numeraire, so that Pc : 1,
and let the real wage equal two thirds of a unit of corn per unit
of labour time, i. e.
W ::= ~Pc : ~ (9.34)
So we can derive the following results
r ::= 20%; Pn::=2; Po: ~ (9.35)
For the L.M.E. the following equations can be derived from Table 9.2:
3 f6 + 3 Y : 3 ;>n (9.36)
49 + 3,Pn + 30 Y : 88f>c + 3 1'0 (9.37)
3 + 3 ?o + 30 y..: 30 ~ (9.38)
Remembering that ;g has been set equal to 1, then
~ : 2; ~ : -1; y:1.
The negative price of old machines, indicates that under a
labour-managed economy old machines would be better scrapped. To
see this let us look at th~ results when only the first two processes
in Table 9.2 are used. Now,
3,Pc + 3 Y : 3 I'n
49 + 3th + 30 Y : 88/6
and if ~ : 1, then
;On .. 1 1::= 2 D. Y ::=1 11
(9.39)
(9.40)
(9.41)
The money value of income is therefore higher when old machines
are scrapped than when they are used. In fact, since ~,the price
of the only good consumed by labour, has been set equal to one in
both cases, then the real income of labour will also be higher if
old machines are scrapped. A similar experiment with the capitalist
example would show that profits would suffer from the scrapping of
old machines, as indicated by the positive value of Po.
Why would an L.M.E. discard old machines when a capitalist
economy would continue to use them? Under the capitalist system labour
is exploited and therefore not paid its true value, equal to Y.
Consequently, although the old machine process is very labour consuming
considering its small output of corn, it is still profitable to capit-
alists. For labour managers it would be far more sensible to transfer
the labour used in the old machine process into the machine and corn
industries using new machines.
In the last section it was suggested that the distortion of
prices away from labour values under a capitalist system could result
in a·very inefficient use of resources. The above example illustrates
just how this could occur.
The numerical example derived from Table 9.2 can be just as
easily generalised as the earlier example. Equations (9.31) to (9.33)
may now be written as:
(1 + r) (pm A + wa) = pm B (9.42)
where B is the matrix of outputs, which now incorporates joint
_products and fixed capital as a special kind of joint product.
From (9.42) we can deduce that:
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= w (1 + r) a @ - (1 + r ) A] -1 (9.43)
The output matrix B has replaced the identity matrix I of equation
(9.10).
For the L.M.E. equations (9.36) to (9.38) may be generalised
to
Y a =;Om (B - A) (9.44)
and therefore
m
;0 = -1Ya (B - A) (9.45)
It should be clear that all the earlier conclusions concerning the
comparative performance of the L.M.E. and C.E. in equilibrium will
not be altered by the introduction of fixed capital and joint
products.
7. The Choice of Technology
Up to now we have not allowed for any choice of technology,
except in terms of use of old or new machines. However, for many
industries, more than one process may be available. How can this
be incorporated into the picture?
Once again exactly following Steedman's line of argument, we
find that choice of technQlogy may be represented by a set'of N input
6matrices Ao ••• Aj An. Thus the Jth combination of one pro-
duction method for each product is represented by Aj. For convenience,
input coefficients are adjusted so that all input matrices produce
the same output matrix B.
How do capitalists choose which of the many technologies they
i
should use? Their object, as always, is to maximize the rate of
profit, r. From :(9.42 ) we see that, for a given real wage rate,
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(..j == WLpm-1, then:
m -1 m
(1 + r.) (P. A. + L CV P. a)
~ J J J
== (9.46)
or
-1
(1 + r j) (Aj + L W a) == B (9.47)
and
( -1 a)-lB Aj + L co -1 (9.48')
Capitalists will therefore choose that combination of techno-
logies, Aj, which maximizes r .. The term in (9.48) is not easy to
. J
decipher, although it is clear that the choice of technology is very
dependent on the real wage rate
How will the L.M.E. choose its techniques? In line with the
C.E. we must assume that the object of labour managers will be to
m-1maximize their real income, y;o . Returning to equation (9.45)
we see that
..m-1ytj (B - A )
j
-1a (9.49)
The L.M.E. will, therefore, choose those techniques, A which maximize
-1real net output per unit of labour used in each industry, (B - Aj)a .
Returning to equation (9.30) we find that labour values, L are equal
to:-
-1
1 = a (B - A) (9.50)
or
-1 -1
1 == (B - A) a (9.51)
Therefore labour's real income may be described as
to m-1y 14. J (9.52)
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Thus, when choosing techniques so as to maximize real income,
the L.M.E. aims to minimize the labour value of each product, Le.
they choose a combination of technologies which minimize the direct
and indirect labour inputs into each commodity.
A concern of neoclassical economists has been that the labour
managed firm may have a tendency towards over-capitalisation, and
consequently be inefficient. Although, of course, in the neoclassical
structure this tendency could only be effective when there is dis-
equilibrium, since we all know that there is no difference between
the C.F. and L.M.F. at general equilibrium. The numerical example
in section 6 suggests that an L.M.E. may tend towards greater capital
intensity even in equilibrium and that this may be no bad thing.
We cannot assume, however, that the result in section 6 can be
generalised. Let us return to Table 9.2 while taking account of the
conclusion reached above We now see that an L.M.E. would reject
the old machine using process not because it is more labour intensive but
because the direct and indirect labour input into o~e unit of corn pro-
duced under this process is so much more than under the new machine
process. The K/L ratio of the old machine process could be held constant
(i.e. the left-hand side of the corn (OM) line remains the same), but if
the output of the old machine process rose from 30 to, say, 50 units
of corn, a quick calculation would show that the old machine process
would now be viable under an L.M.E. In other words, the total direct and
indirect labour put into producing one unit of corn by a combination of
the two processes would be less than if only the new machines were used.
This analysis suggests, therefore, that the neoclassical conclusion
that an'L.M.E. is prone to over capitalisation is very misleading.
'.
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Even in situations where an L .,M.F may opt for a more capital intensive
process than its C.F. partner, the choice would be a far more "efficient"
one than that made by the C.F.
Another position taken by neoclassical economists is that the
tendency to over capitalisation by an L.M.F. (in disequilibrium) will
create serious problems of unemployment. Increased demand for a
commodity will, they argue, stimulate a larger growth in both output
and labour employed by a C.F. than an L.M.F. In fact the reverse
is also true - a drop in demand will cause an 1.M.F. to reduce labour
less than a C.F. Therefore we could also argue, even along neoclassical
lines, that an L.M.E. is less likely to slump into high unemployment.
These points will be pursued further in Chapter 10which discusses
situations of disequilibrium.
If we return to the equilibrium analysis so far, it should be
noted that throughout we have conveniently assumed a fixed supply
of labour, 1. Why should the labour used by either a C.E. or an
1.M.E. in equilibrium equal the labour supplied? Neoclassical economics
gets round this one by introducing the labour supply schedule.
Unemployment is the result of excessive real wages. A cut in real
wages will, it is true, reduce effective demand.arrl,therefore;thedemand
for labour. Fortunately a cut in real wages will also encourage
many workers to transfer their labour power to other lucrative
activities which do not involve selling their labour to capitalists.
Fortunately more workers drop out of the labour market as a result
of a cut in real wages than the fall in labour demanded. Consequently
unemployment disappears.
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Neo-Ricardians would reject the labour supply schedule.
Workers do not disappear with a drop in real wages (except of course
for the well documented case of married women). Therefore a cut in
real wages, by reducing the demand for labour, would effectively
raise levels of unemployment. If we accept the Neo-Ricardian view,
the demand for labour is no more likely to equal supply, even in
equilibrium, under capitalism than under an L.M.E. Therefore, achiev-
ing equilibrium is not an end in itself. Schemes must be introduced
to aim for equilibrium with full employment. Such schemes would
have to encourage entry of 'new firms and growth among existing firms.
Techniques of production do not just pop out of thin air. They
are usually arrived at following research conducted by the firms which
will apply the techniques. As C.F.IS are searching for techniques
to maximize profits, it is very probable that the direction of technical
progress followed by a capitalist economy would be different from
that of labour-managed economy.
8. Variations within the Labour Process
Up to this point we have assumed that the intensity of effort
put in by workers per unit of time remains constant. It can, of
course, vary. The object of C.F. IS is to maintain as high a level
of effort as possible. In Chapter 6 Steedman illustrates that,not
surprisingly, a rise in labour intensity .can be viewed as equivalent
to a drop in real wages. The struggle between capitalists and labour
will be a dual one over both wages and the labour process.
Many authors have argued that the intensity of labour effort
may be different under an L.M.E. than under a C.E. Either labour
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managers increase their efforts because they can now reap the rewards
of their work, or they reduce effort now that they have the option
of doing so. We found in section4that real labour income under an
L.M.E., Ya;om-1, is certain to be more than real wages under the
C.F.,~, so long as profits are positive. However, if labour
effort is lower in an L.M.F. than in a C.F., then the difference
m-1between uo and YaJO could disappear. The opposite would be true
if labour worked harder in an L.M.F. However, the important point
to realise is that labour is now able to make the choice between
commodities and effort or leisure time. A choice which could only,
be very unsatisfactorily made through labour struggles and disputes
under a capitalist system. It should be remembered, that compara-
tively low incomes in an L.M.F. may reflect members' choice, rather
than their failure to work efficiently.
9. Returns to Scale
The,discussion so far has conveniently assumed constant returns
to scale. Although we have argued that the neoclassical continuous
concave production function is very far fetched, and that a limited
number of discrete choices reflects the true situation, this still
does not remove the issue of economies of scale. It would seem not
impossible that, even within such limited choices, some economies
of scale may exist.
It is well known that a capitalist firm working under a "V"
shaped production function will not operate at the point of constant
returns to scale when it is making a profit. The labour-managed ,
firm, on the other hand, will always try to operate at constant returns
7to scale.
Equation (9.8) is therefore something of a mis-representation
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of the capitalist position. It assumes that capitalist firms are
producing at the point of maximum technical efficiency. In fact
they will be operating at some less efficient point on the production
function.
We have already seen that the capitalist economy described in
equation (9.S) perfornsbadly compared with its L.M. counterpart.
The existence of returns to scale will serve to exaggerate this
difference. The C.F. will operate at inefficient scales, thereby
reducing the size of net output (I - A) or (B - A).
10. Expanded Reproduction and Capital Accumulation
You may have noticed that Tables 9.1 and 9.2, and all the
models described, have assumed a fixed allocation of labour between
processes. Thus, in Table 9.1, 56 units of labour are always
applied to the iron industry whatever the distribution of income
between wages and profits. A change in relative prices, therefore,
does not stimulate an expansion or contraction of industries. In
Chapter 13 Steedman incorporates the possibility of choices over
labour allocation between industries and, therefore, choices over
the pattern of output.
If the pattern of output is variable, maintaining the fiction
of simple reproduction becomes even more precarious. Net output of
capital goods (iron in our first example) is unlikely to remain at
zero. At this point then, we introduce expanded reproduction, in
which there is a positive net output of capital goods during one
period of the production process, i.e. there is capital accumulation.
rhe input and output matrices, AI and BI, now represent not only
all industries, but also every available production processes for
every industry. Columns of AI and BI represent commodities, whereas
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the rows are the number of processes. AI and BI will therefore be
rectangular rather than square matrices.
The elements of AI and BI will be taken to represent the inputs
to and outputs from the jth process when it is operated by one unit
of labour time.
Now if g is the rate of growth, then clearly g is constrained
by the size of net output. Assuming that labour consumes all their
wages, and that capitalists reinvest all their profits, then
(1 + g) (AI + c..."li)X ~Blx (9.53)
where: Wi real wages per unit of labour time
i = a row vector of unit elements
x = column vector showing how much labour-time is
allocated to each process.
Where a process is not used then xj will equal zero.
From equation (9'.42) we know that
,(I + r) (pm A + wa) = (9.42)
or
(9.54)
Now converting to coefficients measured in units of labour
time, then
(1 + r ) pm ( A I + (.JIi) x ~ pm B IX (9.55)
(N.B. now the vector x is determined within the model, rather than of
given values as represented by vector a. )
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Equation (9.55) is now written as an inequality because A' and
B' include many processes which will not be used because they are
not sufficiently profitable. Thus "the revenue from any process is
at most equal to (1 + r) times the capital advanced to set it in
motion.1I8
However, any product produced over and above the needs of
replacement and growth will have a zero price. Thus (9.53) may be
written as:
(9.56)
Further, any process which cannot achieve the profit rate r will
not be used, i.e. x for that process will be zero.
j
Therefore (9.55)
may be written as
(9.57)
Therefore, comparing (9.56) and (9.57) we reach the well known
conclusion that:
'i)X]-1 (9.58)
Thus, either there is no production at all, or r = g, i.e. the
rate of profit, equals the growth rate. Secondly, for a given real
wage C,) , and with workers consuming all their wages, then r = g are
uniquely determined.
11. Growth in the L.M.E.
A similar logic may be followed for the L.M.E. Equation
~9.56) is now replaced with
m
(1 + g)'p (A' +,Pm-1 Y') x m= ;0. B'x (9.59)
and equation (9.57) becomes
(1 + c);Om (A' + ;om-1 yl) X =;om B'x (9.60)
The meaning of yl is now distinctly different from Y. In earlier
discussions we simply assumed that labour consumed all products over
and above that required to replace the inputs used up in the production
process. Now we assume that labour managers reserve some of their
income for accumulation, c, while consuming the remainder of the net
product = yl. The unsurprising conclusion is that the rate of growth
in the L.M..E. must equal the rate of accumulation decided on by labour
managers.
The L.M.E. emphasises the very simplified assumption made in
the capitalist model, i.e. that capitalists now reinvest all profits
(earlier we assumed that they consumed all profits). In fact, of
course, they will do both. So we should write that r = c+k, where
k = the rate of capitalist consumption. Equation (9.57) would no'll!
be written as
(1 + c + k) pm (A' + w'i) x = pmB'x
and (9.56) as
(1 + g + k) pm (A' + w'i)x
Therefore, for the capitalist economy, we may al.sowrite that
g =: C ~ r, (At the moment we ignore the "realisation problem",
that savings by capitalists or workers do not get fully channelled
back into the economy via investment. Fora discussion of this see
Chapter 10).
Suddenly the L.M.E. and C.E. are beginning to look very similar
once more. But is there any reason why the rate of accumulation should
be the same for the two economies? Not at all. In the C.E. the
rate of accumulation is determined by the following:
(a) the outcome of the struggle between labour and capitalists
which determines the real wage rate (or the intensity of the
labour process) and therefore the rate of profit 'r';
(b) the desire for accumulation as against consumption of capitalists;
(c) the technological limitation on the maximum rate of profit.
For the L.M.E. the technological limitation is also important.
But apart from this, the rate of accumulation will be entirely
determined by labour's preference between consumption and accumula-
tion. By coincidence, the rate of accumulation may be the same in
both economies, but even then relative prices and choice of techno-
logy will be different, unless capitalists reinvest all profits.
As long as capitalists consume part of the profits, then even if
capital accumulation is equal in the two economies, Y must still be
greater than ~, with all the consequences discussed earlier.
Neoclassical economists argue that the rate of accumulation
chosen by capitalists will reflect society's desired rate of accumula-
tion. How does this work? Well people in general save. The savings
reflect the desired rate of accumulation. Savings are channelled
through the banks and reinvested. Investment and saving are equal-
ized by the rate of interest which amazingly equals the rate of
profit. Thus, the populace recoups the product taken from them at
the point of production, for purposes of investment, via the interest
earned on their savings. At the same time, they manage to grab back
profits which for a moment, it seemed, might have quite unreasonably
beehdisappearing into the pockets of a few capitalists.
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Further, all means of production receive their marginal product.
The income of each individual determines their power to influence
the overall level of savings, but as each individual receives a "just"
income, then everything is satisfactory.
This logic falls down if we accept that income distribution is
the end result of class struggle, rather than the smooth adjustment
of continuous curves. Now wages ~ay be forced so low that labour
and
have nothing left to saveJ they would certainly prefer to transfer
accumulation to their own consumption. Unfortunately, they don't
get any say in the matter.
Labour struggle may push up wages to the point at which some
accumulation (savings) is seen as desirable. Even so, the bias
of income towards profits ensures that capitalists always have
unreasonable weight in determining the level of accumulation and
growth.
Ultimately the rate of accumulation might be quite similar
in the L.M.E. and C.E., but probably it will be very different (either
more or less). However, rates of growth and accumulation found in
the L.M.E. will reflect the wishes of a much broader spectrum of the
population than in the C.E.
12. The Pattern of Demand
This discussion has centred entirely on the process of
production. Issues of exchange have been ignored. If we return
to the first numerical example, we see that capitalists and labour
fought over the distribution of net product between profit and wages.
However, the content of the consumption .goods available were taken
as given, i.e. equal to 48 units of gold and 8 units of corn. Labour
managed to win 5 units of corn and capitalists consumed the rest (48
units of gold and 3 units of corn}. With the conversion to an L.M.E.,
labour got to consume the entire net output of 48 units of gold and
8 units of corn.
What if gold didn't seem as desirable to labour as to capitalists?
What if 5 units of corn were more than enough, and another 3 units
of corn were the last,thing any worker wanted? Suppose someone was
allergic to corn. How do they persuade producers to grow barley?
By offering money, of course. If labour and capitalists receive
wages and profits in the form of money, then demand schedules suddenly
appear on the scene. So, neoclassical economists would argue, a
labour theory of value is inadequate. Value theory must reflect
consumers' demand, as well as costs of production.
It is certainly true that demand is a vital determinant of
price when economies are in disequilibrium. In this situation price
not only serves to ration goods, but also to signal situations in
which production should expand or contract. This is true for both
the L.M.E. and C.E.
However, even neoclassical economics would accept that in
equilibrium (zero profits) prices come to reflect costs of production.
These prices = average costs, would, however, bear no relation to
labour values.
If we consider the L.M.E., it should be clear that: even if labour
manage~s decide to move resources away from the production of corn
and gold and into the production of barley and other consumption items
demanded by workers; and even if this necessitates some juggling with
the capital goods industries to ensure that enough capital in the
right combinations is produced to keep the whole process going;
that in the end the relationship described in equation (9.30) will
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still hold. Once the L.M.E. gets itself back into equilibrium, and
adjusts the pattern of output to meet demand, then relative prices
will settle down so as to exactly reflect relative labour values.
For the capitalist economy the picture is quite different.
Neoclassical economists are indeed right to point out that prices
will not reflect labour values, for we have seen in section 5
that this is impossible as long as the rate of profit is not zero.
However, even for the C.E. in equilibrium, demand will lose its
impact on relative prices. We can see from equation (9.10) that
equilibrium prices are entirely dependent on technological coefficients
and the rate of profit. The difference in the pattern of prices in
the two economies is therefore nothing to do with demand schedules,
but entirely due to the fact that capitalists take profits out of
net product.
Demand will, however, be very important in determining the mix
of output. We may expect that, as long as workers' consumption patterns
are different from that of capitalists, so the pattern of output in an
L.M.E. will be different from that of the C.E. One very obvious
outcome of a conversion from an L.M.E. to a C.E. may be a change in
the proportion of capital goods in total output. Whether or not this
proportion will rise or fall will depend on the rate of accumulation
desired by capitalists and labour.
The neoclassical structure is used to imply that the mixture
of outputs produced by a capitalist economy reflect the combined
desires of the population. In fact the pattern of output is heavily
weighted towards capitalists' preferences. Within an L.M.E. this
choice is returned to the majority of the people.
13. Application of this Analysis
Economists have had very little success in predicting the macro-
economic implications of labour management. Either they have assumed
that macroeconomic relations will be little affected by the introduction
9of labour management, or they have tried to apply micro-economic
predictions to macro issues. Frequently neoclassical predictions
of differences in the behaviour cf .labour managed and capitalist firms
are searched for in aggregate observations. The underlying assumption
is that changes at the micro economic level will not set in motion
some kind of multiplier effect which will soon over-turn the initial
micro-economic response. Theories of under-investment and over-
10capitalisation in L.M.E. 's are typical of this approach.
The internal logic of the neoclassical model ensures that
micro economic responses of capitalist firms automatically return
the economy to a Pareto Optimal General Equilibrium. Consequently,
any sensible link between micro and macro economics is ruled out.
The fundamental difference between capitalism and labour
management is at the micro (firm) level. Consequently, economists
sensibly began to look at labour management at the micro level. By
employing the standard western approach to micro economics, they were
therefore unable to analyse the macro economy.
The Neo-Ricardian model does not preclude the possibility of
unemployment, inflation, uneven distribution of income etc. Therefore
the changes at the firm level can be traced through to the national
level.
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The models described in this chapter make no pretensions to
being realistic. They are equilibrium models. They can, however,
act as the first building block of a macro-economic analysis of
the L.M.E. Each equilibrium condition must now be painstakingly
removed and the implications analysed. I have discussed the
consequences in Chapter 1.0.
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CHAPTER 10
A MACRO ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF CAPITALIST AND
LABOUR-MANAGED ECONOMIES
Neoclassical theory concludes that, as long as there are no
rigidities (e.g. sticky wages) preventing the proper working of the
market, then the economy should always be tending towards a full
employment equilibrium. The theory therefore effectively excludes
any analysis of the possibility of long term under-employment.
The model described inihe last chaptertakes the level of
output and employment as fixed, but it does not assume that this
level is necessarily one of full employment. It therefore opens
the possibility of linking micro economic conditions to macro
economic problems. To do so, however, money and exchange must be
introduced.
The numerical examples in Chapter 9 took first the
price of gold, and 'chen the price of corn as the numeraire. Fortunately
there seemed to be enough gold and corn around to ensure that the
process of exchange went smoothly. In the general models money was
completely removed by considering relative prices only. Thus
equation (9.8) in Chapter 9 could be solved for a unique set .of
. pmprl.ces, • But it could also be solved with an infinite number of
other sets of prices which are all multiples of pm. In other words
equation (9.8) only determines relative prices. Steedman overcomes
t1!isby introducing a fixed real wage,ce , in equation (9.11).
The effective numeraire now becomes the re~l wage, and prices are
measured in real wage units. Unfortunately, as we all know, wages
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are not fixed in real terms, but in money terms. In order to understand
the determination of prices, and therefore inflation, we must intro-
duce money into the system.
The introduction of money opens up many more complications,
however. In the last chapter workers automatically received wage
goods, while capitalists received consumption and investment goods.
In effect Say's Law was in force. Whatever was produced was consumed.
The existence of money allows both workers and capitalists to delay
consumption and investment. Savings, in the form of money, become
a real possibility. We can therefore no longer assume that effective
demand will equal the supply of goods. The possibility of crisis
emerges. This was a problem foreseen by both Marx and Keynes.
Capitalists cannot make a profit unless they (i) sell their
product, and (ii) they sell it at a price high enough to more than
cover the costs of production (including wages). This is the essence
of the "realization problem". Thus, effective demand must be adequate
to ensure that capitalists receive enough profits both to replace
investment goods used up, and to be motivated to continue to reinvest
their profits in domestic production.
A crisis may occur if profits are so low that either sufficient
reinvestment does not take place, or capitalists move their money
into non-productive speculative ventures (e.g. property or currency
speculation) or transfer their money abroad.
Profits may be squeezed if effective demand falls. But, as
we saw in the last chapter, the rate of profit is inversely proport-
ional to the wage rate. Profits may also, therefore, be squeezed
if real wages rise.
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Marx concentrated on the former problem. He believed that
effective demand would fall because, as the organic composition of
capital increased, the surplus earned by capitalists would expand
at such a rate that capitali.sts would face increasing difficulties
in absorbing the surplus. Once, however, capitalists began to save
some of the surplus, then effective demand would no longer equal
the supply of goods. Capitalists would find themselves unable to
realise the expected surplus, profits would fall, firms would cut back
on production and employment, so effective demand would fall once
more, and a spiral down into crisis would have begun.
More recent writers have tended to argue that capitalist surplus
has expanded as a result of the growth of monopoly capital, rather
than of the organic composition of capital. Others have concentrated
on the role of wages in squeezing profits. We will look at these
in more detail in a moment.
All of this,literature might be grouped under the heading of
"profits squeeze". There is general agreement among these authors
that the workings of the capitalist economy contain inevitable
tendencies towards recurrent crises. These tendencies disturb the
precarious balance between the share of profits and wages. Glyn
and Harrison describe this fundamental contradiction within the
capitalist economy.
"Accumulation always proceeds along a tightrope. Consider
wages. If accumulation is to continue smoothly, real wages must
qevelop within a certain band. They must not rise so rapidly that
conditions for producing surplus value deteriorate enough to prevent
capitalists from accumulating further. Nor must they grow so slowly
that the conditions for realisation are adversely affected."l
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Marx and his followers concentrated on the role of a particular
class, capitalists, as accumulators. Keynes, on the other hand,
taking a more neoclassical perspective, viewed savings as an activity
distributed throughout the population. His approach to the problem
became, therefore, one of investigating the savings of all classes.
Furthermore, unemployment occurred because of the unfortunate failure
of savings and investment to coincide at the level of full employment.
This failure was not the inevitable consequence of processes at work
within capitalism.
In the next sections we consider each of these explanations of
crisis in more detail, and consider whether they apply to labour
management, and whether their effect on a labour managed economy
would be the same as in a capitalist system. The object of this
chapter is to consider the various forces which might possibly lead
to macro economic problems. It does not attempt to determine which
may best explain the economic problems .faced by either Britain or
Yugoslavia today.
THE PROFITS SQUEEZE
1. The Rising Share of Wages
A mass of evidence has been produced which indicates that the
average rate of profit has been falling in the U.K. and other capitalist
economies over the last few decades.2 A frequent explanation of the
fall has been the rising share of wages. Why has the share of wages
increased? As might be expected, the growing strength of labour
unions is a common answer.3 Other authors have suggested, however,
that the depletion of the "reserve army of labour" during the high
levels of employment in the fifties and sixties allowed the share
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of wages to rise. Glyn and Harrison believe that competition between
firms for scarc.e labour pushed up real wages. Thus, they say, the
problem is caused by the over-accumulation of capital in relation
to the supply of labour. "The fall in profits was basically due to
the internal dynamics of the accumulation process rather than action
on the part of workers I organisations.1I4
This proposition can sound extremely similar to the neoclassical
perspecti ve. The difference is that the Neo-Ricardian view of the
world rejects the notion that there is some natural wage rate (equal
to the marginal product of labour), any deviation from which will
be bad for everyone in the long run.
Instead it is argued that the economy might settle into a steady
state with an infinitely different variety of wage/profit combinations.
The problem arises when the existing distribution of surplus between
wages and profits is disturbed. The essential instability of the
capitalist system will then be exposed and the economy will descend
into r-ecesston ,
Let us return to the equations derived for expanded reproduction
in a capitalist economy (Chapter 9 section 9 ) .
(1 + g + k) pm (AI + WI i)x = pmBlx (IO.I)
(1 + c + k) pm (AI + wli)x = pmBlx (10.2)
If the share of wages rises then the amount available for
capitalist consumption, k, and accumulation c, must fall. Inevitably,
then, the rate of growth, g, must fall. Those industries producing
investment goods will suffer a decline in demand. Lay-offs and
bankruptcies will occur, thereby reducing the amount available for
both wages and profits. So more firms will go into decline as demand
falls. The familiar spiral downwards into recession will have been
set in motion.
The decline will be even more severe if (i) profits are reduced
to the point where they are insufficient even to replace existing
capital goods; or (ii) investment outside of domestic production, e.g.
5overseas , in property, as savings in a deposit account, becomes more
attractive to capitalists than investment in home production.
Let us nOw consider the case of a labour-managed economy. For
the L.M.E. the equations derived in Chapter 9 for expanded reproduction
were:
(A' + ;om-1 Y')x
+
.om-1(At / : yt)x
(10.3)
(10.4)
Now, it is quite possible for labour-managers to decide to change
the share of accumulation, c, in the surplus, and thereby affect the
rate of growth g. The problem of balancing investment, consumption
and savings is one that faces both capitalists and labour-managers,
and we will discuss that later in this chapter. There is no reason,
however, to expect either class struggle or labour shortages to .change
the division of the surplus between c and Y'. Nor would we expect
a rise in the income of labour-managers to induce them to divert their
money out of domestic production.
It is clear that on this issue the L.M.E. should be at a distinct
advantage. The inherent instability of the capitalist economy arising
frpm the ceaseless accumulation of capital and the struggle between
wages and profits should not occur in an L.M.E.
2. The Capitalist Response to Rising Wages
Undoubtedly capitalist employers will struggle to hold down
absolute wages or to increase labour effort through productivity
deals, removing "washing-up time", etc. Capitalists have another
option open to them for reducing the wage component of net output.
This is the use of cheaper foreign labour.
In its most blatant form, this can be observed as the use of
immigrant labour. "By 1969 6-7% of the labour force in France, West
Germany mid Italy were immigrant workers. ,,6 The use of guest workers
may contain the share of wages by two methods. First, immigrant
labour can often be employed more cheaply. Second, by maintaining
a regular supply of labour, it reduces the bidding up of wages by
firms in pur-sudt of.scarce labour.
Another option available to firms is to transfer production
to countries where labour is cheaper. "Whenever workers act to raise
wages or control the intensity or duration of work they will lose
their jobs to other groups of less well organised and less militant
workers in other countries.,,7
Firms may also substitute imports for home produced goods. We
have seen that B.S.C. and other multiple footwear retailers imported
a high proportion of footwear from countries, such as Hong Kong, with
relatively cheap labour. This solution is not only available to
distributors. Cowling argues that domestic monopolies often have
direct control over imports. He quotes the example of Ford, which
js the major car manufacturer in the U.K. and also the leading car
. t 8lmpor er.
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None of these capitalist responses will benefit anyone but the
individual owners of capital. The use of immigrant labour will hold
down the wages of both local and immigrant workers. The transferring
of capital overseas and the encouragement of imports from countries
using cheap labour will squeeze domestic production. To quote Cowling
again, "such a system of resource allocation, determined as it is by
distributional rather than efficiency objectives, is socially
inefficient, and involves the wholesale waste of the world's resources ..,9
Will labour-managed economies instigate similar wasteful behaviour?
Let us begin with the use of cheap foreign labour. In an L.M.E.
this will not reduce the income of domestic workers. In the ideal
L.M.F. the surplus should be shared out equally between all workers.
Consequently guest workers should enjoy the benefits of incomes as
high as local workers, while the L.M.F. benefits from the supply of
extra labour which was perhaps becoming scarce.
In practice there is no reason to believe that labour-managers
would display any less prejudi.ce than capitalist employers. Like
capitalists they would have a lot to gain from holding down the income
of immigrants. What forei.gn workers lose, local workers would gain
in their own pay packets.
In an L.M.E., the employment of foreign workers should be less
damaging to the local population than in a capitalist economy. Further-
more, only labour shortage, rather than wage pressures from labour
militancy, would stimulate the L.M.E. to bring in foreign labour.
On'the other hand, foreign workers are just as likely to be exploited
in an L.M.E. as in a capitalist economy.
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We would expect an L.M.E to t:e just as vulnerable to wholesalers
and retailers importing goods produced by cheap labour as the C.E.
Labour-managed manufacturers may also import goods and share out the
profits between them. An L.M.F. is only likely to use imported goods,
however, when demand for its product exceeds its own capacity. It
would never, like a capitalist firm, lay-off workers and replace them
with imports.
Lastly, no labour-managed firm is going to move abroad in order
to enjoy cheap labour.
We may conclude then, that, first an L.M.E. is not likely to be
pushed into recession as a result of a squeeze on profits by wages.
Second, that the L.M.E. will not suffer the damaging responses to such
a profits squeeze observed among capitalist firms.
3. Monopoly 9apitalism
Chapters 7 and 8 described the growing concentration of the
footwear and clothing industries. There is plenty of evidence that
the same process has been at work in most industrial sectors of the
U.K.10
In Chapter 8 we briefly discussed why, at a micro economic level,
this process might not be to the benefit of the majority of the
population. Neoclassical economists have also recognised that the
growth of monopoly power may have adverse effects on micro economic
efficiency. They have not linked this to macro economic problems.
Others have argued, however, that the rise of "monopoly capitalism"
-will lead to growing instability and stagnation in capitalist
. 11economlCS.
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The basic premise is that the growth of monopoly power will lead
to a tendency for the share of profits in national income to increase.
This, then, is the opposite of the process described in section 1.
How can this argument be combined with the generally agreed fact that
the rate of profit has been falling in the U.K. in recent years? The
authors argue that the tendency for the share of profits to rise may
not actually be observed because of capitalists' increasing difficulties
in absorbing their expanded income which will create a "realization
crisis".
Many authors have suggested that firms will enjoy an increase in the size of
their surplus as their monopoly power increases. They will achieve
this by raising their selling price, thereby transferring income from
consumers to capitalists. This, in effect, means a transfer of income
from workers to capitalists.
There is some evidence that earnings in the U.K. are positively
linked to industrial concentration.12 Thus, where firms have grasped
higher ..profits through market dominance, unions have managed to reclaim
part of these profits. Cowling argues, however,. that "while union
pressure may secure higher wages this is quite consistent with wage
share remaining unchanged.,,13 Cowling quotes recent evidence that
higher levels of concentration are associated with lower wage shares.14
The effect of growing monopoly power is, therefore, to transfer
income from workers (and other unemployed consumers) to capitalists.
The realisation problem occurs because capitalists face increasing
problems in absorbing this surplus. Or, as Cowling suggests, it takes
f'Lr-msome time.to adjust to the rise in profits when their monopoly
power increases. If capitalists do not absorb all of their profits
as consumption or investment, then aggregate demand will fall.
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Once aggregate demand falls, then firms will find it increasingly
difficult to sell their products. Firms will contract, demand will
fall further, and so the spiral downwards will continue.
The macro economic instability predicted from a rise in monopoly
capitalism is, in essence, a result of a redistribution of income from
consumers to capitalists. Once again, we would expect this process
to be less damaging in the L.M.E. If a firm enjoys an increase in
monopoly profits then members will reinvest this or feed it through
to earnings. Unabsorbed surplus should not appear because, as in
capitalism, the owners of capital cannot find uses for their surplus,
but are not willing to pass on this unused portion to workers. It
is possible, however, that if the L.M.F. only adjusts wages at set
intervals (say yearly) that unused surplus may pile up. The problem
should, however, be less severe than in a capitalist economy.
4. The Struggle between firms
The growth in monopoly power is not uniform throughout the economy.
In Chap.ter 8 we described a situation in which large firms not only
. . 15squeezed consumers, but also other fjrms.
In equations (9.8)and(9.14) of Chapter 9, a common rate of profit, .
r, or of labour income, Y, was assumed throughout the economy. As
in the neoclassical model it was assumed that there would be a general
tendency, through entry and exit of firms, for the rates to equalize
across firms. This tendency is, however, continually being sabotaged
by firms struggling to push their profits (or labour incomes in an
L.M.E.) above the norm.
This process is detrimental to welfare at a micro economic level,
as we saw in Chapter 8. It can also have adverse effects at a macro
economic level. Increasing differences in the economic power of firms
is likely to reduce aggregate demand by both squeezing some firms out
of the market and by allowing other firms to accumulate a surplus that
they find increasingly difficult to absorb. Thus, a problem of
realization will again emerge.
In the L.M.E. the surplus absorption problem should not be so
severe for the reasons outlined in the last section. However, weaker
firms may well be pushed out of the market. This may not be because
they are inefficient, but, say, because the action of other,
perhaps less efficient firms, has cut them off from their markets.
The L.M.E., like the capitalist economy, may suffer from excessive
and unfair inter-firm rivalry.
Would we expect t.hisrivalry, often manifested by take-overs and
mergers in capitalist economies, to be as vigorous in a labour-
managed economy? In Chapter 8 we noted that the C.P.F. cooperatives
did not take part in acquisitions. This might be explained, however,
by the constraints of British cooperative law. It might also be argued
that the L.M.F. has far less to gain than the C.F. from these
activities.
A capitalist firm which takes over a weaker firm may acquire a
labour force earning lower rates of pay than its own employees. As
long as the owners can keep this fact quiet, or justify it on the
basis of lower productivity or whatever, there should be no need to
disturb the differential.
The rules of the ideal L.M.F. would, however, require labour
incomes to be equalized across plants. An L.M.F. would, therefore,
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be disinclined to merge with a less successful firm unless the
gains resulting from a strengthening of market power were more
than enough to offset the drop in income suffered by the members
of the richer firm.
Labour managed firms are, therefore, likely to reject acqui-
sitions in favour of other popular methods used by capitalists
to strengthen their position vis a vis other firms. One method,
technical innovation, JOaybe of benefit to society at large.
Other methods, e.g. advertising, franchise agreements, excess
capacity (as a barrier to entry) would be as wasteful in an L.M.E.
as in a capitalist economy.
5. Inflation
At the beginning of this chapter we discussed how the model
described in the previous chapter implicitly assumed that labour
is paid in wage goods, and capitalism receive investment and consump-
tion goods. Once we introduce the real condition that both groups
are paid in money, then only relative prices are determined. Money
prices could take on an infinite number of different values.
Thus, even in perfect equilibrium, prices may not be fixed.
In fact, we could envisage a situation in which physical production
remains constant, while wages, prices, and therefore profits, all
inflate at exactly the same rate. So Kalecki concluded that in a
competitive economy, with many small firms, labour could not improve
the share of wages by pushing up the wage rate. Employers would
simply retaliate by putting up prices, and all else would continue
b f 16as e ore.
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We can see now how inflation can become an important instrument
o th t 1 d fOt 171n e s rugg e over wages an pro 1 s. Sutcliffe writes that "the
fact that inflation is higher in the crisis than it was in the
boom reflects that falling profitability has made the struggle over
18distribution a much sharper one."
Inflation, then, can upset the precarious balance between the share
of wages and profits. The direction of change is in dispute. Kalecki
believed that where oligopoly was predominant, then firms would be
unable to pass on the full amount of a wage rise, because individual
firms acting alone would fin~ their sales and profits falling when
they raised the product price.19 Cowling disagrees, and argues that
"in tightly organised, concentrated industries we can expect a high
degree of collusion over wage-fixing ••• This may come about via
multi-employer agreements ••• or by wage leadership with the dominant
20firm or firms setting the pace." Howthorn, on the other hand,
argues that ultimately the degree to which firms can continue to
convert wage rises into price rises depends on how far governments
are willing to expand the money supply in line with inflation (see
Section 7).
Inflation in a capitalist economy can, of itself, be socially
undesirable, and secondly it can upset the balance between wages
and profits and set the economy on a downward spiral. Is the L.M.E.
exposed to the same hazards?
The labour-managed firm is just as likely as the capitalist
firm to mark-up prices whenever possible. Members will try to improve ,
their earningsby whatever means possible, and raising prices will
be one method. Thus, if government monetary policy allows it, we
would expect inflation in the L.M.E. to be just as severe as in a
capitalist economy.
----- -
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We have seen, however, how a capitalist economy can get itself
into a situation of rising inflation combined with growing unemployment,
better known as "stagflation". This is a trap into which an L.M.E.
is less likely to fall. Inflation of output prices will be immediately
fed through into both incomes and investment. Unless labour suffers
from money blindness, and thinks that rising nominal income reflects
rising real income, then the level and pattern of demand should remain
unchanged.
6. International Trade
The struggle over the distribution of the surplus is likely to
induce producers to mark-up prices. Glyn and Sutcliffe believe that
this process is restricted by foreign competitiun. If producers
raise their prices too quickly then consumers will substitute imports
for home produced goods, and exports will shrink. Profitability
must therefore decline and recession set in.
Inflation in a capitalist economy may therefore induce a crisis
both by disturbing the balance between wages and profits, and by
forcin~ down profits in the face of foreign competition. Some authors
have disputed that this process has actually been important in explain-
. h t . 21lng t e presen receSSlon. Nevertheless it is a possible cause
of decline to which a capitalist system might be exposed. Is the
L.M.E. open to the same risk?
Once again the L.M.E. should have an advantage over the capitalist
economy. In the last section it was suggested that, within the
constraints of the money supply, the L.M.F. would mark-up prices
just as readily as the capitalist fi~m. Like the C.F., however,
the L.M.F. is likely to hold back on price increases if it finds
that its product i.sbeing squeezed out of the market by cheaper imports.
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Workers' earnings will, therefore, also be automatically checked,
and the L.M.F. will not suffer a loss in"profits", and therefore have
insufficient resources for reinvestment by the continued upward
pressure from wages. The effect of foreign competition on the L.M.E.
should, therefore, be to contain inflation rather than to induce
a crisis.
We might expect, therefore, the L.M.E. to be more protected
than capitalist economies from the import of goods which could be
produced by domestic industries. Both economies may, however, suffer
balance of payments problems as a result of importing goods which
cannot be produced at home.
THE CIRCULATION OF MONEY
7. The Supply of Money
The quantity theory of money, being a tautology, may be applied
as much to a labour managed economy as to a capitalist one. The
slmplest formulation of the quantity theory may be written as:
PT = VM (10.5)
whore P = prices; T = number of transactions within one unit of
tImo; V = the velocity of money measured in the same time units;
and M the supply of money.
If we accept that the number of transactions is a functionD
of total output, B, then (10.5) may be written as:
(10.6)
For the C.E. with expanded reproduction, equation (10.6) may
bo written as:
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(1 + c + k) pm (AI + wli)x = VM (10.7)
and for the L.M.E. as:
,.0 m .dll-1(1 + c)/ (AI +/- yl)X = VM (10.8)
If the velocity of money is a constant (which of course is open
to doubt) then we can see that if the economy grows at the rate g,
as a result of accumulation c, then if prices are to remain stable
the money supply M must also grow at the same rate. Inflation
cannot occur unless the money supply expands more rapidly than the
rate of growth, or the velocity of circulation increases. This was
the point made by Rowthorn mentioned in section 5, i.e. the extent
to which firms can continue to convert wage rises into price rises
depends on how far governments are willing to expand the money supply
in line with inflation. Also, of course, on the extent to which
governments have control over the money supply.
Regulation of the money supply is, therefore, just as important
in an L.M.E. as in a C.E. If the money supply grows too slowly then
it may dampen effective demand and lead to a recession. If the money
supply and credit expands too quickly then the economy may suffer
from 'severe inflation.
8. Withdrawals from the Circulation of Money
Marx and his followers concentraed on the actions of capitalists
which might lead to a crisis. As we have seen above, they envisaged
that effective demand might not match supply either because capitalists
were not able to absorb all of their surplus, or because profits
were so squeezed that they chose to move their money out of domestic
production.
----2'70·
Keynes concentrated on other actions which might draw money
out of circulation, and consequently leave an imbalance between
effective demand and supply. He pointed out that taxes and imports
were leakages from the circulation, and that unless they were at
least balanced by governrnent spending and export earnings, then we
might expect output and employment to decline. Even if these
expenditures are balanced, we cannot expect this to coincide with
full employment. Government action may be necessary to reduce
unemployment. This condition applies as much to an L.M.E. as to
a capitalist economy.
Keynes also emphasised the role of savings in reducing effective
demand. Here he differed from Marx in that he viewed savings as
an activity pursued by all members of an economy, and not just
capitalists. Furthermore, some capitalists may wish to save and
others borrow to invest. So we meet the problem of not only matching
savings and investment at the level of full employment, but also
of arranging for an efficient distribution of money from savers to
investors.
We found in Chapter 6 that most small firms rely entirely
on internal financing for investment. The Wilson Committee also
found that between 1973 and '77 only 24% of comp~nies' sources of
22funds was from bank loans. . Much of these bank loans will have
also been funded by company savings.
In a capitalist economy, therefore, it may not be too misleading
to concentrate, as Marx did, on the role of capitalist savings
and investment, and to ignore other sources of savings.
In an L.M.E. the position is somewhat different. The distinction
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between capitalists and workers disappears. It is the savings of
workers which must be relied upon to finance investment. The Macro
economic problems highlighted by Keynes might, therefore, be thought
of as a better description of an L.M.E. than of a capitalist economy.
Just as in a capitalist economy, savings and investment in the L.M.E.
may only be equal at some level of output below full employment. Government
intervention will therefore be necessary to either effect the rate of
savings or investment, or to inject new sources of demand into the economy.
9. The Rate of Interest
Accordi.ng to neoclassical analysis, the rate of interest is deter-
mined by the intersection of the aggregate savings and investment schedules.
Each aggregate schedule is'determined by aggregating the individual sched-
ules of firms and savers. Individual schedules are derived from applying
utility or profit maximizing rules to inter-temporal utility or production
functions. (Such as the one described in Section 7 of Chapter 1.)
This equilibrium rate of interest will coinci1e with neoclassical
full employment. By this device neoclassical analysts were able to ignore
the effect of the level of national income on both aggregate investment
and savings.
The model in Chapter 9 assumes that equilibrium may occur at an
infinite number of levels of National Income, and, following Keynes, it
is accepted that it is the. (expected) level of National Income which pre-
dominantly determines the rate of Investment and Savings.
At the individual level firms may choose to borrow more and invest
more if the interest rate falls. It would, however, be wrong to
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transfer this to the aggregate level. Keynes put it this way,
"An attempt to derive the rate of interest from the marginal efficiency
of capital involves a logical: error" 23 .•.."The marginal efficiency
of capital partly depends on the scale of current investment, and
we must already know the rate of interest before we can calculate
what this scale would be.,,24
In other words, the rate of profit depends on the level of
effective demand, which depends on the level of investment, which
depends on the rate of interest, which according to neoclassical
economics depends on the rate of profit, and so on. The argument
is circular, and leaves all values indeterminate.
Unfortunately Keynes continued to retain the concept of an
aggregate marginal efficiency of capital {m.e.c.} He first described
m.e.c. schedules for each firm, and then went on to write, "We can
then aggregate these schedules for all the different types of capital,
so as to provide a schedule relating the rate of aggregate investment
to the corresponding marginal efficiency of capital in general which
that rate of investment will establish •.•. The rate of investment
will be pushed to the point on the investment demand-schedule where
the marginal efficiency of capital in general is equal to the market
25rate of interest."
Keynes retention of the concept of an aggregate m.e.c. schedule
was in fact a hang-over from neoclassical thought. Garegani and
others have shown it to be logically inconsistent and unnecessary
to Keynes' main line of argument.26 In fact Milgate has revealed
that in the draft of the General Theory Keynes made several attacks
·on the neoclassical theory of interest. Only after receiving criticisms
from Harrod did he diJ.utehi.sarguments. 27
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If the rate of interest is not determine a by the rate of profit
then how is it determined? Keynes found himself faced with exactly
the same question. "If the rate of interest is not determined by
savings and investment in the same way ~n which price is determined
by supply and demand, how is it determined?,,28 In answer, Keynes
turned to liquidity preference theory.
So we can conclude that investment may be expected to be,related
to the rate of profit which is related to the level of national income
and is a real phenomenon. The rate of interest, on the other hand,
is a purely monetary phenomenon and is determined by the supply and
demand for funds for both investment and other reasons, 1.e. liquidity
preference.
10. Under-Investment
The "under-investment effect" described in section 7 of Chapter
1 is a classic example of neoclassical economists incorrectly trans-
ferring micro economic conclusions to macro economic conditions.
Their reasoning is based on the premise that there is some "correct"
rate 'of interest, which is that level at which the aggregate invest-
ment schedule intersects the aggregate savings schedule, and which
coincides with full employment.
In fact, as we have seen, the rate of interest is a purely monetary
phenomenon. Its role is to bring the supply and demand for money
into equilibrium.
In the Yugoslav case.iLabour-managers may choose to transfer money
from enterprise investment to personal savings. By doing so they will
-increase the supply of money available for loans. The rate of
interest will fall, and so enterprises will be encouraged to borrow and
invest more.
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As in a capitalist economy, the level of investment in Yugoslavia
will be determined by technical conditions, the preference for consumption,
and the level of national income. Yugoslav property rights will have no
effect on aggregate levels of investment. They may, however, effect the
channels by which savings are transferred into investment. Capitalist
firms may rely more on internal savings, while Yugoslav firms prefer to
borrow funds.
11. The Level of Investment
The neoclassical presumption that the rate of interest and the rate
of investment in capitalist economies is in some way "correct" is there-
fore quite wrong. There is no "correct" rate of investment. The
equilibrium rate of interest and investment may well be at less than
full employment.
In fact, because many more people in an L.M.E. would be involved in
the decision as to how much of the surplus should be accumulated rather
than consumed, then the L.M.E. rate of investment might be considered
far more "correct" than the capitalist one. Unfortunately, even in the
L.M.E., those people not working in enterprises would be excluded from
the decision.
It is interesting to observe that if it is true that capitalists
are continuously driven to accumulate more and more capital, then a
capitalist economy with sufficient profits must continuously grow in
order to remain stable and not topple over into crisis.
The hope that eventually an economy may reach a steady state of
simple reproduction is, consequently, an impossibility under capitalism.
A capitalist economy must drive forwards with endless, perhaps socially
undesirable, growth, or spiral down into a cycle of falling profits
and increasing unemployment.
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For the L.M.E. in which workers may consume all the surplus
(over and above replacement investment) this contradiction does
not exist. Furthermore. the decision as to whether growth is
desirable will be put into the hands of all the workers in an L.M.E ••
and not left to a small group of capitalists.
12. How does the Labour Managed Economy compare with a Capitalist
Econorn~:.~
We must begin by pointing out that this chapter has been concerned
with the "ideal" L.M.E. composed entirely of those "ideal" labour
managed firms described in Chapter 1, and working within a perfectly
free and responsive market system. Anyone who knows anything of
the Yugoslav system will know that it deviates considerably from
this description. In the next chapter we will discuss the real
conditions faced by Yugoslavia.
We have seen that the capitalist economy contains within it
inherent tendencies toward crises. These tendencies disturb the
precarious balance between the share of profits and wages. Some
tendencies. e.g. the over-accumulation of capital, may push up
the share of wages. Other tendencies, e.g. increasing industrial
concentration. may increase the share of profits. Moves in either
direction may push the economy into recession.
The labour-managed economy does not contain the same contra-
dictions. There is no struggle between wages and profits because
each worker is the recipient of their full share of the surplus.
Consequently. as we have explained in sections 1 to 6, the L.M.E.
will not inevitably move towards one crisis after another.
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The L.M.E. will, however, face various problems which are
also met under capitalism. Investment and savings must be brought
into line by government intervention. The money supply must be ex-
panded at a rate sufficient to oil the process of exchange as the
economy grows, but not so much as to induce undesirable levels
of inflation. Foreign trade must be regulated in some way to avoid
balance of payment problems.
If the L.M.E. can succeed in these difficult tasks then we
would expect the L.M.E. to progress along a path which is fundamentally
more egalitarian and efficient than a capitalist economY,even if
it could achieve equilibrium (for a proof of this see Chapter 9).
We may conclude from this chapter that the ideal L.M.E. is
fundamentally more stable, efficient and egalitarian than a capitalist
economy. It does not contain tendencies pushing it inexorably toward
a crisis, although it would require demand management to keep it
on a steady path.
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CHAPTER 11
A RE-INTERPRETATION OF THE YUGOSLAV EXPERIENCE
In this final chapter an alternative is offered to the neo-
classical interpretation of the behaviour of the Yugoslav economy.
The purpose is not to prove that this alternative interpretation
is the correct one. A great. deal of research would be required
for such an enterprise. The aim is rather to suggest that existing
empirical studies of Yugoslavia cannot confirm the neoclassical
model of labour management, and that a very different understanding
"'
of the economic process could be drawn from the same evidence.
1The economic system of Yugoslavia has been well documented,
and will not be described in any detail here. After the Second
World War, Yugoslavia followed the path of other Cominform
members and initiated a system of central planning. In 1948 Yugo-
slavia was expelled from the Cominform. Soon afterwards Yugoslavia
began to transform the economic system from centrai planning to
something described as "self-management".
In 1950 the "Law on Management of Government Business Enterprises
and Economic Associations by Workers' Collectives" was introduced.
This began the process of handing over control of enterprises to
workers' councils. The powers handed over to enterprises were
initially very limited, but various laws enacted during the following
decade steadily increased the formal powers of the workers' council.2
Major reforms were introduced in 1965. Their purpose was, to
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quote Horvat, "to establish more efficient market relations". 3Up
to 1965 the State had still maintained considerable (although
decreasing) control over enterprise behaviour. This was achieved
in a number of ways, e.g. price controls, heavy taxation of enterprise
surpluses, and state control of investment funds.
The O.E.C.D. reported that in 1964 government institutions
still absorbed 51.4% of enterprises' net product. A considerable
proportion of this money went into investment funds which were
administered at the federal level. Enterprise incomes were extracted
through the medium of vari.ous taxes. The 1965 reforms abolished
some of these taxes (e.g. the contribution of 15% of enterpri.se
income towards the.'Federal Investment Fund), and reduced others.
The aim was-to leave enterprises with a much larger proportion of
national resources. In 1965 enterprise allocations to government
institutions had fallen to 44.8% of their net product, and by 1966
to 40.4%. After thi.sthe proportion of contributions began to creep
5up once more.
The 1965 Reforms also adjusted price differentials. In 1964
60% of industrial products were;subject to price controls.6 The
price reforms brought 90% of product prices under control. The aim
of the reform was, however, "to eliminate from the Yugoslav price
7structure the distortions and anomalies inherited from the past" •
The level of inflation prevented the authorities from freeing prices
altogether.
Central Investment Funds were transferred to banks in 1964.
Both Federal and Republican banks, however, were still partially
- 8under the control of the National Bank. .The 1965·Refonns allowed
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both enterprises and socio-political communities at both Communal
and Republic level to found banks. Control of the funds of these
banks lay with those organisations making deposits into the banks,
and the influence of these organisations was to be in direct pro-
portion to the size of the deposit made.9
Finally, 1965 brought in reforms in the area of foreign trade.
The dinar was devalued. Many export subsidies were abolished, and
import duties reduced.
The 1965 reforms have been described in some detail because
many authors have claimed that a "structural break" occurred in the
10Yugoslav economy in that year. It has been claimed that only
after 1965 were YugJslav firms free to follow genuine income maximizing
policies, and thus behave as predicted by the theory of the labour
managed firm. The effects of the 1965 Reforms have, therefore,
become an important component of studies of the Yugoslav economy.
In the following sections we will look in turn at each of the
prediytions from neoclassical analysis which have been tested
empirically on Yugoslav data. Estrin and Bartlett observe that
the literature "has not yet directly tested the central propositions
from economic the:ory on Yugoslav data i for example those concerning
enterprise supply responses and the choice of technique, or investment
d .. ,,11eCl.Sl.ons. Most of the empirical work is, in a sense, once removed
from the predictions. For example, theory predicts that the adjust-
ments in labour force size by labour managed firms will result in
a dispersion of labour incomes. It is the dispersion in incomes rather
than labour-force adjustment which has been put to the test.
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As far as I am aware, there has been only one direct test of
neoclassical predictions using Yugoslav data. Stewart searched
for the predicted negative short run change in the labour force when
. . 12 .pr1ces r1se. US1ng industry level data he looked for a fall in
the labour force when an industry's product price rose more than
the national average. The data did not conform to predictions.
Industry level employment generally rose when prices in the industry
increased more than average. Stewart's findings for Yugoslavia were
therefore the same as those noted among C.P.F. cooperatives in
Chapter 4.
Empirical studies which do not test the central predictions,
but look at secondary data, inevitably open themselves up to alternative
explanations, as we shall see below.
1. Income Distribution
Explanations of an uneven distribution of incomes in the Yugoslav
Social Sector (self-managed enterprises) fall into two classes.
Estrin and Bartlett describe these as the "labour school" and the
"capital school.,,13
The labour school argue that Yugoslav income differentials are
mainly brought about by the fact that labour markets will not be
cleared in an L.M.E. This is because L.M.F.'s will not expand their
labour force to the point at which average incomes equal the pre-
vailing wage rate (see Chapter 1).
According to the "labour school" income differentials will
appear in an L.M.E. for exactly the ~ame reasons that profits will
appear in a capitalist system, i.e. shifts in demand or costs, and
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uneven market power among firms. The labour school then argue that
because L.M.F.'s are income maximizers rather than profit maximizers,
the labour market will not clear, i.e. firms will not adjust their
workforce until wages are equal across firms.
We may contrast the labour school's position with that outlined
in Chapters 9 and 10. According to this analysis income differences
will appear for two reasons: (i) demand or cost shifts, or market
power, enable firms to raise their rate of surplus value above average;
(ii) the proportion of the surplus value recovered by labour as
wages will differ across firms. The latter point will only apply
to a capitalist system, while the former will apply to either system.
We can see then that the two schools would agree on why income
dispersion would appear in an L.M.E. They would also agree that
labour markets will not necessarily clear in an L.M.E. The difference
is that the Neo-Ricardian school would also not expect labour markets
to clear in a capitalist system.
The Labour School derive their position from the theory of labour
management. Their argument is that the maximand of the L.M:F. prevents
labour markets from clearing. Put simply, they claim that because
labour markets do not clear in an L.M.E., then this is evidence that
L.M.F.'s are not profit maximizers.
This position is not very satisfactory. The line of reasoning
must lead one to deduce that British firms are also income maximizers,
because there is little doubt that income dispersion also exists
in the U.K. The empirical work presented by the labour school (see
pext section) implicitly contrasts Yugoslavia with the hypothetical
neoclassical system in which labour markets clear. TheNeo-Rical~dian
school would deny that such an economy exists.
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How then might we distinguish empirically between the labour school
and the analysis presented in Chapter 9? Both agree as to why income
differentials would appear in an L.M.E., both agree that such differentials
would not tend to disappear. The difference lies in what is thought to
be the objective of firms in either system.
The ,labour school sees the C.F. as a pure profit maximizer and the
L.M.F. as a pure income maximizer. The analysis presented in Chapter 9
would not deny that the two types of enterprise may have differences in
their objectives along the lines described in neoclassical theory .. In
practice, however, pursuit of these objectives would be very imperfect
due to lack of information and flexibility in technology. Secondly, the
necessity for firms to hold on to their position in the market, or even
to strengthen it through growth, will overwhelm the first objective.
Ultimately, then, there will be very little difference in the behaviour
of the C.F. and L.M.F.
It might be possible to distinguish empirically between these two
schools. The labour school's analysis would suggest that the dispersion
of the surplus value per worker earned by firms should be higher in an
L.M.E: than a C.E. We shall see in the next section that this prediction
has not been tested by the labour school.
The "capital school" explain income dispersion in a different way.
Their position is that in a C.E. each worker receives their correct return,
i.e. the value of their marginal product. Under normal circumstances, all
of the remaining surplus will be absorbed by the cost of hiring capital.
Capital market imperfections may, however, enable capitalists to retain
part of the surplus. If the capitalists raise funds internally and then
purchase capital then the "cost" of c.apitalfollowing purchase (Pp) will
be only the pynents on any extra funds which had to be borrowed. If all
funds are raised internally then P will be zero. If some, but not all,
p
funds are borrowed, then the marginal product of capital
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will be more than the costof capital, P .
p
In a capitalist system, then, capitalists may enjoy a capital
rent equal to (MPK - Pp)K. The labour school then argue that the
difference in an L.M.E. is that this rent will be earned by labour,
and so income differentials will appear because the value of the
capital rent will differ across firms.
The line followed by the capital school is, therefore, very
similar to that taken in Chapter 9, i.e. that under a labour managed
system the surplus normally taken by capital is returned to labour.
The contrast lies in the assumption by the capital school that there
is some "correct" level of the rate of interest at which all profits
are absorbed. The Neo-Ricardian analysis considers that the rate
of interest is a monetary phenomenon unrelated to the rate of profit,
and that there is no equilibrium at which all profits have disappeared.
2. Labour Market Imperfections
In this section we look at empirical studies which have explained
income dispersion in Yugoslavia by the existence of labour market
imperfections.
Wachtel opened the discussion in 1972.14 He did not explicitly
base his analysis on the theory of labour management. Later writers
. 15have, however, set his work within the labour school.
Wachtel noted that interindustry wage differentials increased
in Yugoslavia between 1956 rod 1966. He suggested that richer firms
would have more funds to reinvest. Their higher levels of investment
would raise labour productivity above the average, and so feed through
into higher incomes.
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Wachtel's analysis is classified as labour school because he
assumed that the action of firms would not remove the differentials.
Instead he thought that the differentials would increase over time.
He believed that all firms would try to pay some minimum wage rate.
Poor firms would therefore be left with very little money for
new investments. As rich firms continued to reinvest at a high
rate, average net product would grow even further, leaving yet more
money to reinvest, and so the cycle of expanding incomes would continue.
If, as Wachtel suggests, wage differentials are due to uneven
rates of investment, then, he argued, we would expect average industry
wage rates to be related to labour productivity and levels of concen-
tration in the industry. Wachtel found that cross-section estimates
for 22 industries for five years between 1956 and 1965, indicated
that labour productivity and industrial concentration were increasingly
important in explaining wage differentials.
We have noted that Wachtel's study is placed under the labour
school because he was concerned that in Yugoslavia the workings of
the labour market failed to reduce income differentials. His explana-
tion as to why differentials might appear did not, however, suggest
that Yugoslav enterprises are not profit maximizers. Nor did he
suggest that the failure of the labour market was unique to labour
management. Indeed, he noticed that similar models had been used
to explain interindustry wage movements in the United States.
Wachtel's evidence can fit the Neo-Ricardian analysis just as
well as the neoclassical model: a fact which he probably would not
deny. His work. cannot be used to imply that labour managed and
capitalist enterprises have fundamentally different objectives.
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In 1979 Estrin returned to the same issue.16 Unlike Wachtel,
he claimed to be testing a hypothesis specific to labour management.
liltis intended to focus empirical attention towards those observable
variables which economic theory predicts would behave differently
in a self-managed environment."
Using the theory of the L.M.F.,Estrin derived the result that
average incomes are directly related to technical efficiency, output
prices, market concentration, and the scale of production, while
inversely related to the cost of capital.
Under neoclassical theory exactly the same relationship could
be derived between these variables and the rate of profits. Estrin
therefore implicitly implies that such variable profits could not,
at least in part, be won back by labour in a capitalist system.
This assumption is not supported by the evidence from capitalist
economies (see Chapter 4).
Secondly, Estrin's evidence cannot be used to show that Yugoslav
and capitalist firms pursue different objectives. All that we can
say is that variables which create differences in the rate of surplus
value earned by firms in a capitalist 9ystem, apparently are related
to variations in incomes in Yugoslavia. In other words, the share
of surplus taken by capitalists is redistributed to labour in the
Yugoslav system.
Two years later Estrin took a different approach to the same
17problem. He now states that litheanalysis of self-managed economies
is that income dispersion between and within sectors would sig:-
nificantly widen as a consequence of introducing such a system. II
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His empirical work was based on the presumption that income dispersion
should increase following the 1965 Reforms. This would be because
the Reforms finally freed firms to pursue their own objectives.
The data behaved as expected. Inter-sectoral dispersion of
average incomes increased after both the 1965 Reforms and more minor
reforms in 1961. The dispersion soon narrowed again, which Estrin
put down to "moral suasion" from the authorities.
Estrin notes that in 1956 (the first year of his data)
"the authoriti.espromoted equality (of incomes)".18 In fact income
equality has been a continuing objective of Yugoslav policy makers.
The 1965 Reforms introduced a few short years in which the workings
of "the market" were given precedence over income equality. As
Estrin himself observed, moral suasion soon reappeared to control
the level of dispersion.
All that Estrin has proved by his evidence, that differentials
widened after the Reforms, is that when the authorities relaxed their
control over income differentials then these diffe~entials increased.
We might expect the same phenomenon to occur whether the economy
was centrally planned, self-managed, or capitalist.
Estrin supports his argument by making Lnter-nat Lonaf comparisons
of income differentials. The reason for doing so is apparently because,
although Estrin now apparently recognises that income differentials
will appear in a capitalist system, he anticipates that self-management
will make these differences more acute.
Estrin found income dispersion in Yugoslavia to be significantly
wider than in either developed or Eastern bloc countries. Several
comments may be made about this result.
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First, Yugoslavia is generally classified as a "middle income"
country, and comparisons are usually made with countries at a similar
19stage of development. Income dispersion usually decreases as the
economy develops. Comparing Yugoslavia with more industrialised
countries therefore put it at a disadvantage. Estrin compared Yugoslavia
with only two other middle income countries, Greece and Spain. He
found that the level of income dispersion in Yugoslavia lay in between
that found in Greece and Spain. Tl1iswould suggest that Yugoslaviafs
stage of development could explain income dispersion just as satis-
factorily as its system 0f self management.
Second, it is well known.that Yugoslavia suffers from huge
regional differences in incomes. This is a heritage from the days
when Yugoslavia was divided between several different empires.20
Estrin argues that the high level of Yugoslav income dispersion cannot
be explained by regional disparities. "The coefficient of variation
between 21 sectors in each of the eight republics and autonomous
provinces were generally greater than for Yugoslavia as a whole.,,21
Singleton and Carter have, however, observed that regional income
differentials within republics are as great as inter-republican diff-
erences." "For example, the per capita income of the four central
communes of Zagreb in 1974 was four times higher than that of the
communes of Vrgin Most, Dvor, and Gracac.,,22 Estrin's evidence
cannot, therefore, rule out regional differences as an explanation
of the degree of income dispersion observed.
Finally, to return to the point made earlier, even if Estrin
can cOnNince usthat·Yugoslavia suffers from an exceptional degree
of income dispersion, this only tells us that disparities in capitalist
surplus value have been redistributed into incomes in Yugoslavia.
It does not prove that YUgoslav enterprises have a different
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objective to capitalist firms.
Estrin states that "the important questions in the following
sections relate to the scale of these differences between industries
and firms under self management. ,,21-Iere implies that self management
will lead to wider income differentials than found in a capitalist
system. This may be true, but again can be put down entirely to
the redistribution of surplus from capital to labour. In order to
distinguish between different enterprise objectives we would have
to compare the dispersion of enterprise net products per worker
(average income plus profits per worker) in Yugoslavia with that
found in comparable capitalist countries.
Much the same criticism may be applied to a recent paper by
Estrin, Svejnar and Mow.24 The central concern of this paper is
to determine whether labour or capital market imperfections can best
explain income differentials in Yugoslavia.
The authors estimate Cobb Douglas and CES functions for 19 Yugo-
slav Lndustr-fes. They estimate a function derived from the relation
y = 130 MPL + L) (MPK _ P )!S1--'1 p L (11.1)
value of the
where: y = net income per worker; MPL & MPK = the/marginal products
of labour and capitar respectively; P. = cost of capital;p.
K = capital; L = labour; 13 0 & J31 are constants.
The values' of MPL and MPK are derived from the production
function estimates.
The authors argue that if the labour school are correct then
most income dispersion can be explained by variations across firms
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in the estimates of MPL. If the capital school are correct, most
Kvariation will stem from dispersion in the term (MPK - Pp)I.
results suggest that Yugoslav income dispersion is largely a conse-
Their
quence of labour market imperfections.
This conclusion might be correct, but once again all that the
authors have proved is that dispersion in the rate of surplus value
observed in a capitalist system, may be observed as labour income
dispersion in Yugoslavia.
If we consider the case of the profit-maximizing capitalist
~
firm, we know that:
wL + P K+n = (MPK)K + (MPL) L
P
where: w = the wage rate and TI= profits.
(11.2)
Equation (11.2) may be rearranged as:
w + n
L = MPL +
K(MPK -P )-P L (11. 3)
Equations (11.1) and (11.3) are, therefore, the same, except
that incomes, Y, in the L.M.E. are replaced by surplus per worker
(w + n)
L
in the capitalist economy. Equation (11.1) therefore
only captures the redistributive effects of labour management, and
tells us nothing about differences in enterprise objectives.
As we noted earlier, in order to prove that enterprises follow
different objectives under a self-managed system, we would have to
look for a wider dispersion in Y in the L.M.E. than found in the
dispersion of(w + 1\) in comparable capitalist economies.
L ,
3. Capital Market Imperfections
The major empirical work in this area was conducted by Vanek
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and Jovicic. They suggested that Yugoslav firms do not pay the full
cost of capital, i.e. (MPK - Pp) > O. This may be because funds
have been accumulated internally or because the rate of interest
is too low. If this is true then part of workers' income will be
Kcomposed of a capital rental of (MPK - Pp).I. Consequently,
workers' incomes will be a function of the capital/labour ratio,
K/L = k. They estimate a function of the form:
Y = a + bki (11.4)
where: Y and k = net product of industrial branch, and capital, both
?
as a ratio of unskilled labour equivalent.
Vanek and Jovicic conclude from their study that variations
in capital rentals K(MPK - P )-P L were the main explanation of
variations in labour incomes throughout Yugoslavia. Estrin, Svejnar
and Mow h~ve, however, called this result into question.26 They
point out that the estimation methods effectively excluded any other
result.
Whether or not the results were correct, we have already pointed
out in section 1 that this line of argument cannot be distinguished
empirically from the redistributive effects of labour management
emphasised by the Neo-Ricardian school. It cannot be taken as evidence
of a unique L.M.F. maximand.
4. Monopoly, Concentration and Mergers
The conclusion of the labour school is that conditions which
give rise to uneven profits in a capitalist economy will lead to ,
income dispersion in an L.M.E. The Neo-Ricardian analysis leads
to the same conclusion without making any reference to neoclassical
theory. Both schools would agree that market dominance, monopoly
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power md restrictive practices will raise income levels in an L.M.E.
In the last chapter we suggested that an L.M.E. should be less
prone to the appearance of a small number of giant firms dominating
the market. In this section we will consider whether this holds
true for Yugoslavia.
In section 4 of Chapter 10 it was suggested that L.M.F.'s would
be less inclined to merge with other firms than would capitalist
firms. The evidence appears to support this. Several authors have
reported that the majority of mergers are brought about as the
It f f th th ·t· 27resu - 0 pressure rom e au orl les. The stronger firm in
the partnership often tries to resist the merger.
Mergers are apparently promoted by officials for two reasons.
Tyson draws attention to "the widespread view that large size is
required for efficiency and international competitiveness and that
"powerful groups of producers are the prot.agonists of production
28 29and development." ,
Estrin-believes that the majorit.yof mergers are instituted
30in order to save weaker firms from going bankrupt. Bankruptcy
is virtually unheard of in Yugoslavia. The authorities apparently
put more emphasis on maintaining employment than on using other
resources efficiently. Estrin estimated that "about 85% of mergers
represent painless exit ..., and t.hatonly about 15% of mergers were
31between firms seeking to exploit scale economies or market power."
Although the existence of self management has apparently
discou~aged firms from merging with others, Yugoslavia is still
renowned for it.shigh levels of concentration. This may be explained
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by three factors. First, Yugoslavia has a relatively small domestic
market, so that inevitably the number of firms in each sector must
be limited. This is made more acute by the fact that Yugoslavia
is still not a fully industrialised country, and a large proportion
of the population work in agriculture. Second, as Estrin has explained,
the years of central planning immediately following the Second World
War, concentrated even further a relatively small industrial sector.32
Finally, as we have seen, the authorities promoted mergers.
Even so, Estrin found that more Yugoslav sectors showed a
decline in concentration over the period 1959-68 than an increase •
Quite the opposite was true of the U.K.33 Furthermore, he emphasised
the difference in the kind of competition that Yugoslav firms face.
"Yugoslav firms are unlikely to enjoy such a dominating position
as their Western counterparts ••. Because there are fewer firms,
and the size distribution is narrower and less skewed, the Yugoslav
giants face a small number of medium size firms, rather than a large
hinterland of very small ones.,,34
On the other hand, Yugoslav firms have tried other methods of
promoting market power. Granick quotes examples of associations
between firms which were intended to act as cartels, although he
did not consider them to have been very successful.35 Governments
have done almost nothing to prevent restrictive practices, and since
1972 have implicitly encouraged them by promoting "Self Management
Agreements." (SMA). Such agreements were intended to coordinate
enterprise production. An example might be an agreement of a producer
to supply another firm with certain materials over a fixed period.
This agreement secures the producer's outlet and excludes other
producers from competing for the custom. The effect of the S.M.A.
is therefore very similar to the vertica~ take-overs discussed in
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Chapter 8.
One final point should be made in this section. Neoclassical
theory of the labour managed firm suggests that labour managed firms
36would choose to remain smaller than their capitalist counterparts.
Evidence from Yugoslavia does not support this view. Jan Vanek
observed that among Yugoslav firms "the motivation to growth ...
seems on the whole very strong - at least equal to and probably
stronger than their motivation for short-term efficiency and cash
incomes.,,37 Granick found that the majority of the enterprises in
p
t tl t . t b h t' t. .t. 38his survey were cons an y ry~ng 0 ranc ou ~nto new ac ~v~ ~es.
Estrin reports that the average firm size grew steadily.
This evidence conforms with the picture of enterprise rivalry
described in Chapter 8. Although restriction of output might be
beneficial to labour managed firms in the short run, in the long
run firms must grow in order to advance their dominance of the market,
or at least to keep up with rivals. We might expect this force
for internal growth to be even stronger in an L.M.E. where firms
would be less keen to grow through mergers.
5. Over Capitalization, Unemployment and Growth
Neoclassical theory of the labour managed firm suggests
that, in sectors which are doing well enough for capitalist firms
to be making a profit, labour managed firms would opt for excessively
capital intensive techniques (see Chapters 1 and 2).
,
As a result the productivity of capital would be low and this
would reduce the growth in both output and employment. This prediction
of slow growth is a direct result of the assumption that the L.M.F.
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will have a different maximand from the capitalist firm. Redistribution
of the surplus would not on its own lead to the same results. Empirical
tests of these predictions are"therefore better tests of the neoclassical
theory than studies of income distribution.
Both Sapir and Estrin have recently published papers which
suggest that the slow down in growth following the 1965 reforms was
a consequence of Yugoslav firms being set free to pursue income
" "" b" t" 39max1m1z1ng 0 Jee 1ves. They follow a similar line of argument.
Both note the sudden decline in the growth of industrial output after
1965. The growth in both employment and investment fell after 1965,
but employment growth declined much more rapidly, and actually became
negative in 1966 and 1967. The net result was that average capital
intensity rose, while the productivity of capital fell.
Sapir makes the point that a:change in the capital labour ratio
should only reduce output growth if the elasticity of substitution
between capital and labour, 0<, is less than one. He estimates the
value of 0<.. for the entire Yugoslav manufacturing sector' and
does find it to be considerably less than one. Using this estimate
of ex he then imputes the degree to which the slow down in the growth
of output could be ascribed to a decline in the growth of labour and
capital, and how far toa change in factor proportions. He attributes
20% of the fall in the growth rate to a change in factor shares, the
" remainder being due to a slow down in factor growth.
The evidence would appear to support the neoclassical theory.
VIecan explain these results in a different way however.
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It is no surprise to find that firms invested relatively more
in relation to labour following the Reforms. The change in the
taxation system left them with a much higher proportion of their
income to distribute as they wished. It is not unlikely that prior
to 1965 firms would have preferred to invest more but were prevented
from doing so by government policy, which directed investment funds
into new firms. After 1965 the number of new firms entering production
dropped dramatically. Estrin records 118 new firms in 1964, and
only 24 in 1965 when the central Investment Fund had disappeared.
Neoclassical economists might ask why firms would continue to
invest when the productivity of capital was falling. But here we
must distinguish between expected returns and actual returns. Yugoslav
firms had grown used to a rapid level of growth in both output and .
expected
demand, and therefore would have / to benefit from heavy investment.
In fact growth slumped in 1965, thereby reducing the level of demand.
We may speculate that firms had to cut back on their planned level
of output. Thus, although the new capital might have been physically
able to produce at high levels, in actuality the productivity of
capital fell because of the decline in demand.
Tyson adds another explanation as to why investment remained
high following the reforms.40 She suggests that it takes firms
some time to adjust incomes upwards in response to a rise in net
.,
product, although ultimately their object is to maintain distributed
earnings as a fixed proportion of the net product.
Tyson estimated an equation of this form using sectoral data
over 10 years. The estimates were statistically significant for
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eleven of the sixteen sectors. So we would expect the sudden rise
in enterprise funds available for distribution in 1965 to result
in a sharp rise in enterprise savings, as was observed.
There is a contradiction in the approach taken by Estrin and
Sapir. They have argued that the release of market forces in 1965
led to over-capitalisation by firms, and this gave rise to a slow
down in growth. If, as we would expect, the slowing of growth squeezed
the surplus available to firms, then, following neoclassical reasoning,
we would expect L.M.F.'s to reverse their position and switch to
more labour i.ntensive methods. In fact Estrin records a steady rise
in the capi.tal labour ratio over the next seven years, even though
he describes the economy as being in a "severe recession" after 1965.
According to neoclassical theory firms will select more capital
intensive techniques in order to raise members' incomes even further
than if they retained existing capital labour ratios. In fact Estrin
reports that the rate of growth of industrial incomes fell from
5.44% between 1952-65 to 5.12% from 1965-73.
"
Estrin claims that there was actually a relative acceleration
in the growth of real wages, because industrial wages grew more
rapidly than rural wages. Since government regulations allowed firms
to retain a much higher pe~centage of their incomes after 1965,
we would expect the industrial/rural ratio to rise. If we accept
Tyson's permanent income hypothesis, then we would expect the ratio
to increase for a few years and then to level off. Estrin's own
results show this process taking place.
The evidence on wages does not, therefore, support the theory,
\'
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and it is not difficult to explain the relative rise in firm invest-
ments. The fall in the productivity of capital measured by Sapir
might appear to explain the fall in the growth rate, but this result
is achieved because the issue of effective demand is ignored.
Ironically, although both studies are concerned with a slowing of growth
and employment, the analysis makes the standard neoclassical assumption
that what firms can produce they can sell. The fall in capital pro-
ductivity is consequently explained by changing capital shares rather
than a drop in effective demand. This emphasises once more the failure
of neoclassical analysis to bridge the gap to macro economic issues.
p
If our alternative analysis in Chapter 10 is to have any credence
it must offer a different explanation as to why growth slowed after
1965. This is not difficult. In fact the Yugoslav economy had already
entered a downward cycle before 1965. Estrin's figures show that the
growth in industrial employment fell from 8.4% 1962/3 to 1.2% 1963/4.
This recession was exacerbated by the overall decline in the level of
investment after 1965. Total real investment fell by 14% in 1965 com-
pared with 1964.41 Much of this loss was due to the fall in the
formation of new enterprises. The liberalisation of foreign trade also
brought about a steady deterioration in the balance of payments. In
1965 Yugoslavia enjoyed a surplus on current account of US $65 million,
in the following three years there were deficits of the order of $41,
t· 1 42$82 and $109 million respec 1ve y.
We may speculate that the slump in expected demand caused firms
to cut b~ck on planned"production. As in a capitalist economy, it
is always easier to cut back on labour than fixed assets. So the ,
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industrial labour force fell in 1965 and 166. Because firms were
able to cut back on labour, the fall in the productivity of labour
was considerably less than in the productivity of capital.
6. The Level of Investment
In Chapter 1 we discussed the Furubotn and Pejovich prediction
that Yugoslav firms would tend to under invest. This result is of
course in contradiction to the over-capitalization problem discussed
in the last section. Furubotn and Pejovich would claim, however,
that even in general equilibrium, when capitalist firms would be
making no profits, the under-investment effect would apply. The
over-capitalization hypothesis is, however, purely a disequilibrium
prediction.
There have been no rigorous tests of the former hypothesis.
Some impressions can be gained, however, from looking at existing
data on enterprise investment. In fact there appears to be general
agreement that Yugoslav enterprises suffer from anything but under-
investment. Estrin notes that the theory "is inconsistent with the
relative acceleration of capital at the aggregate and sectoral
43levels."
Yugoslavia has consistently maintained an e~ceptionally high
level of investment. In 1980 gross fixed capital formation was
fer
35.5% of G.D.P. This proportion was higher than/any other O.E.C.D.
member.44 In the period 1966-70 (the years in which some writers
clail!lthat self-management was truly in force), enterprises in the
social sector accounted for 72.4% of gross investment in Yugoslavia.
68.4% of this investment was funded from their own savings. In the
U.K. 72% of funds raised by quoted compani.esbetween 1965 and 169
. db' t 1 . 46were ralse y In-erna savlngs. The savings behaviour of Yugoslav
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firms does not, therefore, appear noticeably different from that of
of firms in the U.K.
In the last chapter we suggested that the Furubotn-Pejovich
effect may have induced workers to channel funds into investment
via personal savings rather than collective enterprise savings.
This does not seem to have occurred. One explanation may be that
the interest to be earned on saving deposits in Yugoslavia was so
lowthat the effect was reversed so that leaving savings in the enter-
prise became much more lucrative than putting them in a bank. The
low rate of interest rate would, of course, also make loans popular,
but only once enterprise savings had been used up. The World Bank
reported negative real interest rates for every year between 1970
47and 1975, except for 1972. In other years the rate was positive
but very low.
Low interest rates should not necessarily be a cause for concern,
as we suggested in the last chapter the Yugoslav property rights
might reduc,e the equilibrium interest rate below that found in a
simila~ capitalist system. There seems little doubt, however, that
the Yugoslav interest rate has been below its market clearing rate
for some time. The World Bank noted an excessive and unsatisfied
demand for investment funds, and this is dealt with by an ad hoc
ft ' ff' 't t f t' , - f d 48and 0 en ~ne- ~c~en sys em 0 ra ~on~ng un s.
Many authors have suggested that the high rate of investment
in Yugoslavia is a consequence of the low rate of interest.49 We
would dispute this view. The low rate of interest may have led to
a disequilibrium in the demand and supply of funds, and this may
have held back the desired level of investmen~. The level of investment
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seen as desirable would, however, be predominantly determined by the level of
national income.
Firms must be able to sell their produce. Even if the rate
of interest is negative, if firms cannot sell the product of their
investment they will make a loss on the project. The rate of invest-
ment must therefore be closely linked to the level of effective demand.
In Yugoslavia the fact that firms are never allowed to go bankrupt
may contradict this effect. Firms that do not go bankrupt can afford
to invest in projects that will make a loss, but might employ relatives
and friends. The Yugoslav's lack of bankruptcy, along with their
commitment to provide alternative employment for social sector employees
50should they be made redundant, is probably one reason why investment
funds are in such high demand.
7. Conclusion
This ends the survey of empirical work developed out of the
neoclassical theory of labour management, and using data from Yugoslavia.
The number 'of works cited is small, especially in relation to the
preponderance of theoretical literature on the subject. There is
a noticeable lack of empirical work on this topic, and, as we have
seen, what does exist often falls into the trap of confusing the
redistributive consequences of labour management with predictions
of a change in the enterprise maximand.
One reason for the small number of empirical studies may be
the lack of data readily ava i LabLe for western authors. This problem
has h~d a second effect. It has led researchers to use aggregate
data as a substitute for firm statistics. This has encouraged the
tendency to apply micro-economic reasoning to macro economic data.
Apart from the questionable validity of using micro economic
methods when considering macro economic issues, the theory of Labour .
management has left yawning gaps in its discussion of Yugoslavia's
economic performance. The theory has nothing to say about inflation
and the balance of payments. Problems with both of these have been
central to Yugoslavia's experience. Nor does neoclassical theory
offer any insight as to how the government should regulate the money
supply and their own expenditure.
The evidence presented in this chapter cannot be used to argue
that the analysis of theL.M.E. presented in the last chapter applies
to Yugoslavia; it merely suggests that existing empirical studies
do not rule out this alternative analysis. Yugoslavia is not, of
course, the ideal L.M.E. described in the last chapter, so that we
cannot expect all of the predictions inthe last chapter to apply
to the Yugoslav case •. It would be possible, however, to design
empirical work to test how well the analysis in Chapter 10 describes
the Yugoslav experience. Such a project is, however, beyond the
scope of this thesis.
We may observe, however, that Yugoslavia has survived well
through the recent recession experienced by most western countries.
In 1981, eleven out of twenty O.E.C.D. countries suffered a fall
in the real value of industrial production. In 1982 fourteen out
of twenty experienced a fall.51 Yugoslavia managed to increase
real production by 3.9% in 1981 and hold that level steady into
1982.52
Figures for employment are available for 14 O.E.C.D. countries.
Only seven of these managed to increase total employment in 1981.
By 1982 this number was down to 3. Yugoslavia increased paid
employment (i.e. excluding many rural workers) in both years.
Over the two years paid employment increased by 5.9%. At the same
time registered unemployment has come to be a serious problem in
Yugoslavia. The cause is somewhat different from most Western
countries, i.e. the drop in total employment. Instead it is due
to the rise in those seeking paid employment generated by both a
drift from rural to urban areas, and because of the return of many
workers who once held jobs in W. Germany and other European
countries.
Why has Yugoslavia managed to maintain production when other
countries have fallen back, even when it is suffering from an
exceptional shortage of foreign exchange? Neoclassical theory
of labour management has no answer to this question. The analysis
in the last chapter can offer an answer, and suggest that Yugoslavia
is less prone to the recessionary effects brought about by a squeeze
on capitalist profits.
305
FOOTNOTES TO CHAPTER 11
1. See for example:
HORVAT, B. (1976) "The Yugoslav Economic System", International
Arts and Sciences Press.
2. For a description of the changing legislation and powers of the
workers' councils, see:
(a) HORVAT, B. (1976) As above.
(b) SINGLETON, F. & CARTER, B. (1982)
Croom Helm.
"The Economy of Yugoslavia",
3. HORVAT, B. (1976) As above.
4. O.E.C.D. (1970) "Economic Surveys: Yugoslavia". November.
5. O.E .C.D. (1970) As above.
6. O.E.C.D. (1970) As above.
7. O.E.C.D. (1970) As above.
8. For a description of the banking system see:
SINGLETON, F. & CARTER, B. (1982) As above.
9. SINGLETON, F. & CARTER, B. (1982) As above.
10. See for example:
(a) ESTRIN, S. (1979) "An Explanation of Earnings' Variation
in the Yugoslav Self-Managed Economy". Economic
Analysis, Vol. 13.
(b) SAPIR, A. (1980) "Economic Growth and Factor Substitution:
Whatever Happened to the Yugoslav Miracle".
Economic Journal, Vol. 90.
(c) WYZAN, M.L. & UTTER, A.M. (1982) "The Yugoslav Inflation".
Journal of Comparative Economics, Vol. 6.
11. ESTRIN, S. & BARTLETT, W. (1980) "The Effects of Enterprise Self-
Management in Yugoslavia: An Empirical Survey"
University of Southampton Discussion Papers in Economics
and Econometrics, No. 8101.
12. STEWART, G. (1981) "Short-Run Employment Behaviour of the Labour-
Managed Firm: Evidence from Yugoslavia". University of
Warwick Economic Research Papers, No. 191.
13. ESTRIN, S. & BARTLETT, W. (1980) As above.
14. WACHTEL, H.M. (1972) "Workers' Management and Inter-Industry Wage
Differentials in Yugoslavia". Journal of Political
Economy, Vol. 80.
306
15. ESTRIN, S. & BARTLETT (1980) As above.
16. ESTRIN, S. (1979) "An explanation of Earnings' Variation in the
Yugoslav Self-Managed Economy". Economic Analysis
and Worlwrs Management. Vol. 13.
17. ESTRIN, S. (1981) "Income Dispersion in a Self-Managed Economy".
Economica, Vol. 48.
18. ESTRIN, S. (1981) As above.
19. See for example the comparisons made by:
TYSON, L.A. (1980) "The Yugoslav Economic System and its
Performance in the 1970s". Institute of International
Studies, University of California, Berkeley.
20. For a description of the roots of regional inequalities see:
SINGLETON, F. & CARTER, B. (1982). As above. Chapter 17.
21. ESTRIN, S. (1981) As above.
22. SINGLETON, F. & CARTER, B. (1982) As above.
23. ESTRIN, S. (1981) As above.
24. ESTRIN, S., SVEJNAR, J. & MOW, C. (1982) "Market Imperfections,
Labour-Management and Earnings Differentials in a
Developing Country: Theory and Evidence from Yugoslavia".
Department of Economics, Cornell University. Working
Paper No. 276.
25. VANEK, J. & JOVICIC, M. (1975) "The Capital Market and Income
Distribution in Yugoslavia: A Theoretical and Empirical
Analysis". Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. 89.
26. ESTRIN,. S., SVEJNAR, J. & MOW, C. (1982) As above.
27. (a) GRANICK, D. (1975) "Enterprise Guidance in Eastern Europe"
Princeton University Press.
(b) TYSON, L.A. (1980). As above.
(c) ESTRIN, S. (1978) "Industrial Structure in a Market Socialist
Economy". University of Southampton. Discussion Paper
No. 7717.
28. TYSON, L.A. (1980) As above.
29. FEDERAL EXECUTIVE COUNCIL (1971) "An Outline of the Concepts of
the Social Plan of Development of Yugoslavia from
1971-1975". Quoted by TYSON, L.A. (1980).
30. ESTRIN, S. (1978) As above.
31. ESTRIN, S. (1978) As above.
32. ESTRIN, S. (1978) As above.
33. ESTRIN, s. (1978) As above.
34. ESTRIN, S. (1978) As above.
35. GRANICK, D. (1975) As above.
36. VANEK, J., PIENKOS, A. & STEINHERR, A.
and Imperfect Competition",
liTheLabour Managed Economy".
"Labour-Managed Firms
in VANEK, J. (ed.) (1977)
Cornell University Press.
37. VANEK, J. (1972) liTheEconomics of Workers' Management", George
Allen & Unwin.
38. GRANICK, D. (1975) As above.
39. (a) SAPIR, A. (1980) "Economic Growth and Factor Substitution:
What Happened to the Yugoslav Miracle?" Economic Journal.
Vol. 90.
(b) ESTRIN, S. (1982) liTheEffects of Self-Management on Yugoslav
Industrial Growth". Soviet Studies. Vol. 34.
40. TYSON, L.A. (1977) "A Permanent Income Hypothesis for the Yugoslav
Firm". Economica. Vol. 44.
41. O.E.C.D. (1966) "Economic Surveys: Yugoslavia".
42. O.E.C.D. (1970) "Economic Surveys: Yugoslavia".
43. ESTRIN, s. (1982) As above.
44. O.E.C.D. (1983) "Economic Surveys: Yugoslavia 1982-3".
45. SCHRENK, M., ARDALAN, C. & ELTATAWY, N.A. (1979)
"Yugoslavia. Self-Management Socialism. Challenges
of Development". World Bank Country Economic Report.
46. DEPARTMENT OF INDUSTRY. "Business Monitor M3."
47. SCHRENK, M. et al. (1979) As above.
48. See for example: SCHRENK, M. et al. (1979)
49. See for example:
(a) SAPIR, A. (1980) As above.
(b) TYSON, L.A. (1980) As above.
50. TYSON, L.A. (1980) As above.
51. O.E.C.D. (1983) "Main Economic Indicators".
As above. Chapter 8.
52. O.E.C.D. (1983). As above.
308
CONCLUSION
This conclusion will follow the example of many others, and
concentrate on the policy implications of the previous discussion.
The thesis has concentrated on the purely economic aspects of
labour management, and this conclusion will remain within the same
limits. The design of policies that will improve the participation
and control of members must be one of the, if not the, most important
issues facing experimenters in labour management. Unfortunately, it
lies outside the scope of this thesis.
p
The structure of the conclusion will follow a similar pattern
to the main body of the thesis. We will first consider cooperatives
working within capitalism, and then discuss labour managed economies.
COOPERATIVES UNDER CAPITALISM
1. Pragmatic Solutions
In Chapter 3 we looked at some explanations of cooperative per-
formance which were not based on neoclassical theory. A frequent
explanation of the perceived failure of British cooperatives to either
survive or grow has been lack of finance. The policy recommendation
which naturally follows from this assessment is the need for more
financial provisions for cooperatives.
The evidence presented in this thesis would not contradict the
proposition that cooperatives suffer from a shortage of funds, but
it would question whether cooperatives suffer more difficulties in ,
this respect than other small businesses.
Studies which have emphasised the need for more cooperative
financing have often looked at cooperatives in isolation from c~italist
f. 1lrms, so that distinctive differences between the two types of
enterprise have not been made clear. Although we would not dispute
that cooperatives would benefit from additional funding, concentration
on this issue alone can be misleading. It can lead to the conclusion
that ready sources of cash is all that a cooperative needs to succeed,
and that once a cooperative has funds it should be left to survive
in the capitalist market. The position taken by Chaplin and Cowe is
a good example. "Many groups (cooperatives) also reported that finding
sales outlets had become a more significant problem, bringing home
the point that co-operatives, however pure in structure and product,
must survive in a market economy, just like any other business.,,2
Thornley comments that "Cooperatives need to experience the discipline
of the market place. Few can be expected to sympathise for long with
3organisations which charge uncompetitive prices."
Thornley does not present any evidence which confirms that it
was uncompetitive prices that have squeezed cooperatives out of the
market place. The evidence presented in Chapter 6 suggests, instead,
that cooperatives have been squeezed out of the market because their
potential outlets have been acquired by competitors, and because they
are unable to grow to a size sufficient either to (i) set up their
own outlets; (ii) have the strength to obtain a decent bargain with
monopolistic buyers; (iii) provide the range and flexibility of
production available from large competitors.
We conclude from this that, if the promotion of cooperatives is
consinered desirable, then cooperatives must be provided with a protected
market. This policy is usually rejected because it is thought to
waste limited national resources by subsidising inefficient production.
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There are two reasons why this may not be true. First, many firms
secure outlets not by efficient production, but by acquiring the outlet
in question. In Chapter 6 we noted the take-over by Courtaulds' of
Clutsom-Penn International. This removed Courtaulds' competitor,
Du Pont, which had apparently been offering a better price. Second,
competition with cooperatives may be in the form of imports from
countries with very low wage rates. The cooperatives are, therefore,
put at a disadvantage not because they are inefficient, but because they
are less exploitative of their workforce. In a country with high un-
employment, the savings on unemployment benefit payments to workers who
might be employed in a cooperative, may well outweigh the national
savings on cheap imports.
Many studies of cooperatives recommend support systems such as
banks, managerial advice, and training schemes, for a cooperative
4sector. Our evidence suggests that this is not enough. Cooperatives
must be ensured access to a market. Sometimes inter-cooperative
trading is advocated, but the size of this market would be very small
in the U.K. Only one of the reports considered in this thesis raises
the issue of protecting cooperative outlets. The Wales T.U.C. state
that, tlacall for preferential treatment would not be feasible or
politically realistic, but certainly some features of the French
tendering system which entitles cooperatives to an automatic share
of public works ... could be enacted.tl5 Unfortunately this suggestion
is not followed through to the final recommendations.
We have noticed the tendency to study cooperatives in isolation from
,
their markets. One result of this has been, as we have seen, to centre on
internal cooperative problems, rather,than the conditions that they face
outside. A related consequence has been the frequent assumption that the
experience of cooperatives elsewhere might be easily transferred to the U.K.
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The usual example of this is the Mondragon cooperatives. Many
authors have assumed that Mondragon's success compared with British
cooperatives must be the result of their unique methods of organising,
rather than the economic conditions surrounding them. Typical is
this statement by O'Connor and Kelly. "The Spanish experience, in
particular, offers more positive lessons. It shows that a number of
conditions need to be satisfied if new cooperatives are to have any
. 6real chance of long-term success." The authors then proceed to
list six conditions found in the Mondragon cooperatives.
Campbell, writing about Polish cooperatives, concludes that
"the great success of worker-ownership in both the Mondragon and
Polish movements has been due to the similarity of the structures
evolved, rather than to any peculiarity of Basques or Poles ••••
It was found necessary for members to be committed to their under-
takings by means of entrance fees and personal shares in capital
assets. In the comparatively "affluent" conditions of the West,
7such commitment is likely to be the more necessary." This is a pos-
ition frequently advocated by Oakeshott. "The wor:.<:ers'commitment
to the long-term success of the enterprise will surely be immensely
stronger if it is underpinned by the responsibility which a measure
of actual ownership brings.,,8
Oakeshott and Campbell. have noticed the success of Mondragon.
They have then isolated a characteristic of Mondragon cooperatives
not found in the U.K., and assumed that this characteristic explains
why Mondragon has apparently been so much more successful. The
characteristic in question is the non-collective ownership of assets.
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New members are required to buy their share of the assets. The value
of these assets appreciate in proportion to the share of profits which
are reinvested. When the member leaves she may take her share-of the
capital (subject to certain restrictions).
In contrast, we would emphasise the very different industrial
structure faced by the Mondragon cooperatives when they first started
production. Thomas and Logan have made a study of Mondragon. They
emphasise that "it would be fallacious to ignore Mondragon's historical
context. Indeed, to understand it properly such phenomena as the
degree of industrialisation, the history of Basque Nationalism .••
have to be taken into account.,,9
The first Mondragon cooperative, Ulgor, was founded in 1954.
The cooperatives expanded rapidly over the next two decades. Thomas
and Logan observe that "census data collected from 1958 indicates
that industrial firms (in Spain) were on average rather small:
enterprises employing between one and five workers amounted to 82 per
cent of all industrial firms, 12.5 per cent employed between 6 and
1025 persons, and only 0.07 per cent over 500 workers." This is
considerably different from the oligarchic structure found in the U.K.
today. Furthermore, the nature of Basque Nationalism undoubtedly
helped cooperatives to secure markets in their locality. Thomas and
Logan also noted a rapid ri~e in consumer spending in Spain during
the 1960's. "There was ample room for expansion into new product areas,
given that tariff protection was high and that the government planned
further increases in real income."ll Table A shows that, by the
late s~venties, the Mondragon cooperatives tended to be considerably
larger than other industries in their area.
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TABLE A. SIZE DISTJnHI.I'I'IIIIIS~::'_!~I'J!_lI(/i(!!_Jl!_2J.:~.~r:RATIVESAND OTHER
FIRMS IN 'I'm: .1'111.1'1 lUCE OF :.;~LU_'Ui.',r~:'/L. (%)
Industry in Province of
Guipuzcoa (1978) 37 . 27
.._.----.-.--~,--------_11 - ~y) lff) - 500 >500
Mondragon Cooperatives (1 tI'/n) 12. L'l 47.0
.,---------_._--------'
Source: Thomas, H. & Logilll, C. (1gB?) "Mf)fJ';('agon".
The evidence would (.lllltlt,'!At that Wr, uhol)11 not expect that a
Mondragon style system (If (.Irillorship in the r{;~ipe for success for
Bri tish cooperatives. In Iql! b we would go or;.,; step further and
.,11 "suggest that a system ot 11111l1,lg-in.ia hlgh l.y undesirable. Members
of cooperatives face a dOllldp r-Lsk , tho loss ')f their job and the
loss of their capital. 'I'llt"'~ have beon rnany!:ases where workers have
lost their redundancy pay iii III their auv Ings it';;en cooperatives have
failed. The Scottish DMI Iy News is juot on~ example.
Because members will lose II'Plr' jobs U' Cl Co(,,;;""!rativecloses, coop-
erati ves have a tendency in ~1Lr'uggl e on when ?; private firm would
long ago have sold out to f~ Inrgcr conpuny, ~he end result is that
cooperative members end up ,," Lh little or no"2':.ingwhen they finally
cease trading.
Under present ?ondiLi(IIH~, in which cooperat i.ves are a very
risky proj ect, local au thcw i I.tes and 0 thcr p!'"~~motingbodies should
not, therefore, require inil 101 contr'ibution~ from their members.
This is not to say that rn811!1,rq'fj would not be «xpect.ed to fund at least
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part of future capital needs from retained earnings. Nor that
individuals who initiate a cooperative on their own should be
prevented from putting in their savings. Many of today's new coop-
eratives are, however, often initiated by local authorities, the
M.S.C., Cooperative Development Agencies, etc. In these cases contri-
butions should not be required from new members.
So far we have concentrated on one example from abroad. French
and Italian cooperatives are also frequently compared with those in
Britain, and are generally considered to have been a greater success.
There are a number of reasons for their success, but one is certainly
the partial protection of outlets afforded to cooperatives in these
countries. Thornley reports that in France state contracts for
building works are regulated by the Code des Marches Publics. This
states that "if practicable, one quarter of the work involved in a
project will be temporarily reserved for cooperatives to undertake
at the average price of the other three lots.,,12
If any British government was serious in its promotion of
cooperatives, then a scheme similar to the French building code should
be applied to all expenditure on any item by central government, local
authorities, and nationalised industries, at least. The code might
possibly be expanded to all firms purchasing above a minimum value
of a certain product or service. Because cooperatives would be
paid the average price of the remainder of the contract, no organisation
could claim that it was being forced to pay more than necessary.
There seems little doubt that, in the foreseeable future,
British' cooperatives will not be afforded the kind of protection
proposed above. Many organisations continue to promote cooperatives,
however. Such a commitment to cooperatives would seem ill advised,
if not irresponsible, given the risks that cooperative members
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face. The risk is not only one of losing both their job and their
savings, but, as Wajcman has revealed, the experience of working
in a cooperative which fails can leave the members totally demoralised.13
If these organisations insist on promoting cooperatives, then
they must be very selective of the industries in which they operate.
Declining industries such as footwear are certainly not advised.
Second, sectors should be chosen which serve a broad and fragmented
market, general printing being an example. It is this aspect which
makes retailing (e.g. wholefoods) a good area for cooperatives.
Although our evidence d~es not indicate that cooperatives
have been less successful than similar small businesses in maintain-
ing employment, we have seen that many small businesses continue
to survive through mergers. This puts cooperatives at a noticeable
disadvantage in terms of their employment creating potential even
if they do get off the ground, while many cooperatives never succeed
in breaking into the market. Certainly past experience does not
lead one to expect them to have any noticeable impact on the level
14of unemployment. Why then do we have the present craze for
cooperatives as part of a strategy of employment creation?
One possible answer is politics. For all parties the promotion
of cooperatives is considered a vote catcher. For the Conservatives
cooperatives symbolize self-help and enterprise, along with the
ethos that profits are not reserved for an exclusive section of
society. For the Liberals, cooperatives represent the replacement
of industrial strife with harmonious production. For Labour, ,
cooperatives stand for workers control and employment creation.
All parties are, therefore, eager to list the number of cooperatives
that they have set on their way.
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Many of the workers who join cooperatives promoted by the
M.S.C. or Local Authorities may be more concerned with finding
employment than fulfilment through participation. In such cases
we must ask if cooperatives are the most cost-effective scheme for
employment creation. Many cooperatives require a relatively high
capital input per worker, and then, as we have seen, have difficulties
finding a market for their services.
There exists an alternative method of employment creation
which does not face the risk of failure because it cannot break
into the market. This is direct labour, which has the added advantage
that it will probably require less capital input per worker than
required by new cooperatives. Unfortunately there have been no studies
of the comparative costs of creating one permanent job through direct
labour as compared with one in a cooperative. This is a subject which
needs further investigation.
At the present moment it is, of course, politically unacceptable
to expand direct labour. Consequently we find local authorities
using money to bolster both local firms and cooperatives. It is open
to question whether this is the most efficient scheme for creating
jobs.
The conclusions at the end of this section might be summed up
as follows. If cooperatives are to be promoted merely as vehicles of
employment, then direct labour might be a less risky and more cost
effective alternative. If, however, cooperatives are to be promoted
because of their potential for industrial democracy, then they must be
provided with considerably more pr-o+eotion than at present exists in
the U.K.
2. The Neoclassical Perspective
We only considered one neoclassical study which dwelt specifically
on the position of cooperatives within capitalism. This was the paper
by Vanek on the financing of cooperatives which was described in
Chapter 3.15
Vanek concludes at the end of his paper that all cooperatives
should rely completely on external finance for investment. He recognises
that to achieve this one could not rely on the conventional banking
system. Therefore either governments or philanthropic individuals
would have to provide the finance.
From our own perspective, full external finance might be considered
desirable for two reasons. First, it does not expose members to the
risk of losing their savings. Second, it might reduce the level of
self-exploitation which goes on among members of new cooperatives
who are forced to reinvest a large proportion of their income.
In re~lity, the money is not likely to be forthcoming from either
governments or philanthropists, and, inevitably, cooperatives, like
other small businesses, will be thrown back on internal finance. We
would argue that the consequences of internal financing are likely to
be much less damaging than Vanek suggests.
First, Vanek's analysis is based on the static income maximising
theory of the labour managed firm. In fact firms are likely to obey
pressures to maintain their position in the market. Therefore, in
conditions in which pure income maximisers might choose to shrink,
real cooperatives would probably do the reverse.
Vanek's analysis is based on the standard neoclassical assumption
that firms are price +aker-s, i.e. if they set their price at the level
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set by their competitors, then they are sure to sell their output. If
however, cooperatives cut back production they are likely to face two
problems. First, competitors who are able to supply a larger order,
and a wider range of products, are likely to steal their orders.
Second, their weakening market strength will force them to accept a
lower price for their product. The empirical evidence presented in
Chapter 6 gave no support to Vanek's predictions of self-extinction
by cooperatives.
Apart from the self-extinction forces, Vanek also describes
the under-investment force. We have dealt with this problem in
the L.M.E. in Chapter 10. In a capitalist economy the position is
different, for we cannot expect the rate of interest to adjust
downwards to compensate for this effect. Even so, the effect is
likely to be diluted as long as there are enough members of the
cooperative who expect to stay in the cooperative for longer than
the productive life of the investment.
Cowling has raised the spectre of cooperative profits being
entirely absorbed by finance capital "By converting from industrial
to finance capital, capitalists could avoid the increasing conflict
in the process of production and retire into a position of supplying
capital at arm's length to worker-controlled enterprises.,,16 There
could be a danger that Vanek's philanthropists or government agencies
could come to play just a role, charging excessive interest rates
,on the grounds that the cooperatives are not putting up any funds.
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This might be another good reason for cooperatives to avoid external
finance. Even without external finance, however, it is quite possible
for large capitalists to squeeze all spare cash from small enterprises,
both private firms and cooperatives. B.S.C. apparently did just
this with small footwear manufacturers.
THE LABOUR MANAGED ECONOMY
3. The Role of the mar-ket;
It is a fundamental contention of the neoclassical school
that the market is paramount. If the market is allowed to follow
its natural course then everyone will benefit. The role of policy,
therefore, must be restricted to oiling the workings of the market
mechanisms. The following statement by Sirc is a good example
of this position.
"One of the most important requirements of an economic system
is to bring in line the interests of workers as consumers with
the interests of workers as producers. In other words, the sectional
interests of enterprises and their staff have to be aligned with
the general interests. In the capitalist system, this adjustment
is achieved through the enterprise, particularly through the private
ownership of the enterprise's risk capital ... These arrangements
(the workings of the market) bring the functioning of the enterprise
in line with the general interest, which is that enterprises should
produce goods which people,mostly workers, want at the cheapest
. 17possible prlces."
Sirc's statement is built on a mass of neoclassical analysis
which is summed up by the concept of Pareto optimality. Two important
assumptions are that (i) there is no involuntary unemployment (because
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wages will fall until everyone is employed); (ii) long-term p~ofits
are zero. If either of these conditions are breached, then it must
be because the market is being prevented from working freely, e.g.
because of the action of trade unions or the erection of barriers to
entry.
In Chapter 10 we explained why full employment could not be expected
to result from the free operation of the market. The interests of
the unemployed would not be'served in this situation. Secondly, the
analysis ignores the existence of unemployment for other reasons such
as lack of child care and racial or sex prejudice. Furthermore, once
the concept of marginal productivity is brought into question
., then even with full employment we cannot rely on the market
to allocate resources to their most highly valued uses. We must not,
therefore, rely on the market to pull the economy in directions which
will be in the long-term interest of the majority of the population.
This applies to both capitalist and labour managed economies.
The consumers in a capitalist economy will, however, be at an
added disadvantage to those in a labour managed economy, even if they
are in employment. We illustrated in Chapter 9, that the system of
private capital ownership, in which profits are earned by capitalists
for indefinite periods, will leave important decisions (such as the
aggregate rate of investment) in the hands of a small number of capitalists.
We would suggest, therefore, that Sirc is wrong to state that
the c~pitalist system serves the general interest. In the same paper
Sirc argues that a labour managed system cannot serve the general interest
because of the nature of the collective ownership of capital. Our
analysis in Chapter 9 would indicate that an L.M.E. would be more
successful than a capitalist economy in serving the general interest.
As we have just noted, however, the market cannot be relied upon to
serve the interests of'the entire community.
The tendency among most writers on labour management is to assume
that as long as the market system is made to work perfectly, then the
L.M.E. will benefit everyone concerned. This premise derives from
the discovery that the general equilibrium solution will be the same
for both economies. Pareto optimality will, therefore, be achieved
by improving the workings of the market. (This position is different
from that of Sirc who believes that an L.M.E. could never achieve Pareto
optimality). The policy prescriptions that inevitably grow out of
this analysis are ones which supposedly improve the workings of the
market.
For different reasons the Yugoslav authorities have tended towards
encouraging the freedom of the market. Although their thinking was
not based on a neoclassical analysis, there tended to be a feeling
that true democracy would only be achieved when all decisions are handed
over to the workers. This mood was also encouraged by the necessity
of satisfying nationalist feelings, which was achieved by drastically
reducing the number of decisions made at the centre. The 1965 reforms
were a result of this thinking.
Whenever enterprises have been given more freedom to follow their
own wishes, the authorities have soon had to move in again to reduce
the growing inequalities. There is, then, implicit recognition that
the market cannot serve the general interest. We believe this to be
true, which inevitably leads to different policy prescriptions than
found in neoclassical studies. We will look at a number of issues
in turn.
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(i) Capital Allocation
There is general agreement among western economists writing on
Yugoslavia that the system of allocating capital is poor. The rate
of interest is so low that the demand for loans well outstrips the
supply. The system of rationing the limited supply of funds is not
apparently based on any systematic method. Loans tend to be available
for those with the right contacts, 'money tends to circulate within
Republics, or even within communes, and is often spent on bolstering
up existing enterprises which are facing bankruptcy.
Authors writing from a neoclassical perspective generally assume
that it would be enough to set the interest rate free to move up to
its true equilibrium, and to ensure the complete mobility of capital,
so that funds find their way into the most lucrative projects. Tyson
writes
"what is needed in the Yugoslav self-management system is a set
of rules that guarantees that alternative uses of capital will
be judged according to a consistent measure of capital scarcity.
A pr-Ivate ownership system with capital allocation through financial
markets in which privately owned firms, individuals, and banks
participate would achieve this objective. So would a system of
"socialist" ownership in which the state charges firms for their
use of capital and allocates the returns to capital among
competing uses." 18
Our analysis in Chapter 9 indicates that the level of investment
chosen by firms in a labour managed or capitalist system may not reflect
the desires of the majority of the population. In a capitalist system
the problem is more severe because only a small number of capitalists
will take this decision. 'In an ideal L.M.E., where there is full
participation by all workers, this decision will at least be based
on the opinions of a broader spectrum of society. It still, however,
excludes all of those who are not in paid employment.
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In Yugoslavia the rate of unemployment is high for structural
reasons. Many others earn low incomes in peasant agriculture. These
groups may justifiably wish for a higher rate of investment and growth
than chosen by those in paid employment. The market will not provide
a mechanism for their wishes to be satisfied. In this situation the
authorities would be justified in stepping in and taxing away a significant
proportion of enterprise net income for re-investment elsewhere. This
conclusion depends, of course, on the assumption that central and local
authorities better represent the wishes of the population than does
the market. An issue which~s undoubtedly open to dispute.
The analysis by Furubotn and Pejovich leads to the inevitable
conclusion that Yugoslav property rights should be modified so that
enterprises are not required to maintain the book value of their assets.
The discussion of umerinvestment :in Chapter 9 indicates that such a move
would be totally unnecessary. Quite the reverse, Yugoslav property
rights might be seen as one scheme for ensuring that those in paid
employment do not squander assets which the unemployed also have rights
in.
(ii) Entry of New Firms
We saw in Chapter 1 that the neoclassical analysis leads to the
conclusion that, in situations where capitalist firms might earn a
profit, then labour managed firms will select capital intensive techniques
and so income differentials will appear. The response to this result
has been to recommend the standard theoretical solution for removing
profits in a capitalist system, i.e. to encourage the entry of new
firms. Vanek concludes at the end of his "General Theory." "One
fundamental conclusion .•.is the paramount importance of free and speedy
entry in the labour-managed economy.,,19
,
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This is also an important policy proposal from the labour school.
They argue that income differentials arise because of both the existence
of monopoly power and upward shifts in demand. Our own analysis would
not disagree with this. Estrin concludes that
"this approach would base the solution on changes in enterprise
numbers, and effective anti-trust legislation. Rather than con-
centrating on prices and incomes policies, which merely worsen
resource misallocation while acting on symptoms rather than causes,
the authorities should undertake an entrepreneurial role in high-
earning efficient and concentrated industries. II 20
The evidence presented in this thesis would suggest that reliance
on the entry of firms as the sole means of overcoming these problems
would not be advisable. It is not easy for new firms to enter existing
markets. Existing firms with substantial reserves can afford to undercut
the new competitor in the short-run and squeeze it out of existence.
Secondly, can we be sure that existing demand will be able to absorb
the increased supply? The end result of new entry might be exit of
the new or old firm. (This would not be true of Yugoslavia where firms
apparently never exit). Lastly, reliance on entry of new firms would
be an extreinely slow and drawn out scheme for reducing inequali ties.
Although we would not deny the contribution which new firms might
make, this should not be relied on as the only policy to overcome inequalities
of income. Estrin shies away from income policies for the standard
neoclassical reason, i.e. there will be a misallocation of resources
if incomes do not equal the value of labourls marginal product. Unfortunately
we believe that resources will never be allocated in the perfect manner
envisaged by neoclassical economists. In reality, production methods
are likely to be fairly inflexible, while the demands of maintaining
a position in the market will prevail over short-run maximising objectives.
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The imposition of an incomes policy is unlikely to make the misallocation
worse. Some form of incomes policy, e.g. taxing away a proportion
of above average income, will probably be the only effective method
of reducing income inequalities.
(iii) Macro Economic Policies
Only two people, Ward and Vanek, have attempted to.censtruct a
macro econemic model frem a base greunded in the theery ef the labeur
21managed firm. Vanek has made two attempts, but we will only censider
his later version, because Vanek believes that both his first attempt
and Ward's werk were inadequate.
In his secend paper Vanek develeps a macro.ecenomic medel fellewing
the standard geometric interpretation ef Keynes's General Theery.
The majer difference that Vanek preposes between a capitalist and labeur
managed ecenomy is in the aggregate production functien. Vanek claims
that in an L.M.E. in the shert-run,
"the levels ef empleyment and eutput can largely be taken as
censtants, fundamentally determined by long-range precesses ef
grewth and not subject to.short-run ferces." 24
Keynesian models assume the epposite, i.e. that natienal output can
be adjusted in the short-run.
Hew dees Vanek justify this cententien? Vanek refers to.standard
shert-run theory ef the L.M.F., i.e. that ceeperatives weuld lay eff
werkers when demand rises. He cemments that
J'over-short perieds, with increasing prices, it weuld be absurd
for the \IIerkingcollective to.fire seme ef its members in erder
to.increase the remaining workers' incomes."
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Vanek's conclusion does not, however, fit the data presented in Chapter
4, which illustrated that the C.P.F. cooperatives tended to expand
the labour force when aggregate demand increased.
The constancy of employment may have some slight plausibility
when considering increases in demand, but certainly not for falling
demand. In this situation Vanek relies on the inflexibility of technology.
If demand falls then neoclassical theory predicts that the L.M.F. will
expand output. Vanek thinks this unlikely because of fixed proportions
in the short run.
We would argue that not only would L.M.F.'s not expand employment
when aggregate demand falls, in fact employment will inevitably fall.
Vanek's position is a consequence of applying micro economic analysis
to macro economic issues. His assumption that employment will be maintained
is derived from the neoclassical position that as long, as prices
adjust sufficiently, the economy will inevitably return to full employment.
All the enterprise must do, therefore, is to lower prices until they
can sell all their output. His analysis leads him to the conclusion
that changes in monetary and budget policy will predominantly work
through into prices.
Vanek's method ignores the possibility that effective demand may
fall to the point where any achievable drop in prices (i.e. not so
large as to reduce workers to the point of starvation) will leave goods
unsold. Second, he ignores the multiplier effect that the fall in
prices; and therefore in workers' incomes, will have on effective demand.
Vanek concludes from his analysis that unemployment will not be
reduced by monetary or budgetary policies, but that on the other hand,
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"the comparative short-run inertia of real product has the great
advantage of virtually eliminating the danger of short-run
recessions of the type we have in Western economies." 25
The discussion in Chapter 10 leads to exactly the opposite conclusion.
We argued that, although the L.M.E. should not inevitably tend to
the deep economic crises suffered by capitalist economies, that it
would certainly suffer from short-run recessions. These recessions
would be a consequence of a slump in effective demand. The remedy
would be an expansion of government expenditure.
It is a peculiarity of Yugoslavia that public expenditure is
divided among so many regional and local bodies that budgetary measures
to regulate demand are virtually impossible to co-ordinate. This
is probably a result of the need to satisfy demand for autonomy among
the various Yugoslav nationalities. It should not be considered as
an inevitable consequence of labour management.
We have earlier argued that the market should not be relied on
to serve the general interest. Nor should. it be looked to to reduce
income inequalities. Now we suggest that the government should maintain
control of a significant proportion of national income in order to
regulate effective demand. These conclusions suggest that an L.M.E.
would benefit from being mixed, with a consideraole part of production
planned from the centre and employing workers at fixed wage rates.
This need not, of course, exclude workers control over other conditions
of work.
Outside of this "public industry" labour-managed enterprises
could be encouraged in sectors which are less prone to concentration
and high profits. Such enterprises could work both in sectors not
served by public firms, and in competition with public industries.
There should, however, exist a tax system designed to syphon off a
proportion of excess profits earned by labour managed firms.
The conclusions contained in this final section are derived from
the analysis presented in Chapters 9 and 10. Like most Western theories
of labour management, this analysis has not been tested empirically.
If the conclusions in this section were to be offered as serious policy
recommendations, then the analysis would first have to be subject
to empirical verification.
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APPENDIX 1
Under·-Investmentin the Labour-Managed Firm
+ ... +
(l+i)N-l + (1+i)N-2 + + (l+i) + 1
= ----------~~--------------------(l+i)N
N-land Z (1+i)N-2 + (1+i)N-3 + .•• + (l+i) + 1~----------------
(l+i)N-l
ZN (l+i)N-l + (1+i)N-2 + + (l+i) + 1 1
= X(l+i)ZN-l (1+i)N-2 + (1+i)N-3 + + (l+i) + 1
N (1+i)N-2 (1+i)N-3 +
1
Z + + 1 + (l+i)
=N-l N-2 (1+i)N-3 +Z (1+i) + + (l+i) + 1
ZN > 1N-lZ
N-l..::::ZN, and similarly ZN-2< N-l and so on.Thus Z ' Z
ZH< ZN as long as H < N.
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(ALI)
(Al. 2)
(Al. 3)
(Al. 4)
(Al. 5)
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APPENDIX 2
Long-Run Adjustments
(1) Comparing the C.F. and L.M.F. capital/labour ratio
When the C.F. is earning zero profits at output price Pxo it has
a capital/labour ratio of (Ko/Lo) and output of Xo. The L.M.F. works
at exactly the same scale and factor proportions. When price increases
by OPx from Pxo to PX1 then we can compare the new capital-labour
ratios chosen by the two enterprises, (K/L)c and (K/L)s respectively
(~)s (~) c
K + OKs K + oKc
= bLs + oLcK + L
= (KL + K <5 Lc + L oKs + Ks bLc KL - L & Kc - K 0 Ls
bLs bKc) 1x (L + oLs) (L + St,c )
(A2.1)
(A2.2)
Unless either of the firms are reduced to a zero labour force,
then the denominator of (A.1) must be positive. To find the sign of
(A.1) it is only necessary, then, to determine the sign"of the numerator.
The numerator! N, may be simplified to,
N = K (oLc - bLs) + L( bKs - SKc) + &Lc( bKs - t,Kc) +
bKc ( cSLc - OLs).
So, using equation (2.18) in Chapter 2, and substituting
in the function g ( bY 1- ) described in (2.20), then
Px
N = K (-g( bY all + L (+g(~YI- ) alk +
Px PIAl Px PIAl
fg( E,Y Ipx ( bLc
alk + bKcCall) )} (A2.3)PTAi PiAl
g(bY' (Lalk - Kall) + g(&Y /_ ) (alk oLc - all bKc)N = (A2.4)
Px Px
PlAT P IAI
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Now we need to determine the sign of (La .- Ka ) and (a. &Lc
lk 11 lk
aIlS Kc) . Without going through all the operations here, it can be
shown that the latter term may be reduced to the negative of 21AI
which must be positive since for a three input function IAI < O.
It is necessary to impose a condition slightly stricter than
a concave production function to determine the sign of (La1k - Ka1l).
We know from (2.19 ) in Chapter 2 that
bK alk (A2.5)SW c =
piAl
bL = all (A2.6)-cOW PTAT
Thus, the change in the capital/labour ratio of the C.F. as a
result of a change in w may be written as
K + 6K K LK + L bK - KL - K 6L
L + 6L L = L (L +OL)
,::::. L OK K 6L
L (L + &L)
= . Lalk - Kall
L(L +&1.)pIAl
(A2.7)
(A2.S)
(A2.9)
Once again L (L + &L) may be taken as positive. Therefore, if the
capitalist firm increases its (K/L) ratio when w increases then
(Lalk - Kall)
pIAl > 0 (A2.10)
-And so, as long as the production function is such that the profit-
maximizing capitalist firm will increase its capital/labour ratio
when .the wage rate increases, all other prices held constant, then
a rise in the price of the product will increase (K/L)s more than
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(K/L)C depending on whether g( bYlp ) is positive or negative.
x
(2) A Decrease in input prices
In Chapter 2 I have suggested that an increase in capitalist
profits resulting from an increase in the product price Px need
not be distinguished from the case where input prices (not including
wages) decrease.
Suppose capitalist profits increase as a result of the drop
in the rental price of capital, Pk, totally differentiating the
first order conditions with respect to Pk,
Fkk Fkm Fkl
K 1 1
Pk P Px x
F F Fml
M
0 0 (A2.11)= ormk mm Pk
Flk Flm Fll
L -KPk 0 PxL
for the C.F. for the L.M.F.
and so,
. bK' - bK = - K alk -(I) ~:cI pbPk S SP c PxL TAl =k k
..£_S - &L -K all ~(I) ~cl---c = = 6w PbPk ,bPk PxL " TAT, , k
(A2.12)
(A2'.13)
(A2.12) and (A2.13) are very similar to (2.18) and' in Chapter 2
except that (-K/L) has replaced (F/L). As with an increase in Px,
(A2.12) and (A2.13) may be re-written as
bKs _bK C - h( bY bK (A2.14)= -cbPk bPk - £,wPk Pk
b Ls &Lc - h ( hYI_ ) ~c (A2.15)--- bPk = bWbPk Pk Pk
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The function h is negative because a decrease in Pk will be equivalent
to an increase in P . Now the functions (A2.14) and (A2.15) may bex
substituted into (A2.1) to give,
) (A2.16)
Now for a decrease in Pk
bKC = -akk and SLc = _akl-- -- --
bPk pIAl &Pk pIAlx x
and so, (alk oLc - all 6Kc) = (-alk ~l + all ~k)
"t (Fkm Fml - F Fkl) (Fmk Flm - Flk Fmm)}mm(Fkk Fmm - Fkm Fmk) (Fmm F11 - F Fml)1m
(A2.17)
(A2.18)
(A2.19)
"{ Fkm Fml Fmk Flm + Fkm Fml Flk Fmm + F Fkl F Flm - Fmm FklFlkFmm}mm mkFkk Fmm F Fll - Fkk Fmm Flm Fml - Fkm Fmk F Fll +FkmFmkFlmFmlmm mm
(A2.20)
The first and last terms of (A2.20) : cancel to leave,
(A2.2 1)
(A2.22)
= F (IAI)mm (A 2.23)
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From the standard theory of the firm it is known that IAI must
be negative definite, and for a three input production function·this
requires that IAI < 0, we also know that F.. < 0,mm and so the sign
of (A.2.2~must be positive.
Returning to (A.2.16) it was shown earlier that (Lalk - Kall)/PxIAI>o
when the production function is such that the C.F. will increase its
(K/L) ratio when w increases. And so we can see that,
N P ~k ~ as -h ( bY (A2.24)
PkThus, as Pk decreases, (i.e. profits increase) then NPk increases,
i.e. (K/Ls)' will increase relative to (K/Lc), which is exactly the
same result as for an increase in P. Exactly the same result may bex
derived for a decrease in P .m
(3) The L.M.F. holds labour constant
It was pointed: out that in some cases the equation (2.21) in Chapter 2
will be able to incorporate the possibility that the L.M.F. decided to hold
L constant, but, given that constraint, will attempt to maximize net income
per worker. However, depending on the values of Fkl and Fml, then Eym in
Diagram 2.1 may lie to right of E , and if the L.M.F. is to keep L fixedo
then it must choose a scale below that which would maximize Y. Whether
the equilibrium output with L constant (Elc) is above or below the output
which maximizes Y, it can be shown that (K/Ls) > (K/Lc) as long as
the L.M.F. aims to maximize the net income of this group of workers.
To make the proof easier, the production function will be
~ reduced to F = F(K,L). For a capitalist firm, totally differentiating
the first order conditions with respect to P gives,
x·
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&K _Fk
Fkk Fkl &F'x P (A2.25)x
bL = _FlFlk Fll bP Px x
bK
CbP x
(-FkF11 + Fl Fk1)
P x (Fkllll- Flk2)
(A2.26)
(-F1Fkk + Fk Flk)
Px (Fkk Fll - Flk2
(A2.27)
For the L.M.F. with fixed L, then only the first order condition
Fk = Pk/Px need be differentiated, to give
bK
bP s =
. x
(A2.28)
> 0 (A2.29)
The difference between the two (K/L) ratios may be written as,
L b K + K &L - L S K + bK bLsec s cK + bK s K + 6K c =
L L + &Lc
L (L + & L )c
(A2.30)
Taking the denominator of (A2.30) as positive, "then the numerator
maybe written as
(A2.31)
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= bL bK +c s (FkFlk(L Flk + K Fkk) - FlFkk(K Fkk + L Fkl)
FkkPx(FkkFll - Flk2) (~2.32)
= 5Lc bKs + (FkFlk - Fl Fkk)(LFlk +KFkk)
PxFkk (FkkFll - Flk2)
= 5L c 5Ks (L Flk + K Fkk)
PxFkk(FkkFll - Flk2) (A2.33)
It was shown in (A.2.29) that bK > 0, so, as long as we assume thats
L is not an inferior factor, i.e. L will be increased by the C.F. when
product price increases, that is bL / 0, then the left-hand term inc
(A.2.33) must be positive.
The term (L Flk + K Fkk) is equivalent to (A2.9) and will be
negative as long as the production function is such that the C.F.
would increase its (K/L) ratio when w increases and other prices
remain constant. Since Fkk < ° and (Fkk
and, if L is not inferior, then 0 L > 0, then the final term of (A2.33)c
must also be positive.
Therefore N / 0, i.e. the (K/L) ratio of the L.M.F. will be
greater than the C.F. (K/L) ratio.
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APPENDIX 3
The Data
1. C.P.F. Cooperatives
The information on the C.P.F. cooperatives was collected
from their annual returns to the Cooperative Union, Holyoake
House, Hanover Street, Manchester. Yearly annual returns
were only available from 1965 onwards. Prior to 1965 the Cooperative
Union had only retained the annual returns for every fifth year. The
returns for intervening years had been deposited in the archives of
Birmingham Public Library. Unfortunately they were not available for
inspection. The missing data was replaced by records from the "Annual
Co-operative Statistics" published by the Cooperative Union. The
information recorded in these statistics was less detailed. For
example, fixed assets, were only recorded at their written down value.
Therefore the value of depreciation could not be distinguished from
the cost of purchase.
Data was also collected from the annual returns made by the
cooperatives to the Registrar of Friendly Societies, 17 North
Audley Street, London. The Registrar holds annual returns for coop~
eratives going back ten years. The last ten years of ~eturns for
cooperatives which have died were also available. This made it possible
to collect detailed information on some cooperatives before 1965.
The Registrar of Friendly Societies also has copies of the cooperatives I
rule,b60ks.
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Forty-four producer cooperatives made returns to the Cooperative
Union in 1950. Twelve of these were not included in the survey, either
because they went into liquidation soon after 1950, or because less
than 50% of the workforce were members of the cooperative in 1950.
The remaining thirty-two cooperatives are described in Table 1.
TABLE I. C.P.F. COOPERATIVES INCLUDED IN THE SURVEY
Number of Size of Workforce in 1950
Cooperatives Industry Smallest Largest Average-
15 Footwear 37 445 124
10 Printing 15 180 64
4 Clothing 90 1273 678
1 Lockmakers - - 466
1 Carriage Builders - - 60
1 Bass Dressers - - 13
Most of the cooperatives included in the survey operated in the
Midlands. The towns in which they were based are listed in Table 2.
Eleven of the cooperatives were located in Northamptonshire (8 of
these were in footwear). Another seven cooperatives were in Leicester-
shire. The other cooperatives (mainly printers) were spread through-
out England, with one printers in Wales.
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TABLE 2 LOCATION OF C.P.F. COOPERATIVES
FOO:;-'jJEAR PRINTING CLOTHING
No. Town No. Town No. Town-
4 lLeicester 1 Bristol 2 Kettering
2 ~Kettering 1 Gloucester 1 Wellingborough
1 Sileby 1 Watford 1 Wigs ton
1 Iesborough 1 Hull
1 Ihgham Ferrers 1 Nottingham OTHERS
1 F.:Jthwell 1 Derby No. Town- --
1 ?:aunds 1 Birmingham 1 Walsall
1 '1t::;11ingborough1 Leicester 1 Leicester
1 li'J 11aston 1 Swansea 1 Not known
1 fhesham 1 Plymouth
1 Stafford
2. The Samp}e of Capitalist Firms
The sample of capitalist firms was selected from the 1950 Stubbs
Directory, which was available in the Mitchell Library, Glasgow. The
Directory listed firms by product, and, within product categories,
by town. Nea~ly all of the sample of cooperatives were located in
the Stubbs Directory. A sample of 8 firms (2 samples of 4) were chosen
chosen
for each coo;erative. Each firm/was included under the same product
heading as the cooperative that it represented. Wherever possible,
the firms'chC'sen also operated in the same town as the cooperative.
In most cases this proved possible, but occasionally firms from towns
nearby had to be included.
342
Unfortunately the Stubbs Directory did not report the size of
firms I workforces. Consequently it was not possible to select firms
of a similar size to the cooper-at.ives, Where firms were known to be
large, or appeared to be so from the style of their entry in the
Directory, they were avoided. The sample of firms was selected at
random from those remaining which satisfied all the conditions of
product, town and size. It was not possible to choose eight bass
dressers because only five were reported in the Directory. All five
were followed up (Three of these have now merged into one firm, and
the other two are no longer trading).
The annual returns of companies which had been wound up more than
five years ago were inspected at the Registrar of Companies, City Road,
London. Live companies, 'and those recently dead, were followed up
at Companies House, Crown Way, Maindy, Cardiff.
It is not possible to compare the size range of the cooperatives
and the sampl~ of capitalist firms in 1950, because private firms were
not required to report the size of their workforce until 1967. Even
after 1967, the number of employees only had to be reported by firms
employing more than 100 persons. Figures on employment among footwear
firms in Leicester and Northamptonshire were provided for some years
by both the Northamptonshire and the Leicester and County Footwear
Manufacturers I Associations.
The size of live footwear firms (for which data is available)
is compared with live footwear cooperatives in 1968 in Table 3.
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TABLE 3. FOOTWEAR COOPERATIVES & FIRMS: WORKFORCE .IN 1968
-
Cooperatives (Total of 4) Capitalist Firms (Total of 15)
r--- .-
Smallest Largest Average Smallest Largest Average
71 197 128 50 590 218
On average the capitalist firms were larger in 1968, and covered a
wider size range. Even so, all of these enterprises would normally
be consider~d "small". The sample of capitalist firms managed to
exclude firms whose size might have made their experience very diff-
erent from that of cooperatives. This appeared to be also true of
firms not producing footwear. Unfortunately, there is insufficient
data on employment to make a comparison of the sort in Table 3 for
other products.
3. The I.C.C. Sample
It was felt necessary to increase the sample of capitalist firms
in later years. New samples of clothing and f'ootwear firms were
therefore selected from Inter-Companies-Comparisons Business Ratio
Reports on Footwear and Clothing M:mufacturers. These had the added
advantage of usually including information on the number employed.
Unfortunately the I.C.C. Re~orts on Printers had not been published
long enough to be of use. Old copies of the Business Ratio Reports
were inspected at the I.C.C. Offices, 28-42 Banner Street, London,
ECl.
The I.C.C. Business Ratio Reports provide information on the
largest companies in an industry. The method of selecting the-sample
was, therefore, simply to select the smallest firms included in the
report (as measured by workforce size). Fourteen footwear firms were
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chosen and fifteen clothing firms. They are compared with the coopera-
tives and the original sample of capitalist firms in Tables 4 and
5. Figures for employment were not available for all firms in every
year.
TABLE 4 WORKFORCE IN 1978: FOOTWEAR
r----
Number Smallest Largest Average
Cooperatives 4 66 210 119
Original Sample C.F. 15 40 533 224
I.C.C. Firms 12 172 419 276
TABLE 5 WORKFORCE IN 1978: CLOTHING
- -
Number Smallest Largest Average
Cooperatives 2 89 640 315
Original Sample C.F.* - - - -
"
I.C.C. Firms 14 162 1065 361
'--
*Size of Workforce not reported in annual returns, except for two,
employing 331 and 308 in 1978. The other firms presumably employed
less than 100 workers.
The sample of I.C.C. firms tended to be larger than the cooperatives
in 1978, although not dramatically so. The I.C.C. firms were geo-
graphically more spread out than the cooperatives, especially those
in clothing. The majority of British footwear manufacturers are based
in the Midlands, so that geographical differences should be less
important for this sample.
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4. Ownership of firms
The Ultimate Holding Companies of firms are reported in their
annual returns to Companies House. The nature of parent companies
was ascertained from various trade directories. Fellow subsidaries
were located in "Who Owns Whom".
The parent companies of the I.C.C. sample were usually reported
in the I.C.C. Reports, but this was cross-checked with "Who Owns Whom".
Subsidaries of the sample of capitalist firms were often reported
in the company's annual return to the Registrar of Companies. The
nature of the subsidary companies was discovered by referring to trade
directories. Unreported subsidaries were sometimes traced in "Who
Owns Whom". Unfortunately, this publication does not achieve compre-
hensive coverage of smaller firms. Some subsidaries of the sample
of capitalist firms may, therefore, have been missed.
5. Labour
In all cases the size of the workforce was simply measured as
number of persons employed. It was not possible to break this figure
down into full-time and part-time work, or by sex, because this
information was not reported in the annual returns of either cooperatives
or capitalist firms. Both variables would be very important in the
determination of the average wage rate paid by the enterprise. The
absence of this information was, therefore, a serious short-coming
of the data.
Industry wage averages were derived in the same way, i.e. by
dividing the total wage bill reported in the Census of Production,
by the total workforce.
6. Capital
There is no satisfactory way to measure the neoclassical concept
of capital. Several alternatives were tried, i.e. plant and machinery,
with and without land and buildings, before and after devaluation.
Where assets were revalued, earlier figures were adjusted to their
equivalent value following revaluation. The method of adjustment
used was imperfect. All values prior to revaluation were adjusted
by the amount that values changed in the year of revaluation. This
did not allow for the fact that the value of assets (and therefore
the amount by which they should be revalued) changed from year to
year. Fortunately, revaluations did not occur often in the data,
and usually only applied to land and buildings.
